

IRAN

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PREFACE

IF OUR Western civilization is destined to peter out into flat egalitarianism, intellectual no less than social and economic—as many expect—the entire world will have to share this fate. We shall then become the grave diggers of foreign civilizations (as of our own), and the interest we shall continue to take in them will be historical, or, to choose a more expressive term, archaeological.

There can be no doubt that such an outlook springs from a fatal misunderstanding of the democratic ideal. True democracy strives for the creation of conditions which guarantee the unfolding of individual and national personalities—an evolution which finds its limits only where self-realization endangers that of other individuals or members of the community of nations. Once this is agreed, it becomes a noble and urgent task to understand and to appreciate foreign nations in order to establish sound and lasting relations for mutual benefit.

American interest in Iran, apart from regular trade relations, has in the past almost entirely been limited to cultural activities. The Presbyterians had missionary schools (now taken over by the Persian government) and they still conduct a missionary hospital. The work of American archaeologists and anthropologists and of the American Institute for Iranian Art and Archaeology has made all-important contributions to our knowledge of Iran. Three times, in 1911, 1922, and 1944, America sent financial advisers to Iran.

The share the United States will assume in Middle Eastern affairs will exceed by far that of prewar times. To predict the result of this evolution is beyond the scope of this book. The interests of the Arabian American Oil Company in Saudi Arabia alone involve problems of local, regional, and international character. In the region of which Iran is the center the American interests meet

those of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and those of the Russians, who are showing an increasing interest in oil and other concessions in Iran. In this momentous concurrence the oil is, of course, but the expression and symbol of the fundamental problem of the symbiosis of the three great powers on the globe. Whether or not peaceful symbiosis and co-operation will triumph over blind avarice and destructive competition in the years ahead may be determined in the Middle East. The fate not only of Iran but also of the world will depend on this issue. The United States, as a mediator between Great Britain and Russia or to counterbalance another power, will in all probability be called upon to speak the decisive word.

With the second World War the entire Asiatic continent has entered our orbit, to remain there and to overshadow Europe in importance. Iran has attracted the attention of the world because of its transformation under a powerful ruler who made her a modern country within less than two decades and because of the role she was called upon to play in this war. However, the Persia of Herodotus is generally better known than that of the Islamic period and of our days.

Iran looks back on a recorded past of two and one-half millenniums. In order to understand a people with such a long life-span and with a fate and civilization transcending in importance its national borders one needs a comprehensive interpretation of its history to explain the unity of its national ego, which would otherwise seem fragmentary. Facts are mute; it is their meaning that gives them life. It is therefore the design of these pages to present the Iran of today and her problems against the background of her interpreted past.

The last fifty years have weighed heavily on Iran. Having been used as a tool in the hands of the great powers, the country was thrust into modernization, only to see its remarkable progress slowed down by the wartime occupation of its territory. However, the nation's will to live is unbroken. What she has created in bygone times and what she has achieved in the immediate past justify her hope for a bright future.

Perfection we may hope to find in individuals. Among the na-

tions of the world perfection is unknown. The author, during his activity as adviser to the Ministry of Education in Teheran, has conceived a sincere sympathy and friendship for the Persian people. He would betray these feelings were he to suppress criticism where it seems justified, and he feels that he would render a bad service to a country he has learned to appreciate if he did not intimate controversial issues in order to stimulate reflection and discussion. That this unbiased presentation of Iran to the American people may contribute to the growing interest in Iran and to a friendly and helpful co-operation with the Persian people, who are struggling for a better future, is the confident wish of the author.

The official name "Iran" is slowly replacing in the Western countries the time-honored "Persia." However, it is still foreign to our ears to speak of "Iranians" instead of "Persians" and to use the adjective "Iranian" in combinations such as Iranian art, Iranian politics, and Iranian culture. For this reason it has been thought advisable to adopt "Iran" for the country, but to retain "Persian" as an adjective.

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WILLIAM S. HAAS

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THE FATE OF A NATION

THERE ARE countries, such as Egypt, whose recorded history dates farther back than that of Iran. There are others, China and Japan, whose existence as nations was never interrupted, whereas Iran suffered on her way all the vicissitudes to which a nation may be exposed. However, none but Italy can pretend to have been so deeply interlaced with the fate of humanity as Iran. True, the influence of Greece on world civilization is unrivaled, but after the first few centuries A.D. she disappeared from the scene of the world theater. On the contrary, Italy and Iran never ceased to be *dramatis personae*, important participants of the world drama whatever their role, actor or spectator, agent or victim.

A cursory look at the map shows the unique geographical situation of the Near and Middle East, which confers upon this region a historical importance not equaled by any other part of the globe. The protruding offshoot of the Asiatic Continent, which constitutes the Near and Middle East, is a great land bridge connecting the bulk of Asia with Europe and Africa. One section leads from the Anatolian and Iranian plateaus (more specifically from what is today near northeastern Turkey and northwestern Iran) through the Caucasus Mountains into the plains of southern Russia, the other section via the Isthmus of Suez into Egypt. But the waters washing the shores of the Near and Middle East provide an invitation to seafaring. The islands scattered across the Aegean Sea off the Anatolian West Coast are so many intermediate stations between Asia and Greece. The narrow straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles are but interruptions between the opposite continents, and as channels between the Aegean and the shores of the Black Sea they have contributed from ancient times to the *rapprochement* between Asia and Europe. On the southern side the Red Sea

is an inlet establishing easy contact between Arabia and the coast of Egypt.

In the area of the Near and Middle East, Iran occupies a distinguished place. It forms the bridgehead on the way to Central Asia, it bars the way to India, and seen from India it appears as a kind of glacis; in the south it dominates the waters of the Persian Gulf, which is itself an arm of the Indian Ocean. The mountain ranges constituting Iran's western and northwestern borders merge into those of Anatolia, Armenia, and the Caucasus, while the lowlands of the southwest, interrupted only by the Shatt al Arab, form a continuum with southern Mesopotamia and so lead into Arabia proper. Iran has suffered and benefited from this privileged position. The great Achaemenian kings made Iran the center of a world-wide empire by pushing her borders across the Mediterranean in the west and deep into Central Asia even as far as the Indus River. But Alexander and the Arabs invaded Iran from the west, northwest, and southwest, and through the northeastern gate came the Seljuq Turks and the Mongol conquerors. In modern times the British look at Iran as the bulwark protecting India, the Russians as a much-coveted outlet to the warm seas, and it is mainly for these reasons that Iran became in the nineteenth century one of the focal points of international interest.

Where the conquerors marched, the merchant and the pilgrim had traveled before; trade roads are invasion roads, and vice versa. Iran has been an intersection of trade roads since the dawn of history and even earlier. The important road that linked China with the West, one, if not the first, of the silk roads, entered Iran from Bactria, passed ancient Ecbatana, now Hamadan, and crossing the Zagros chain descended into Mesopotamia. Another road connected the northern part of the country with the south, what is now Kurdistan and Fars, skirting the Zagros Mountains.

This geographical situation as a bridge and a highway makes it almost impossible to determine to which ethnological group the original inhabitants of the Iranian plateau belonged. There can be no doubt that migrations, invasions, and the mixing of races occurred continually in prehistoric times, as they did during the

course of the history of Iran. So the population of early Iran was certainly a blend of various elements. What these elements were cannot even be the subject of conjecture, at least so far as the larger part of the Iranian plateau is concerned. Only with regard to the western and particularly the southwestern parts of the country has the veil been somewhat lifted by the common effort of archaeologists and linguists. Here, on the plains of the southwest that spread out from the mountain chains—a region which coincides partly with the Biblical Elam—the anthropological and cultural history of Iran can be traced as far back as the middle of the third millennium B.C. While it has been established that the bulk of the Elamite language belongs to the Eurasian language group, the ethnic character of the people who spoke it is still undetermined. It is not without interest that the indication given in the Old Testament, which contains so much relevant information, confirmed in many cases by modern scientific research, is not given credit with regard to the Elamites. The genealogical registers of Genesis, Chapter 10, and of First Chronicles, Chapter 1, classify Elam with Assur, Arphaxad, Lud, Aram, Uz, Hul, Gether, and Meshach as sons of Shem. But scholars seem to agree that the author of the genealogical tree was deceived by the aspect of the Elamite civilization which was decidedly influenced by Semitic Babylonia. However, this purely negative statement is the only one to meet with general consent.

The archives of the royal courts of Babylonia and Assur, royal letters, and the inscriptions reveal a gruesome picture of the area of which Elam was a part. From its entry into history about 2500 B.C. until about 2,000 years later, when it was embodied in the Persian Empire, the plain of Mesopotamia, from the estuaries of the Euphrates and the Tigris up to the mountains of Anatolia in the north, and the entire country which comprises the Zagros chain, with its lowlands near the Persian Gulf and Kurdistan, as well as the western part of the Iranian plateau, was a great battlefield. There the city-states and the rising great powers of Babylonia and Assyria were almost continually waging war against one another, just as the mountain tribes did when they did not prefer to descend

into the fertile plains or when the rulers of the civilized territories did not penetrate into the mountainous regions to retaliate and to subjugate their dangerous neighbors. It happened that both plains dwellers and mountain peoples had to face the onslaught of nomadic invaders, such as the Gutis, the Scythians, and the Medes and the Persians themselves, who came through the Caucasus from the steppes of southern Russia or from Central Asia, sweeping across the Iranian plateau. This is a history which teaches the sad truth that war is the father of all things, and particularly its own father. In their records the kings glory in enumerating the fortified towns they conquered and laid in ruins, the countries they devastated, looting the royal treasures and killing the inhabitants or driving enslaved men, women, and children with their flocks into captivity. There is no reason to be particularly horrified by this picture. For one may question whether the European Continent when viewed from the perspective of the year 5000 or 6000 will be presented in a very different light. It is true that in European history the periods of peace were filled with civilizing achievements and that humanity progressed despite destruction. But it should not be forgotten under what an obligation we are to Assyria and Babylonia, to speak only of the most important countries. In astronomy and mathematics we still depend upon our heritage from them; the legislative work of Hammurabi meant a decisive step in the evolution of society, the epos of Gilgamesh, even the fragments we possess, must be classified among the most profound creations of human thought, and in arts and crafts peaks of perfection were reached by the peoples of this region. Elam, while at several periods it secured political independence, underwent the decisive influence of the Assyro-Babylonian civilization.

Whatever was the racial character of the Elamites and though their civilization was borrowed from Mesopotamia, it is their country which became the birthplace of Iran as a political power. But before this happened, in the seventh century B.C., there became prominent another people, the Kassites, more closely related to the Iranians, if not of the same stock. They played a noteworthy part in the history of the area in which we are interested and were prob-

ably the ancestors of the modern Lurs, who, like the latter, occupied the central part of the Zagros Mountains. They are supposed to have arrived about 2000 B.C. from the plains north or northeast of the Caspian. Probably they originated as a nomadic people from the steppes, since it is an uncontested fact that they brought with them the horse and introduced its breeding and its use into Iran and Mesopotamia. While the language spoken by the Kassites belongs to the Caucasian family, it is equally likely that they stemmed racially from the Indo-European group, of which the Iranians are so important a branch. About the middle of the eighteenth century the Kassites succeeded in seizing Babylonia, and for more than six hundred years a Kassite dynasty ruled the land. While their contributions to the superior civilization whose orbit they entered were the horse and horse breeding, this contact produced a strange and unexpected result in the Kassite homeland. As an outcome of Babylonian art and the continuing relations with the peoples of the northern steppes and their crafts there developed a magnificent and original bronze art—known as the Luristan bronzes—weapons, trinkets, mirrors, horsebits, particularly representations of animals, in which stylization and naturalism merge into an art of rare perfection.

The Kassites themselves were only one group of the Indo-Europeans who in consecutive waves invaded the Iranian plateau. About the middle of the second millennium this stream may have reached its highest tide, when it branched into two currents. One crossed the mountain barriers into India and became the country's ruling class, the main part of the other branch settled on the plateau south and west of the Caspian and called the land "Iran," the land of the nobles. The country west of Lake Urmia, in the northwestern corner of today's Iran, became known as Parsua, from which was derived later the name "Persians" for the inhabitants themselves. Southeast of Parsua extended the land of the Medes, another Indo-European group. These tribes—for that is what they were until long after they had occupied their new homeland—definitely entered the scene of world history when they became the object of Assyrian policy. Shalmaneser III (860-825 B.C.) penetrated their

country and brought them to submission, but the fact that his successors had to make repeated expeditions, either to consolidate the conquest or to enforce the paying of tributes, proves sufficiently what stuff these people were made of. It seems that the armies of Tiglath-pileser III (746-728 B.C.) advanced as far as the region dominated by the peak of Mt. Demavend, that is, where the capital of Teheran is situated today. Reliefs from the Palace of Sargon (722-705 B.C.) show the Medes, the people of Parsumash, and others presenting their tributes to the king, but several campaigns were needed to maintain and to stabilize the Assyrian overlordship. His successors, Sennacherib and Esarhaddon, follow in his footsteps. But the exploits of Assurbanipal (668-626 B.C.), the last great ruler of Assyria, have as their objectives no longer the regions of the north, they are concerned with Elam. For the great Persian Empire of the Achaemenians sprang into existence in the land of Elam as the creation of a clan that came from the land of Parsua in the north.

Elam had its efflorescence about the middle of the twelfth century. At that time the Elamite kingdom extended far beyond its former borders and embraced cities and tribes of the surrounding regions. In Susa temples and palaces of great size and beauty originated, as the excavations demonstrate. Within a short time the rise of the Elamite power was followed by utter destruction. King Nebuchadnezzar I of Babylonia (1146-1123 B.C.) conquered and sacked the country, and for some centuries nothing more is heard of Elam. It emerges, at least as far as we know, about the middle of the eighth century as an independent power, to fall some hundred and ten years later under the hands of Assurbanipal. Susa was looted again, men and women were carried off, and the land was reduced to desert.

It is the Median kingdom which had the historical function of becoming the link between Elam in the south and the founder of the Persian Empire, who himself came from the north. Herodotus's colorful story of the origin of the Median Empire is now recognized as legendary. But the fact remains that about 700 B.C. the whole of Media was united into one realm. Kshathrita, the succes-

sor of the founder of the United Media, was followed by his son, Cyaxares, who succeeded after a hard struggle in putting an end to the unrest caused by the invasions of the Scythians, the nomads of the northern steppes. This must have been toward the end of the seventh century, about 625 B.C. His alliance with Nabopolassar, the Assyrian governor of Babylonia, in the latter's revolt against his overlord proved successful. They captured and razed Nineveh, the Assyrian capital. The joint victory yielded to Nabopolassar the crown of Assyria and Babylonia, to Cyaxares a considerable extension of his empire, which seems to have included a land as far south as Parsa, part of the modern province of Fars. To conquer Parsa, Cyaxares had to march through the land Parsumash, and it follows, therefore, that the ruler of Parsumash must have become his vassal. The king of Parsumash, Cambyses I (*circa* 600–559 B.C.), was a Persian. When the clansmen of Cambyses left their homeland Parsua in the north is not known. They called themselves after a legendary ancestor, Hakhamanesh, in Greek, Achaemenis, and the dynasty they founded in the land Parsumash, northwest of Parsua, is henceforth known as the Achaemenians. The first historically established ruler is Teispes (*circa* 675–640 B.C.), whose son is Cyrus I (*circa* 640–600 B.C.). His successor, the above-mentioned Cambyses I, was entrusted by Cyaxares with the administration of the newly conquered country of Parsa, so that he now ruled over Parsumash and Parsa, under the suzerainty of the Median king. With the royal house of Media he became related by marrying the daughter of the Median king, Astyages, and the scion of this union is the founder of the Persian Empire, Cyrus II, the Great. He ascended the throne in 558 B.C. His first military action, and a significative one, was to throw off the Median overlordship. The Median capital, Ecbatana, the Hamadan of today, fell to him in 550 B.C. The defeat of Croesus, the Lydian king, in 546 B.C., made him the immediate neighbor of the Greek colonies in Ionia. Their refusal to come to terms with him caused their enforced incorporation into the Persian Empire, which thereby became a Mediterranean power. His campaigns in the northeast and the east led him as far as what is now Russian Turkestan and brought him to

the borders of India. It was in one of these campaigns that Cyrus was killed, in 528 B.C.

Under Cambyses II (died 521 B.C.), who conquered Egypt, and Darius I, who pushed the frontier as far as the Danube, subdued Thrace and Macedonia, and in the east annexed parts of the Indian Panjab, the empire reached the peak of its power. It surpassed in size the empire which the Romans built up later. Unlike the Roman Empire, which consisted to a large extent of coastal regions, that of the Persians was a compact mass of land, a real continental realm. All in all, the two empires differed widely in structure and administration. The Roman Empire had the character of a colonial empire, with important Roman settlements everywhere. Because of the steadily increasing grant to foreign nations of Roman citizenship, the idea and the tendency were to merge the civilized world into one great empire of Roman citizens. The conditions for such a policy were, of course, lacking under an oriental despotism, even one of the most enlightened. While the Roman administration was based on an elaborate law code and on a trained bureaucracy, that of the Achaemenian Empire depended on royal decrees and orders and on the arbitrary will of the satraps, the governors or viceroys of the provinces. Such it remained until the great reform in our time. To control the highest officials, less perhaps their administrative activities, of which the collection of taxes was the foremost, than their loyalty, an ingenious system of tripartition of power had been invented. Beside the governor and attached to him were the secretary and the commander of the troops, both independent to the extent of reporting separately and directly to the court and in this way surveying each other. There were also special royal legates traveling through the provinces, as did the *missi* of the German emperors in the early Middle Ages. To the conditions prevailing then and there those in Achaemenian Iran have another important resemblance in sharp contrast to Rome. The Roman Empire was essentially a city civilization, and only there a system of written law and a bureaucracy could originate. In the early Middle Ages in northern Europe, as in the homeland of Achaemenian Iran, cities were unknown. Agglomerations of peasants dotted the

country, the most densely populated regions were those around the palaces and castles of the king and the governors, just as in northern Europe cities in the proper and modern sense of the word developed only later around the imperial castles. It must not be imagined that even the magnificent palatial constructions of Persepolis and Pasargadae were the centers of great cities. They were surrounded by the dwellings of a peasant population and the tents of nomads.

✓ On the other hand, the Achaemenian Empire is related to the Roman Empire by a fact of momentous importance. To the rulers of the ancient Near East warfare and conquest meant killing, enslaving, looting, and a scorched-earth policy to the point of carrying the gods of the subdued towns and peoples in triumph to the capital so as to make of them, too, servants of the gods of the victors. Cyrus and his successors conceived another idea with regard to their domination on earth. Even if their personal motives were lust of conquest and power, they believed that the Supreme God had entrusted them with the task of uniting the people of the earth in one kingdom of justice and peace. This mission is expressed at length by Darius in the inscription found at the Palace of Pasargadae. "A great God is Ahuramazda, who created the earth, who created heaven, who created man, who created abundance for men, who invested Darius with divine wisdom and virtue." And elsewhere: "Who made Darius king, one over many" and "While the former kings were, there has not been achieved by all of them what has been achieved in one and the same year by me according to the will of Ahuramazda. I walked the path of right and equity." It is the same idea of a universal civilizing mission that Vergil confers upon the Romans in the immortal verses of the *Aeneid* (vi. 852 ff.):

Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.
Haec tibi sunt artes: pacis imponere mores,
Parcere subjectis and debellare superbos.

Remember thou, O Roman, that thy task is to rule
in one empire the people of the earth!
These are thine arts: to impose the morale of peace,

To spare those who surrender and to fight to
the bitter end the supercilious.

It seems, indeed, that the Persian kings treated the subject peoples with fairness and indulgence, neither interfering with their living conditions nor depriving them of their religions. If the kings publicly paid reverence to and worshiped the high gods of the great nations they had subdued, as did Cambyses to Ammon after the conquest of Egypt, this act of political wisdom was destined to conciliate the people and to win over the priesthood, but it must not be considered religious indifference or eclecticism. They themselves stood firm in their own faith and cult, so much so that they considered their creed the monopoly of the chosen people and above all of the king himself—an aristocratic conviction which precludes any kind of proselytism. It is, therefore, consistent that after the conquest of Babylon, in 538 B.C., Cyrus restored to their legitimate owners and worshipers the statues and images of all the deities the Babylonian kings had taken from the subdued peoples and brought to their capital. Likewise, he allowed the Jews who had been exiled to Babylonia by King Nebuchadnezzar after the conquest of Jerusalem in 597 B.C. to return to their country, to rebuild their temple, and to take with them all the precious ritual vessels which had been deposited in the royal treasure house.

Another fact deserves emphasis. The Achaemenian kings were apparently not considered and worshiped as gods, unlike the later Roman emperors, who throughout the empire had temples built to house their images.* It is true that the Achaemenian kings were surrounded by a ceremonial and a reverence not unlike that paid to a god. This, however, in no way implies that they themselves were considered and felt to be divine beings, though it could easily be so interpreted by outsiders, such as the Greeks. Nowhere among

* As to the deification of kings, the Occident can hardly find fault with the Orient. Even before the dedication of a cult to the Roman emperors Caesar enjoyed all the prerogatives of a god. He himself used to emphasize from his youth the divine origin of his house. Upon the senate's decision his statue as *deus invictus* was placed in the temple of Quirinus. As Jupiter Julius he was received among the national gods, and his house was furnished with a gable, such as the gables constructed on temples, to indicate that it was the dwelling of a god. See Eduard Meyer, *Caesar's Monarchie und das Principat des Pompejus*, 2d ed., Berlin, 1918, pp. 501 ff.

their manifold titles in the inscriptions do they glory in their divine nature, they only assert that they have been invested by Ahuramazda with the supreme power to achieve the rule of the gods on earth. The divine mission of the king distinguishes the Achaemenian Empire from the Roman, which was based on the secular idea of uniting the world into one order—that of the Roman Law. This idea of a world-embracing moral conception as the legitimization of Achaemenian kingship would be of particular interest and importance if the idea of a universal monarchy, so deeply rooted in medieval European thought, had for its ancestor and prototype the Achaemenian Empire. While it would be difficult to prove this theory, professed by some scholars, since we cannot follow the way in which the idea of the universal monarchy traveled from Iran to Christian Europe, it cannot be easily dismissed as mere imagination. In any case, the affinity between the two conceptions is startling enough to deserve some explanation. It might be found in Iranian religion. The death of Zarathustra, the creator of one of the world's great religions, who lived between 660 B.C. and 580 B.C., must have occurred about the time of the birth of Cyrus II. It is certainly unique in history that within the same nation—almost in the same period—two great men arose, one a great religious figure, the other a political and military genius, and that their creations became so blended that the spiritual idea infused a soul into the body of the earthly realm, while the body gave shape and appearance to the idea. Yet this is what happened in the sixth century in Iran. Zarathustra taught that Ahuramazda, the spirit of good, in his fight against Ahriman, the spirit of evil, summons men to assist him in the battle which is the drama of the world and to accomplish by their decision the clear distinction between the hosts of light and the armies of darkness. In this struggle, which is not only a moral fight in man's own heart but also a very real war against everything evil—for the duality runs through the whole universe, angels, men, animals, plants and inanimate things—men need a leader, the representative of Ahuramazda on earth. This leader is the king of Iran, who says of himself (it is Darius who speaks): "By the will of Ahuramazda I am of this kind: I love

justice, I hate iniquity. It is not my pleasure that the lower suffer injustice because of the higher." This is his truly princely dignity. The universal monarchy, the mystic hope of Dante, felt and aspired to by a few of the German emperors was for some centuries the dream of the Christian West, but its realization was doomed from the beginning by the antagonism between the secular power of the emperor and the spiritual power of the pope. However, Iran and the Europe of the early Middle Ages share the same universal idea of a deep union between the political and the transcendental powers—a momentous fact quite apart from the question whether or not the conception of the universal monarchy came to Europe as the legacy of Iran.

What is left of the Achaemenian art treasures, the ruins of the royal residences, with their reliefs and enameled brickwork, and the rock tombs of the kings, are the magnificent symbols of a world empire built within an incredibly short time by a vigorous young nation. Inevitably the art of the older civilizations now part of the Persian Empire was bound to exert its influence. The Achaemenian rulers themselves were clear-sighted and open-minded enough to recognize the superiority of the foreign architects and artisans and to make the widest use of their skill. Assyrians and Babylonians, Egyptians and Greeks, worked at the construction of the royal palaces in Persepolis, Pasargadae, and Susa, and we even know some of the Greek architects by name. This was but a result of the general policy of the Achaemenian kings, who attached Greek physicians to their court and granted honorable reception to distinguished Greeks, who, like Themistocles, Histiaeus, and others, were exiled by their compatriots and knew no better and safer place to take refuge than with the enemy of their country—clearly a proof of esteem and respect which could not be surpassed.

It is true that the idea of constructing the palaces on terraces stemmed from Assur and Babylon, it is highly probable that the colossal stone columns and the huge proportions of the throne halls were inspired by Egyptian models, and it may well be that the Greek sense of harmony is responsible for the layout and for

much of the minor work. But Persepolis—to mention the greatest palace, the only one of which a large number of columns and fundamentals are preserved—is neither Assyrian nor Egyptian nor Greek, nor is it just a mixture of all of them. The foreign architects and artists did not simply copy and repeat on Persian soil what they had seen and done in their home countries. Whether it was the Persian atmosphere or the expressed ideas and wishes of the kings or the collaboration with Persian artists which influenced their work, it is certain that Persepolis is a gigantic creation of an original and homogeneous character. The same is true with regard to the reliefs adorning the columns, the staircases, and the halls. The reliefs showing the tribute bearers of the subjugated peoples reflect their models in Assur and Babylon, but the men are more alive, and the animals they lead—camels, horses, rams—are all individualized masterpieces. So, too, the lions, the winged horses, and the bulls combine to perfection the hieratic style and the dynamic expression of accumulated and restrained force. In every respect there is a decidedly new spirit merging foreign elements and influences into an original creation worthy of the epoch to which it gives expression.

The repulse by the Greeks of the Persians under Xerxes belongs more to European history than to Persian; for, although defeat did not affect the Achaemenian Empire, victory meant to Greece independence and autonomous evolution. Many and various reasons have been given for the Greek triumph over the overwhelming Persian land and sea forces. They still cannot fully explain the events, and the Greek victory remains a miracle, as does the phenomenon of Greek civilization itself. There is another point which needs elucidation. In our textbooks, and not only there, it is written that at Plataea and Salamis, Greece and Europe escaped the fate of orientalization. Indeed, if we recall what Greece at that time had already created in exemplary political institutions, in philosophical thought, in political and dramatic art, in sculpture and architecture, where she had almost reached the zenith, it is impossible to imagine what the obliteration of all those achievements and of those then unborn, would have meant. However, contrary to what

we are told, there was no such danger. It is not even necessary to mention the political situation, decisive as it was. For, even had the Persians occupied Greece, such a faraway outpost of the empire could not have been held for any length of time and would have broken away from the central power, as did other peripheral parts of the realm under the successors of Xerxes. But the main argument is not political. For two reasons a military occupation of Greece and her incorporation into the Persian Empire would never have administered the death blow to the Greek civilization. The Persian civilization, despite its high achievements, had not the exuberance and dynamic power of the Greek and was incapable of superseding it; it was in no respect qualified to subdue it, much less so than it had been to subdue Greece by force of arms. To doubt that the Greek genius would have triumphed over competitors far more dangerous than the Persians is to underrate grotesquely its inherent power, or, to use an Aristotelian term particularly appropriate in this case, its *entelecheia*. However, the whole argument suffers from a wrong estimation of the attitude of the great Achaemenian kings with regard to civilization in general and that of conquered people in particular. As they did not impose upon outsiders their own creed, so they refrained from interfering with their civilization. They were, on the contrary, ready to accept cultural values wherever they were found. Greek physicians and architects met at their courts, to say nothing of the generous reception that Greek exiles and refugees found in their country. This attitude is in harmony with and a direct outcome of their Zoroastrian creed, which imposed upon them the duty of uniting the good forces in the name of the Supreme God. It is in this sense that historical justice requires us to revise the common verdict regarding the momentous clash between the Persians and the Greeks in the first half of the fifth century. While the view adopted here does not diminish the importance or the glory of the Greek victory, it restores to the Persians the credit they have a right to claim. The Greeks themselves never failed to recognize the high qualities of the Persians and to appreciate their civilization, as is amply testified by the Greek historians. In the evidence which could be

quoted, the following story is of particular interest because it refers to the period we are interpreting. True or not, it demonstrates the attitude of the Greeks toward Persia. It is related that on his march against Greece, Xerxes was hospitably entertained in Abdera on the Thracian coast by Damasippos, the father of Democritos, who, with Leucippos, became later the inventor of the atomistic theory. The story goes on to say that in recognition of his hospitality Xerxes left with Damasippos some Magi (Persian priests) and Chaldeans to instruct Democritos in theology and astrology. The following words by Democritos himself give credit to the Greek mind and also show his appreciation of Iran. He declared that he would prefer to be able to explain one natural phenomenon according to the law of cause and effect than to win sovereignty over the whole Persian Empire—thus acknowledging that on earth the Persian throne was the most enviable honor.

It may not be a mere coincidence that the descent of the Achaemenian Empire from its political and moral peak accompanied its abandonment of the pure Zoroastrian creed. Under the later Achaemenians the pre-Zoroastrian deities such as Mithra and Anahita returned, and they competed with Ahuramazda in rank and worship. However, the empire which Alexander overran was by no means in a weak and decadent state. If it had been, he could not have been so deeply impressed by its material civilization, its institutions, and its religion as to espouse Persian ways and the Persian outlook on life. The fact that his two legitimate wives were Iranians—one a daughter of Darius, the other a daughter of a Bactrian ruler—is sufficient proof that he considered the Persians the equals of the Greeks. The name and fame of Alexander spread beyond his empire in space and in time. Himself a romantic and almost incredible figure, he was for centuries romanticized in epopees in the East and the West, but it was the East, and particularly Iran, that encompassed him with a fabulous halo.* Alexander left more than a name and an empire. The name lived on; the empire broke

* The Persians made of Alexander a national hero. Ferdausi considers him the grandson of Darius I, since Philip was supposed to have married a daughter of Darius. Therefore Alexander, in his campaign against his half-brother Darius, only asserts his right to the throne of Iran.

asunder with his last breath. Yet there remained the realization of his own dream, the interpenetration of Western and Eastern civilization and the origin of a world civilization born of their union. The Hellenistic period, the most fascinating phenomenon in the history of civilization, could be equaled in its far-reaching effects on the future only by another creative interpenetration of the West and the East. If this should be achieved, the West would certainly again be the determining force, at least at the outset. Such was its role in the Hellenistic civilization. In and around the Greek towns which sprang up in Alexander's time in Egypt and as far east as Central Asia and India, Greek material and intellectual life flourished. The Greek way of thinking, more important than the contents which were imparted, penetrated by means of Greek philosophy and science into the East, there to espouse Oriental ideas and to stir new creations. If the West was the aggressor in the field of the mind, as it had been on the battleground, the defense of the East was vigorous and successful and was soon turned into offensive action. Iran's momentous contribution to the Hellenistic civilization—besides enriching of arts and crafts—was in the realms of mind and spirit, religion, and speculative philosophy, where profound thought and feeling were disguised in myths and symbols. Satan as the principle of evil and the hosts of angels and demons have come from Iran into post-exilic Judaism and into Christianity. Gnosticism and Manichaeism, whose influence on the intellectual and spiritual history of Europe reveals itself with increasing clarity bear the mark of Iran.

The lion's share of Alexander's empire fell to Seleucos, who succeeded in wresting from the competing successors a realm comprising the greater part of the Asiatic domain of the empire, with Iran as the center. It was in the first half of the third century B.C. that the northeastern provinces broke away from the Seleucid kingdom. Among them was Parthia, which occupied the major part of the modern province of Khorasan, but extended, perhaps, farther to the north and the northeast. The Parthians, of unknown racial descent, at the time of their rise to power were probably composed of Turanian and Indo-Iranian elements. They won their inde-

pendence under Arsaces I, from whom the dynasty which ruled over Iran from 248 B.C. until A.D. 222 derives its name. The reign of Mithridates II (123 B.C.-87 B.C.), who annexed parts of India, signifies the height of the Parthian power. In Western history the Parthians are known as the terrible enemies of Rome, second only to Carthage, and by the defeats they inflicted upon Crassus in 53 B.C. and upon Mark Antony in 36 B.C. The last days of the Parthians are still remembered because of their success in fighting the Romans. It was to a truly Iranian dynasty rising in the heart of Iran that they lost their throne. In some ways the Parthian period can be considered the transition from the time of predominant Hellenistic influence to a national renaissance in Iran. The court and the upper classes were deeply imbued with Greek culture, and the fact that the inscriptions on the Parthian coins are Greek is in itself sufficient proof of the Greek influence. Of Parthian architecture not more than a few ruined temples and palaces are left, the most important of the Greco-Bactrian type, represented by the palace ruins of Kuh-i-Khwaja situated on an island hill of Lake Helmand in Seistan. Some sculptures have come down to us, and in 1934 among the remains of a Parthian temple on the high plateau of Malamir in Khuzistan the well-preserved bronze statue of a Parthian warrior, a piece of fine workmanship, has been discovered. Concerning the religious beliefs and cults of the Parthians little is known. One thing, however, is certain—the cult of Mithra occupied an important if not the dominating place among them. The Roman legions, in their warfare against the Parthians, adopted the cult of Mithra and spread it throughout the Roman Empire. Another curious fact deserves mention. The name of one of the Magi kings, Kaspar, goes back to the Parthian king Gundophar, whose name in older tradition is Gathaspar, or Gadaspar, and who ascended the throne in A.D. 19. The name Magi itself, as stated above, derives from a Median tribe which is identical with the Median priestly caste or had, like the Brahmins in India, the privilege of supplying the members of the priestly profession.

The great period of the Sassanian kings—from 222 until the Arab conquest in 642—is a conscious renaissance of the Achaemenian

era and a rejection of Hellenism. The Sassanian coins reveal this change with striking clarity; not a trace is left of Western, that is, Hellenistic, influence, so conspicuous in those of the Parthians, and workmanship as well as representations are of a genuinely Persian character. The portraits of the kings and their attire come from another world, and on the reverse is a Zoroastrian altar ablaze with the sacred fire and often flanked by the figures of two officiating priests. So the coins are the expression of the new and at the same time of the ancient spirit symbolized by the legendary history of the dynasty which recognizes as its ancestor a priest of Persepolis. Ardashir, the historical founder of the dynasty, started the fight against Rome which, under his successor, Shapur II, culminated in the defeat and capture of the Roman Emperor Valerian. The eventful wars against the Romans by Shapur II, surnamed "the Great" (339-379), ended with success for Iran. The Sassanian dynasty could boast of a considerable number of capable rulers and warrior kings. More, perhaps, than the Parthian era, the Sassanian was filled with wars, and by no means all of them were wars of conquest. In the struggle against the White Huns, who during a long period threatened the empire from the northeast, Iran was on the defensive, and with regard to the almost continuous fighting with Rome it is difficult to decide whether in any particular instance the adversary was fighting an offensive or a defensive war. Among the conquests, the most astonishing is that of the naval expedition to Arabia by Khosru Noshirwan (531-579), considered the greatest of the Sassanian kings. Called on for help by the Arabs of Yemen, on the west coast of the peninsula, to free their country from the Abyssinians, he set out with a large fleet, sailed along the Arabian coast, and defeated the invaders. The years before the Arab conquest of Iran are marked by an almost unbroken series of inner dissensions and rivalries between the various pretenders to the throne. The Arab victory near Nahavand in 642 definitely crushed the Persian resistance.

If it was the idea of the Sassanian monarchs to restore the ancient glory of the Achaemenians, such a restoration after more than five centuries could not be a mere imitation. The intention was—and

the facts bear it out—to resume the great traditions but to adapt them to changed circumstances. In no civilization is a revival ever a complete resurrection. What comes to life again always differs from the original, and inasmuch as it is different it may in its own way be just as great as the original. This is certainly true of the Sassanian period. Aside from the question whether the Achaemenian and the Sassanian kings believed themselves and were believed by their people to have descended from the godhead and whether the formulas adopted were meant to be accepted literally, the Sassanian kings did not and could not maintain that they had been entrusted by divine will to dominate the universe. Such a claim would have been contradicted by reality, since the Roman Empire covered one half of the known world. The Sassanian king was satisfied to state that the supreme God had invested him with royal power. The ceremonial surrounding the Sassanian monarch equaled, if it did not surpass the Achaemenians in splendor and in the emphasis laid on the isolating taboo. The pomp and magnificence of the court was the object of admiration by foreign ambassadors, and several descriptions have come down to us. The minuteness of court regulations and the stiffness of court ceremonials were in harmony with social and religious developments testifying to the same spirit. During the whole period there was a marked tendency to distinguish between social classes, and under Khosru Noshirwan the social hierarchy assumed its most rigid form. The Avesta mentions the three classes of priests, the warriors, the peasants, and the artisans—the last two were at first united in one class, but they were separated later. Ardashir established or re-established the social order by dividing society into priests, aristocracy, bureaucracy, and working classes (comprising merchants, artisans, and peasants). Privileges on the one side and interdictions on the other raised almost insurmountable barriers between the classes. The function of the priests was hereditary, all high positions were monopolized by the aristocracy, while its members were forbidden to intermarry with women of the lower classes and the latter were bound by all sorts of interdictions, such as that against acquiring property from the nobles.

The Zoroastrianism of Sassanian times differed widely from the original faith as revealed by Zoroaster. Though the supremacy of Ahuramazda was more deeply emphasized than in classic dualism, both gods, Ahuramazda and the Spirit of Evil, Ahriman, were accompanied by hosts of minor deities, angels, and demons personifying virtues and vices. The Sassanians elevated Zoroastrianism to the rank of state religion. Under the Achaemenians the subjugated peoples had been permitted to preserve their faith, and the Parthian kings, who seem to have continued this policy, showed no particular interest or preference in matters of religion, influenced as they were by the Greeks. In the Sassanian Empire the picture was changed entirely, for, although it was smaller in size than that of the Achaemenians, the Persians formed the overwhelming majority. More important, perhaps, is another reason. Christianity, having conquered the Roman Empire and having been elevated to the rank of state religion, began to display an aggressive missionary spirit which forbade the policy of tolerance exercised thus far by the Parthian kings and called for religious unification and defensive action. So the union between state and Zoroastrianism was sealed, and as a consequence the Zoroastrian creed and its representatives, the priests, rose to a power and prestige unknown before. The sacred texts were collected, including the parts concerned with medicine, astronomy, and other non-religious matters. The so-constituted bulk of scriptures recognized as authentic and sacred grew in the hands of the priests into a powerful instrument of dogmatic definitions and ritualistic institutions, since only the priests themselves possessed the key to the right interpretation. As it always happens under such conditions, formulas took the place of living faith and fanaticism that of spontaneous devotion.

These observations might easily suggest that the Sassanian Empire and civilization were on the decline. This, however, is far from the truth. We have only to look at the administration, the organization of the army, and the military exploits to recognize that behind the rigid social frame and a religious life shaped and guided by

clericalism, creative power and vitality lived on unimpaired. The artistic achievements point decidedly to the same conclusion. Of the great architecture only a few ruins are left, the disintegration being due to the poor material used—stones of various kinds and bricks, both set in plaster, the very opposite of the grandiose stone constructions of the Achaemenians. Yet with this material they succeeded in solving new architectural problems, such as the construction of the arch, the vault, and the cupola. The ruins of fire temples, of the palace at Firuzabad, south of Shiraz, and above all of the palace of Ktesiphon, on the Tigris, of which a part of the façade and of the vaulted hall (75 feet wide, 150 feet deep, and 90 feet high), still stands; these remains and those of other buildings permit us to reconstruct in imagination their shape and beauty. Professor Herzfeld * declares the construction of the “cupola built on squinches over a square room as genuinely Iranian,” and Professor Pope † thinks that “the development of the arch on a huge scale and its use as the unit of construction ought perhaps to be credited to Sassanian Persia.” If so, Europe and Asia are indebted to Iran for one of the most imposing and audacious architectural inventions.

The Sassanian rock sculptures bear hardly any trace of foreign influence. What they lacked in high artistic qualities was compensated for by a sort of monumental realism and majesty. Remarkable reliefs are to be seen near the ruins of the old royal town of Shapur, among them the well-known triumph of Shapur I over Valerian; others near Persepolis, including the investiture of Ardashir I by Ahuramazda; and still others near Kermanshah. Besides the gold and silver plates, the vessels, and the bronzes, the Sassanian textiles added to the magnificence of the period. We know that Persian costumes were worn and imitated in Egypt and in the provinces of the Byzantine Empire and that they influenced the style and the taste of Constantinople itself. Sassanian silks, famous for their materials, colors, and designs, penetrated into the Roman

* Ernst E. Herzfeld, *Archaeological History of Iran*, London, 1935, p. 93.

† Arthur Upham Pope, *An Introduction to Persian Art*, London, 1930, p. 19.

world, and we owe it to their use as church garments and covers of relics that at least some fragments have survived which give an idea of their splendor and of the technique which produced them.

The Sassanian Empire fell under the onslaught of the Arabs. United for the first time by Mohammed, inspired by the new creed he revealed, and filled with the missionary idea of conquering the world for Islam, they subdued Iran in 642, after nine years of fighting. What seemed, and indeed was, politically a national catastrophe, turned out to be of benefit to civilization in general and, perhaps even for Iran herself.

Released from the national isolation of the Sassanian period and now a part of the Arab caliphate, the Persian genius received new incentives and was once more given a world-wide field for its creations. The Hellenistic civilization in the Near East, which lived its last, its Christian phase, under the Byzantine Empire, was taken over in part by the Arabs. The Persians, who had felt the Greek influence under Alexander's successors and whose leading classes were Hellenized under the Parthian kings, withdrew from the Hellenistic world under the Sassanians, having contributed to it Gnostic speculations and other philosophico-religious ideas. Now they joined the Near Eastern world again, and Persian culture together with the Greek formed the two pillars upon which the Islamic civilization was to be built. It is unnecessary to belittle the Arab effort in order to appreciate to its full value the Persian contributions to the new civilization. Indeed, the ability of these simple desert people to assimilate a high, even sophisticated civilization such as the Hellenistic is no less astonishing than their powers of conquest. It is, however, often forgotten that the invaders did not alone bear the burdens of assimilation and creation. There were in the towns of Syria and Palestine under Byzantine rule sedentary Arabs, as there had been under Greek and Roman sway—Arabs who had long become part of the dominating civilizations. Willingly or reluctantly they adopted the creed of the kindred invaders and became the natural intermediaries between the desert people and the civilized world.

After the overthrow of the Umayyad dynasty, in 750, when the

Abbasid caliphs removed the capital of the empire from Syrian Damascus to Persian soil, they recognized a fact and at the same time expressed determination. The fact was that they had been carried to the throne by the help of the Eastern and Persian part of the empire. In founding a new capital, Baghdad, on the Tigris at a short distance from the site of the former Sassanian capital, they indicated their conviction and decision that the strictly Arab character of the Umayyad caliphate—as symbolized by Damascus, geographically the last northern oasis-outpost of Arabia—belonged to the past and that it was to be superseded by a more cosmopolitan spirit.

The legendary splendor of Haroun al-Rashid's regime (789-809) is by no means only an invention of the Arabian Nights, nor is it necessary to be reminded of the extension of his political and diplomatic relations, which almost encompassed the known world. But it was the Sassanian court customs which ruled the court etiquette at Baghdad, where the old Sassanian families equaled the Arabs in rank and office-holding, and it was recognized that descent from the Sassanian kings conferred a distinction yielding only to that of the family of the Prophet. Persians soon appropriated the expressive and flexible Arab tongue and used it with such perfection that a large part of the literary and scientific works in the Arab language were written by authors of Persian origin. On the other hand, in the ninth century, when Persian became a literary language enriched by a high percentage of Arab words, the knowledge of Persian and Persian literature became an indispensable element of education and culture.

The slow process of disintegration which was the fate of the Abbasid caliphate is marked by the rise of several independent or semi-independent dynasties on Persian soil. The kingdom of the Samanids (892-999) must be mentioned, for it was at their court at Bokhara and under their protection that there appeared a group of poets (Rudagi is the best known) who are considered the creators and pioneers of Persian literature. The lands of the caliphate were again united by the Seljuk Turks (1037-1197) under the nominal sovereignty of the almost powerless caliphs of Baghdad,

successors of the Prophet, whose consent and investiture were still considered necessary to confer legitimacy on the rule of the conqueror.

The Persian genius, however, flourished under foreign domination as it had flourished during the time of dismemberment. Firdausi (940-1020), the creator of the Persian national epic, the *Shah Namah*, Omar Khayyam (d. 1123), the astronomer and mathematician, better known as poet-philosopher, Ibn Sina, or Avicenna (b. 980), the famous physician and philosopher, Al Ghazali (b. 1058), one of the greatest philosophers and theologians of the Moslem world, Ferid ed Din Attar (d. 1230), one of the profoundest mystical poets of Islam, and Nezam ol Mulk, the vizier of Malik Shah, who wrote a treatise on the theory of government, are names to show the variety of outstanding achievements; the number could easily be multiplied. To the rich architecture of the period belongs one of the most important buildings of Iran, the *Masjid-i-Jami*, at Isfahan, whose largest part stems from the time of Malik Shah. The art of pottery produced the famous luster ware; textiles and metalwork reached a high state of development.

The thirteenth century is marked in the East, and not only there, by the rise of Genghis Khan. For the world of Islam it meant the sack of Baghdad and the end of the Abbasid caliphate; for Iran, devastation and carnage. The world-conquest tradition of Genghis Khan was taken up, though in an infinitely more civilized way, in the fourteenth century by Timur (d. 1405). His successors ruled Iran for one hundred years, many of them encouraging with remarkable comprehension the efflorescence of science, art, and literature. There was created one of the most magnificent architectural works the world possesses, the *Mosque Gauhar Shad*, in Meshed, as great in plan and style as in beauty of decoration. Among the other arts that flourished under the Timurids were the miniature used for the illustration of manuscripts, the weaving of carpets, ceramics, and metalwork. Jalal ed Din Rumi (1207-1273), widely considered the greatest mystic poet of Iran, lends his fame to the epoch; Sadi, too, lived in the thirteenth century. Jalal ed Din and Sadi, together with Hafiz, who belongs to the fourteenth cen-

tury and Jami (d. 1492), have done more than any other outstanding personalities to spread the glory of Iran throughout the Islamic world, whence it was spread to all parts of the civilized globe. It is due to them that the Persian language accompanied the Mogul conquerors into India and became the language of court, society, and administration until it was replaced by English early in the 18th century, and it is their influence that imbued the mystic poets of the Panjab from the fifteenth century to our days with the spirit of Persian Sufism.

The rise of the Safavid dynasty (1501-1737) signifies the national revival of Iran. Like the other two great national periods, the Achaemenian and the Sassanian, the third is intimately connected with the religious history of Iran. The birth of the Achaemenian Empire coincides in a momentous way with that of Zoroastrianism, and from this illustrious creed the secular power received the divine sanction and derived the superior morale of its policy. The Sassanian epoch is distinguished by the renaissance of Zoroastrianism and its codification. Quite differently, but no less remarkably, the Safavid dynasty is religious in origin and character. The division of Islam which soon after the conquest found an increasing number of adherents in Iran was the so-called Shia which considered the whole line of caliphs after Mohammed usurpers—with the one exception of Ali, his cousin and son-in-law; they recognized no one except members of the house of the Prophet as his legitimate heirs. On Ali and his sons, who died the death of martyrs, and on their appointed spiritual successors—the whole line called Imams—the Shiites conferred a saintly and quasi-divine character. The family of the founder of the Safavid dynasty traced its origin to the seventh Imam, Musa Kazem, who lived in the second half of the eighth century, and through him to the house of Ali. The family, therefore, enjoyed an elevated position and a halo of saintliness, which particularly distinguished some of the immediate ancestors of Ismail Shah, the first of the dynasty. Above all, it could claim the right of supreme leadership of Islam according to the Shiite doctrine. There could not have been much Arab blood left in Ismail, since the family had been

established for centuries in Ardabil, a town in eastern Azerbaijan, in a region populated by Persians and by people of Turkish origin. Indeed, Turkoman tribes supported Ismail in his struggle for the throne of Iran. The Safavid dynasty enjoyed the inestimable benefit of having been started by three kings with unusually excellent qualities. To this must be added that the reign of all three covered a comparatively long period—Shah Ismail (1500–1524), Shah Tahmasp (1524–1576), and after a short interregnum Shah Abbas I, the Great (1587–1629)—a fact of great importance, because in Iran, as in all autocracies, stability and prosperity depend exclusively upon the ruler.

It was but natural that under the Safavids the Shiite form of Islam became the official religion. And it is consistent with the Shiite conception of the Imamate, the successorship of Ali, that at least to the nearest and immediate supporters of the Safavids, the tribes of Azerbaijan and Gilan, the worldly power of the new kings appeared sanctified by divine grace. This is certainly true of Shah Ismail himself and Shah Tahmasp. Shah Abbas the Great, however, though no less devoted to the Shiite faith and cause than his predecessors had been, reduced kingship to its secular character, which it has retained ever since. Although it seems strange that a ruler should renounce by his own free will so incomparable a prerogative as the divine nature of his person and his office, the Shah's action was premeditated, and he had a distinctly political motive for the change. The master—this is old wisdom—depends just as much upon his servants as the servants depend upon their master. Being monopolized, so to speak, by his tribal kinsmen and followers meant to Abbas the honor of a bodyguard, yet on the other hand it limited his freedom of action. His idea of power would permit no barriers, nor would his great conception of melting Iran and the Persians into one powerful unit. He therefore organized other armed forces to neutralize the tribes. As a result of this measure he considerably impaired the influence of the tribal chiefs, but he changed his own position from feudal overlord to absolute monarch.

The creation of a strong national state within reasonable bound-

aries, corresponding almost to those of Sassanian times, and the factual secularization of the royal power in the face of and despite the theological theory which would make the kingdom a theocracy and of the king an incarnation of the Godhead—these two facts entitle us to speak of the Safavid era since the time of Abbas I as not only the national rebirth of Iran but also the real renaissance of Iran as a modern state, with a faint analogy to the use of the term "renaissance" in Europe.

The achievements of Shah Abbas, based on security and order enforced with the utmost severity, will be mentioned in due course. Under the Safavids, the foreign policy of Iran was for a long time dominated by Turkey. It was the Turko-Persian antagonism which brought Iran into touch with the European powers. The imperialistic policy of the sultans exerted its pressure on the East, as it did on the West, and so Iran and Europe became natural allies, with the exception of France, which preferred friendly relations with Turkey. Between the German emperor, the kings of Spain and Hungary, and the Venetian republic, on the one hand, and the shahs of Iran, on the other, letters and ambassadors were exchanged to discuss simultaneous action against the common enemy. Nothing concrete resulted, and Shah Abbas I himself had to wrest from the Turks the northwestern territories they had previously occupied. It has been truly stated that the presence of a strong Iran on Turkey's eastern border alleviated considerably the pressure the latter exerted continually on Europe and so contributed indirectly to the eventual repulsion of the Turkish advance.

Not only international politics but also international trade became more interested in Iran during the Safavid era, particularly since after the conquest of Egypt by Sultan Selim, in 1517, the whole eastern Mediterranean was in Turkish hands. The land routes to the Middle East and the Far East being dependent upon the good will of the Turks, the trade with Iran and across Iran to the Indies and the Far East by land and sea had to be reorganized. It was in this connection that there began the competition about the hegemony in the Persian Gulf which ended with the victory of the British over the Portuguese; from that time the British supremacy

in the Gulf was never seriously questioned. To the political ambassadors were added those of a more commercial character, as the agents of the East India Company; a comparatively large number of merchants came to Iran on their own behalf, and some of them even settled in that country. Finally, the fame of Iran attracted many adventurers who with more or less legitimacy adopted the name and functions of ambassadors. For some time, particularly under the wise and open-minded leadership of Abbas the Great, Iran enjoyed once again an important place among the nations of the globe.

During the Safavid period there occurred the last efflorescence of Persian art. The plans for and construction of Isfahan, the new capital, were in themselves masterpieces. "One of the finest and largest towns I have ever seen" said a French Jesuit Father in 1648, and his praise is substantiated by the descriptions of many travelers. "Gardens here for grandeur and fragour are such as no city in Asia out-vies" says Thomas Herbert, who saw Isfahan in 1628. The royal square with the Masjid-i-Shah, the mosque of Sheik Lutfullah and the Ali Qapu palace, the great bridge over the Zayendeh Rud, in Ardabil the shrine of Safi ud Din, where the ancestor of the dynasty is buried, and other specimens of Safavid architecture are well known. The rugs and carpets, including the silk carpets with gold and silver threads, the paintings and miniatures (of which Behzad from Herat is the great master), ceramics and metalwork had and have world-wide reputation.

From the anarchy and the foreign rule which followed the defeat by the Afghans of Shah Sultan Hussein in 1722 the country was delivered by Nadir Quli Shah, one of Iran's many outstanding war lords. Afghans, Turks, and Russians disputed among themselves the right to Persian soil, and they had to be dealt with. Nadir Shah's campaigns led him into Mesopotamia, Central Asia, and India. His victories over the Mogul emperor and the capture of Delhi yielded to him not only territory (the land west of the Indus) but also world fame and enormous spoils, such as the Koh-i-Noor, the Indian crown diamond, now among the British crown jewels, and the peacock throne. Nadir Shah was assassinated

by his own men in 1747, an end consistent with his barbarous disregard of human life and values. He has sometimes been compared to Napoleon. Such comparisons of men belonging to different worlds and of differing so greatly in character, above all with such different aims (Napoleon with the idea of uniting Europe under French supremacy, Nadir a conqueror for the sake of conquest and power) are cheap and meaningless. However, Nadir and Napoleon do have one point in common: their exploits, momentous as they were, left no lasting mark on the history of their nations.

Among the pretenders to the throne was a member of the Turkish Kajar tribe. A branch of this tribe had been settled by Shah Abbas II in the plains southeast of the Caspian Sea. From this tribe came the man who later gave Iran the dynasty which ruled until the rise of Reza Shah. However, immediately after the death of Nadir Shah it was Karim Khan, of the Zand tribe, in the southern province of Fars, who was victorious and ruled over Iran from 1750 to 1779. He was one of the most likable and humane rulers who ever occupied the throne of Iran, and his memory is still cherished in the minds of the Persian people; his reign constituted a real oasis of happiness in a history rich in oppression and tribulation. In Shiraz, his capital, he is especially remembered. The town is indebted to him for the construction of the great bazaar and many other buildings, for the reconstruction of her famous gardens, and, above all, for a regime which placed the welfare of the people higher than anything else.

After the death of Karim Khan the struggle for the throne broke out anew. It lasted, with short interruptions, for fifteen years, until 1749, when Aga Mohammed Khan, having succeeded in uniting the branches of the Kajar tribe, defeated the last Zand pretender and ascended the throne, in 1796, only to be assassinated a year later. Sir Percy Sykes begins his narrative of Aga Mohammed Khan with these words: "The memory of few princes is so universally execrated as that of Aga Mohammed Khan, the founder of the Kajar dynasty." * Aga Mohammed Khan is a pathological figure.

* Sir Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, 3d ed., London, Macmillan, 1930, p. 289.

When a boy he fell into the hands of the enemies of his family and was castrated for political reasons. The sexual infirmity was transformed into and compensated by a sadistic lust for domination, expressing itself in orgies of cruelty and murder and combined with unbounded avarice. His whole life was an act of revenge by which the world had to atone for the injury which had been inflicted upon him.

^r Under Fath Ali Shah, the nephew and successor of Aga Mohammed Shah, the great drama of Iran begins, in the course of which Iran is drawn deeper and deeper into the net of the European powers—at first as a potential instrument and active partner, later merely as a tool and a victim. The curtain rises after the French Revolution, and the coincidence is not only one of time. The real link in between these two events is the person of General Bonaparte. In his plan, as romantic as it was grandiose, to attack by land and by sea the English in India, their most vulnerable point, Iran was given a predominant if not the central place. The campaign in Egypt was meant to be the first step on the way. The French Convention had authorized him, probably only ratifying his own proposal, to begin the construction of a canal to link the Mediterranean with the Red Sea.* The destruction by Nelson of the French fleet near Alexandria in 1798 put an end to the maritime phase of the project. With even greater fervor Emperor Napoleon resumed the idea General Bonaparte had conceived—to project a land operation against India. He thought of a Persian army trained by French officers marching into India, perhaps even with Turkish participation, while Fath Ali Shah expected in return French assistance in wresting Georgia from the Russians, who, by occupying this country, had become dangerous neighbors of Iran in the Caucasus.

The correspondence between the two sovereigns is highly instructive and interesting. Letters and ambassadors were exchanged. In a letter presented to the shah by Jaubert in 1805 Napoleon begins with the statement that he is informed by his agents about

* The Directoire defined unmistakably as the goal of the army of the orient: to cut through the Isthmus of Suez and to take all necessary measures to secure free possession of the Red Sea for the French Republic.

everything going on in the world. After many compliments paid to Iran and her people, he does not spare criticism, and he ends with the confident hope that the shah will distrust the advice of a nation of merchants which in India barter with the lives and crowns of sovereigns. The shah sent an ambassador to Paris, who was called in his credentials "the Nightingale of Sincerity." A treaty was concluded in 1807 between France and Iran. Napoleon promised artillery and guns and as many military instructors as the shah should want. The shah replied in colorful court style:

Every word in the noble lines is like a drop of amber on pure camphor or like the perfumed curls on the rosy cheeks of a beloved with a bosom of lilies . . . the amber scent of the gracious document has embalmed the alcove of our souls so susceptible to friendship and has perfumed with musk the secret chamber of our hearts filled with justice and loyalty.

The Franco-Persian alliance was of no consequence. Napoleon's *rapprochement* with Russia after the Treaty of Tilsit, his preoccupations in Europe, and last, but not least, the effective British countermeasures put an end to the French military mission under General Gardanne. It was replaced by a British mission, one of whose staff members was even appointed commander-in-chief of the Persian army. The disastrous event of Fath Ali Shah's reign was the war with Russia. The two campaigns ended in defeat and proved the vulnerability of the Persian troops to modern arms and tactics. Not only was Iran obliged to cede to the Russians the largest part of her Caucasian territories; the Treaty of Turkoman Chai, in 1828, marked the first infringement on Persian sovereignty by enforcing the extraterritorial rights of Russian consular agents on Persian soil, the system of capitulations. Nevertheless, Fath Ali Shah was not a bad ruler, and if he had had to cope with only normal difficulties his good will and political insight would have sufficed to overcome them. But to resist the crushing weight of the military and political superiority of competing great powers even a stronger man might have been too weak.

In the international field, the conflicting interests of Great Britain and Russia in Asia began to take definite shape in the time of

Fath Ali Shah. The demon of territorial expansion, which inspired all the moves of czarist Russia, if only for the reason that territories for potential occupation were so conveniently at hand, pushed Russia to the methodical occupation of Central Asia and made her look upon Iran as her prey. By this advance she hurt or was likely to hurt British interests and to threaten vital British positions in India and the Persian Gulf. One of the most important issues of world politics, if not the decisive one in the nineteenth century, was fought out on the soil of Iran.

The Persian policy toward Afghanistan and the Perso-Afghan war which filled a large part of the reign of Mohammed Shah (1834-1845) showed clearly that Great Britain and Russia were the real opponents behind the scene. The fact that the two powers thought it opportune in 1834 to guarantee the independence of Iran by a special treaty reveals their mutual distrust. Since the contracting parties had or might have had an interest in the violation of the pact, the guarantee itself could not inspire confidence and had the character of a temporary quietus rather than a sincere pledge. It must, however, be stated that during the Russo-British antagonism Russia was the aggressor and that Great Britain found herself on the defensive. Consequently, initiative and action were on the side of the Russians, whereas Great Britain's part was only reactive. This is the reason why British policy in Iran until 1914 did not and could not follow a clear line and often gave the impression of weakness and uncertainty.

Iran was caught in the net of foreign politics, and all her efforts to slip through its meshes were doomed to failure. In recognition of her military deficiency Fath Ali Shah had willingly accepted foreign missions and war materials. Mohammed Shah continued this policy, but he appealed to France for military instructors. The motive is obvious, he wished to disentangle Iran from the influence of the paramount powers. His use of the services of foreign nations having no direct political interest in Iran set an example that has been followed by his successors, but the extent to which this policy could be applied depended more or less on British and especially on Russian consent.

The long reign of Nasr ed Din Shah (1848-1896) is—less obviously to those who lived at that time than to those who look back at it—a tragic period. While in the beginning of his rule Iran was a country whose old and venerable civilization was still alive, Western neighbors as welcome guests or as intruders undermined, as time went on, the traditional foundations, and at his death the specter of a dire future could clearly be perceived. Shortly after his ascension to the throne Nasr ed Din Shah resumed the war against the Afghans in order to reconquer what was considered Persian territory. In 1856 he occupied Herat, but being forced by the British, who even declared war on Iran because they thought Herat safer in the hands of their candidate, the shah had to evacuate the town. The conquest of Herat was the last martial exploit of Iran on foreign soil. Military missions, British, French, Italian, and Austrian, now succeeded each other to modernize the Persian army. But the Persian Cossack brigade, formed and armed on the Russian model and commanded by Russian officers, was and remained the only efficient modern unit. It was destined to safeguard the Russian interests, though it was nominally a part of the Persian armed forces. The construction of the telegraph lines by the British since 1864, of importance not only to the British themselves but also to the country, the concession granted to Baron de Reuter in 1872 for establishing a national bank (canceled and replaced by the concession for the establishment of the Imperial Bank in 1889), the monopoly for the navigation on the Karun River in 1888, are so many attempts by the British to get a firm foothold in Iran. They testify to the shah's good will and insight with regard to the necessity of introducing modern institutions and ideas. Having founded the first modern college in Iran, the shah decided after his return from his first journey to Europe, in 1873, to send a certain number of young Persians of the best families to France to get there military training in Saint Cyr, to learn engineering at the Ecole Polytechnique, to study law and medicine, and to get acquainted with modern art.

It has become customary to consider the shah's journeys to Europe pure pleasure trips and to delight in the many anecdotes

connected with his experiences and those of his retinue. This is a cheap and unjust view. The shah, who ascended the throne at the age of sixteen, gave from the beginning of his rule proof of an energetic mind and a firm intention to abolish abuses. Influenced and supported by his great vizier, Mirza Taqi Khan, he began to introduce innovations. He created the "Court of the Oppressed": one day a week everybody was to have free access to the sovereign, who heard the complaints of the people and gave judgment. There followed other institutions which were intended to reform the administration. If the result was not satisfactory, it was due to century-old abuses. His decision to visit Europe sprang from an intellectual curiosity to see with his own eyes the West, whose impact on his country was growing steadily and whose services he was quite willing to use for the benefit of his people. It must not be forgotten that for a Persian ruler to leave the country was an unheard of innovation. Never, indeed, in the history of Iran had a shah crossed the border of his country except as a conqueror or an exile. So a good deal of initiative and personal courage was needed to overcome the barriers of sacred tradition and inveterate prejudice. It was but natural that Nasr ed Din did not remain indifferent to the flattering reception he found at the courts of Europe or to the wonders and luxuries of Western life.

The establishment of new institutions revealed his intention of reforming his country after the Western model. Among the new creations which were the result of his first journey in 1873 the Council of State is of particular interest. Since one of its functions was the appointment of all government officials, it drastically limited the absolutistic power. Needless to say, this and other innovations were never seriously put into practice. Because of the lack of any constitutional body to support them, they depended entirely upon the will of the shah, and nobody could be willing to take the responsibilities under these circumstances.

Now we touch the tragedy of Nasr ed Din's regime. He believed—and he was not the only Asiatic reformer who so believed in earlier times—that the adjustment to the modern world could be

achieved by grafting Western institutions and the results of Western knowledge onto the traditional body of Oriental society. In this belief he did not differ widely from the philosophy of the eighteenth century, with its idea of the magic power of institutions. He, no less than Western mankind, had to learn by devastating experience that it is not institutions which determine whether any regime shall be good or evil, but the spirit which animates them. Deep disillusionment found expression in this word of despair: "Reforms do not agree with Iran." This insight was true enough; the consequence should have been the recognition that Iran could be modernized only at the price of a radical transformation. This, however, was out of the question; such an idea could not enter the shah's mind, nor was the country ripe for a change from the very roots. •

When it was known that the shah was favoring modern ideas, in the sixties, Teheran became a meeting place for concession hunters of European nations. Many were adventurers and crooks; their behavior and methods, their mutual jealousy and foul competition, did much to increase among the Persians feelings of distrust and contempt toward Europeans and the European civilization. Little wonder that under the weight of all these experiences the shah's original will to reform Iran on the European model began to give way to a conservative, even reactionary, attitude. A feeling of deep frustration developed in him; with a sort of sorry and grim humor he gave himself up to fatalism and tried to benefit as much as possible by the hopeless situation. "I wish," he once exclaimed, "that never a European had set his foot on my country's soil; for then we would have been spared all these tribulations. But since the foreigners have unfortunately penetrated into our country, we shall at least make the best possible use of them."

So Nasr ed Din continued to be interested in modernization when the occasion arose, but there was no strong will nor any system behind his interest. The selling of all sorts of coveted concessions, most of which fell into oblivion without any further consequence, became a convenient source of revenue for the shah and

his ministers. One of Nasr ed Din's favorite schemes was the construction of a trans-Caspian railway, for which, as for other projects, he hoped in vain to interest American capital.*

This policy did not contribute to the prestige of the government or to the welfare of the country, as was ostensibly proved by the ill-fated concession of a tobacco monopoly to England, which so deeply aroused the hostile feelings of the clergy and the people that it had to be annulled. So Nasr ed Din's regime, so promising at the start, petered out so that it may well be called the beginning of the end. However, historical justice will have to exonerate him to a large extent from this failure. His good will, his intelligence, and his generally fine qualities as a ruler and as a man can hardly be denied. But he found himself more and more involved in adverse circumstances, so fatal that they inevitably overwhelmed his capacities, and so he became a truly pathetic figure symbolizing in his person the destiny of his country.

In the international sphere the reign of Nasr ed Din Shah must be viewed against the background of the steadily increasing Russo-British rivalry. This rivalry could no longer be characterized in the terms of a poetical observer who compared Persia and Afghanistan to two "women between two strong and powerful lovers, mutually jealous of each other. Russia woos them on the one side and England on the other: and they, like clever coquettes, play them off—one against the other." † Russia's influence reached its peak in the reign of Nasr ed Din's successor, Muzaffar ed Din (1896-1906) in the years preceding the Russo-Japanese War. It was marked by two loans of an entirely political character (implying the repayment of the British loan of 1892), the establishment of a Russian bank in Teheran as a rival institution to the British Imperial Bank, the expansion of Russian trade with Iran, and the recognition by Great Britain of Russia's predominant position in northern Iran. By 1906 Iran owed 7½ million pounds sterling to Russia; the

* For information concerning the vain attempts of the shah and the first United States minister to Teheran (since 1883) to interest the State Department and Wall Street in Persian investments see Thomas Brockway, "Dollar Diplomacy and the Persian Bubble," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, XXVI (July, 1939), 490.

† F. F. Arbuthnot, *Persian Portraits*, London and Guildford, 1887, p. 163.

money had been dissipated, with little benefit to the country, for the personal needs of the shah and his court.

However, the outstanding event of Muzaffar ed Din's reign was the Persian Revolution, culminating in the grant of a constitution by the shah. Few, not even Professor E. G. Browne, had thought the Persian people capable of such a heroic effort. The immediate incentives were the shah's apparent misgovernment and indignation over the exploitation of the country by high officials and foreigners. In the revolutionary action itself the influential merchant class, which suffered directly as a result of the misrule, and the clergy, whose power resided in the people, worked together, and liberal ideas familiar to those who had been abroad or had been educated in the missionary schools shaped the movement and determined its aim. Finally, the support of the British contributed to the success. The opening in 1906 of the first Persian parliament was one of the last acts of Muzaffar ed Din.

His successor, Mohammed Ali Shah, tried no less than three times to overthrow the constitution. The first time, in 1907, he ceded to the pressure of public opinion and the first sign of armed resistance. In the second effort, in 1908, the shah acted in conjunction with the Russians, Czar Nicholas having declared that the shah could save Persia and the throne only by "dispersing the majlis (parliament) and the other revolutionary mobs." Mohammed Ali gathered his troops (including, of course, the Cossack brigade) near Teheran, but the nationalists reinforced by the powerful Bakhtiari tribe, who acted on the instigation of the British, proved the stronger. The shah was forced to abdicate and left the country. Two years later, in 1911, probably encouraged by the Russians, he made an unsuccessful attempt to regain the throne.

Contrary to all appearances, Russia's position had lost in strength. The defeat suffered in the war against Japan in 1904-1905 and the ensuing revolution had impaired her prestige and her initiative. But it was the rising power of Germany which after the failure of an Anglo-German naval agreement caused a regrouping of the European great powers. The Franco-Russian pact was followed in 1904 by a Franco-British agreement removing the dissensions

which had so far existed with regard to their respective spheres of influence in Africa. The "Entente" was formally concluded when, in 1907, Great Britain and Russia succeeded in settling their problems in Asia. Iran had to pay the price. Iran was divided into two spheres of influence, the Russian in the north, by far the larger, including Isfahan, Yezd, and Kakh, the British in the south, a narrow neutral strip of land separating the two zones. As in all pacts of this kind, the principle of the strict independence and integrity of the country concerned and a pledge to respect it formed a part of the treaty—a tribute paid by vice to virtue.

From the viewpoint of international politics the all-important result was that the bitter antagonism in Asia between the two powers had come to an end, though rivalry continued to exist. However, the interest in the common front against Germany—of which the agreement was the outcome—more than the agreement itself was sufficient guarantee that Russia would not allow any Persian problem to become a cause of conflagration. Materially the agreement was to the advantage of the Russians, yet for the British the recognition by Russia of Great Britain's predominant interest in Afghanistan removed the danger of a threat to India. It was the Russians who got the lion's share. The pact left their position in Iran untouched. It changed that of the British, whom it made Russia's accomplices in what the Persians considered an attempt on their independence, although the British themselves considered it, not without reason, the only means of saving at least northern Iran from being absorbed by Russia.

On the other hand, Russia's overbearing attitude in her zone made the Persians regard the British not only as the minor evil but also as the power which, after all, had the welfare of their country at heart. Indeed, for British interests and policy a sound and prosperous Iran was of greater importance than for the Russians. Of this a well-known proof and example is the dismissal in 1911 of the American financial adviser, Morgan Shuster, which was enforced by the Russians on very slight pretexts—much to the detriment of the country.* Under these conditions the inner situation

* See W. M. Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia*, New York, 1912 and 1920.

of Iran rapidly declined. The executive was almost powerless, and order could only be maintained by foreign troops and gendarmery. Even with these it was impossible to stop disorder in many parts of the country, due largely to raiding tribes. To aggravate the anarchy, the crown was practically nonexistent, since Mohammed Ali had been succeeded in 1909 by Ahmad Shah, a boy of twelve years. The competition over the choice of the regent left the country a prey to various groups fighting for decisive influence.

Not long before the outbreak of World War I Sir Edward Grey declared that the Russians had about 17,500 men in Iran, and it was suspected that they were slowly preparing to substitute annexation for sphere of influence. The war put an end to such potentialities, and Iran became one of its battlefields. Serious as was the domestic situation of Iran after the war, it was greatly alleviated by the policy the new bolshevist regime adopted. Having at first occupied the Caspian province of Gilan, they decided in 1921 to withdraw their troops and to establish friendly relations with Iran on a firm basis. This event, like all the others belonging to the years after the war, belongs in the period of Reza Shah and is especially connected with his rise to power—a topic dealt with in the chapter beginning on page 137.

At the time of Reza Shah's accession to the throne, in 1925, the majlis proclaimed the deposition of Ahmad Shah, who had left the country two years earlier. In this way the dynasty of the Kajars came to an end. Reza Shah, from conviction as well as for obvious political reasons, did everything to disparage the reign of the Kajars and to obliterate their memory, even resorting to the destruction of most of their buildings. So it has become the custom to pass a summary sentence of condemnation on the Kajar dynasty. This judgment is certainly justified with regard to the founder of the dynasty and its last three representatives. Muzaffar ed Din did not lack a certain kindness and benevolence, but it was based mainly on weakness and timidity, and he had no qualifications for rulership. Mohammed Ali represented the type of average narrow autocrat in whom selfishness and will power enhance each other. Ahmad Shah practically ruled over ruins, and being in poor health

he soon became disinterested in a task which exceeded his powers. However, Fath Ali Shah and Nasr ed Din Shah can well stand the judgment of history, and their reigns cover by far the largest part of the nineteenth century. That they were unable to stem the decline cannot really be laid at their door, for the forces at work would have doomed the strongest.

As to cultural achievements, the nineteenth century of Iran cannot compare with the great creative periods of Persian history. Yet despite foreign impact the general balance is decidedly favorable, a fact which is all too easily overlooked. The architecture of the Kajars does not have the grandeur of the classic constructions, but their many palaces are gracious and cheerful, not made for eternity, but pleasant to look at and to live in. The Mosque Sepah Salar, in Teheran, erected by Mirza Hussein Khan Sepah Salar, grand vizier of Nasr ed Din, is an imposing building of great beauty and distinction. The art of laying out gardens had not died out, as can still be seen. Nasr ed Din did much to enlarge and to embellish his capital. He had the city surrounded by a large walled enclosure, and its original and elegant gates, with their colored tiles, were very conspicuous. They, too, disappeared under the new regime.

The art of painting was highly developed. Many of the wall paintings have been destroyed, together with the palaces, but there are still to be seen in Teheran in the house of Nezam ol Mulk, one of the ministers of Nasr ed Din (now the most popular restaurant in Teheran) remarkable oil paintings representing the ambassadors of Turkey, Russia, and France (the famous Count de Gobineau) and the shah on the throne surrounded by his sons and his court. Many other pictures, portraits of kings, high personalities and others, all of them the work of good craftsmen, have been preserved.

There were, moreover, at least three painters whose art, judged from any standard, is far above the average and deserves particular mention. One is Mohammed Ghaffari Kamal ol Molk, who died in 1940 at the age of more than ninety years. He studied in Europe, and his pictures show a creative assimilation of Western techniques which adds to the interest aroused by their refined beauty.

The other is Mohammed Khan Malik al Shuara (Saba). A picture of his dated 1890 representing Mohammed Hussein Khan conversing by night with Mohammed Qazim Khan is in possession of the Gulistan Museum in Teheran. It was exhibited at the Exhibition of Persian Art in New York in 1940. The painter, who never visited Europe, has achieved a masterpiece, and his way of using the light and shadow produced by the candle to illuminate the character and expression in the faces of the two men is extraordinary. The third is Ali Meshedi Semirani, whose picture "View of Isfahan" is reproduced in *L'Art vivant*, February, 1932. It is strongly reminiscent of old Italian masters, though so far as is known to this author, the artist has never left Iran.

As to poetry and literature, a look into Professor E. G. Browne's books,* will convince the reader that Iran's tradition is faithfully continued. Fath Ali Shah, a lover of poetry, gathered poets at his court. Qa'ani (d. 1853) is considered the most important. The Sufi current continued with its mystic poetry. Biographical and autobiographical literature was abundant, the art of the novel not neglected, even a few dramas were published.

In the crafts, too, carpet weaving, silverwork, glass manufacture, pottery, admirable things were produced, though the creative spirit was slowing dying out under the onslaught of imported fabrics. However, nowhere in the arts and crafts was the connection with the past so radically interrupted as to make it impossible to revive the old patterns and techniques in the art schools created by Reza Shah.

* Edward Granville Browne, *The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia*, London, 1914, and *Literary History of Persia*, London, 1902-1906.

COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

IRAN extends between two far-flung arcs, the southern one formed by Mesopotamia and the Arab peninsula, reaches across the Arab Sea into Indian Baluchistan, while the northern one starts with the Anatolian plateau and the Russian Caucasus and crosses the Caspian Sea into Russian Turkestan to the border of Afghanistan, leaving the latter country to form the greater part of Iran's eastern frontier line between Russia and India. The Iranian high plateau which in this geographical sense comprises Afghanistan, rises between the valley of the Indus and those of the Euphrates and the Tigris. Iran occupies its largest part. Topographically Iran has often been compared to a natural fortress. Indeed, Iran is on almost all sides protected by high mountain ranges. However, it must not be forgotten that the northern provinces of Iran, Gilan and Mazanderan, bordering the Caspian Sea and the lowlands of Khuzistan in the southwest, east of the Shatt al Arab extend in front of this natural fortification wall. Both regions may—if we want to pursue the comparison—be regarded as the glacis of the fortress; but the fact that they form provinces of the highest economic importance diminishes to some extent the value of the otherwise legitimate comparison.

Iran occupies a privileged geographical position, which is, as all privileges are, heavy with liabilities. Iran shares actively or passively the vicissitudes of Central Asia and the Near East as well as the fate of the Caucasian region and the Russian plain. Iran's southern frontier bellies out into the Arab Sea and the Persian Gulf. The two gulfs meet at a navel-shaped indentation, where the opposite Arab peninsula sends a sharply pointed arrow of land against Iran. The northern frontier may be divided into two approximately equal halves. The eastern half bellies into the steppes of Russian Turkestan, while the first section of the western half, following the southern shore of the Caspian Sea, repeats on a

smaller scale the shorelines of the Persian Gulf. The last part rises in broken curves to the height of the Caucasus Mountains and to the boundaries of Turkey and Russia.

Iran is a huge and rather compact mass of land, whose shape does not lack a certain originality. Those who indulge in the imaginative sport of geographic symbolism—as some Frenchmen do when they consider the almost hexagonal form of their country an expression of the quasi-geometrical harmony and perfection of the French mind and civilization—might be tempted to apply their art to Iran. They might like to contrast the soft and elegant curves of the northern and southern frontiers to the straight and harsh eastern and western borderlines and regard these contrasts as symbols of the two main elements of the Persian mind—a definite masculine vigor and creativeness and a refined and subtle delicacy, in art as well as in the enjoyment of life.

Leaving such fanciful speculations, we turn to a more concrete task of appreciation. From the Armenian highlands northwest of Lake Urmia, where the Caucasus and the Anatolian high plateau may be said to meet, two great mountain ranges begin. The first one, running at first in an almost southern direction, forms the Kurdistan region. Turning into the so-called Zagros system, it follows a soft curve southeast along the Persian Gulf and constitutes the bulk of the Luristan and Bakhtiari country. This wild and rugged mass, broken into several ranges, which are separated by more or less deep valleys and accessible from the west and the east by a limited number of transverse valleys, is the most important part of the first chain. Comparatively rich in forests and in water, it rises to altitudes of more than 11,000 feet. It extends into the equally torn mountains of Fars, barren and of lower altitudes. They taper in a southeasterly direction along the Gulf of Oman in the coastal regions called Makran, of which Persian Baluchistan is the western part. The whole length of this mountain chain is approximately 2,500 miles. Parallel to this gigantic mountain wall, but less impressive in length, height, and breadth, runs an inner range. It starts west of the great salt lake Daria-i-Namak and merges north of the peripheral chain into the mountains of Baluchi-

stan, there culminating in the volcano Kuh-i-Bazman, 11,470 feet high. In the northern part of the plain between the central range and the outer range lies the town of Isfahan.

Bordering the frontier of Russia, at the junction of the Anatolian plateau and the Caucasus Mountains, is the second great range. It runs southeast to the Caspian Sea, reaching in the Savalan Dagħ an altitude of 14,000 feet, and forms the Elburz range, which separates the Persian mainland from the Caspian provinces. Here, northeast of the capital, Teheran, is the highest mountain of Iran, the Demavend, with an altitude of 18,600 feet. Diminishing in altitude, the mountains follow the Gorgan River and form the boundary between the provinces of Khorasan and Russian Turkestan. A series of less important mountains and hills descends from the northeast corner of Khorasan along the Afghan border down to the mountains of Baluchistan, where the impressive mass of the volcano Kuh-i-Taftan, 13,270 feet, is the dominating and characteristic feature.

Such are the natural barriers of the country. Nearly all the settlements of any importance are to be found along the mountain ranges, either in the valleys and on the plains between the chains or on the slopes that descend to the main plateau or to the sea. This is due to the scarcity of water. Iran, on the whole, with the exception of the Caspian region, is an arid country, and the problem of water and irrigation is acute. Rivers are few. The only river which deserves the name according to our standards, the only navigable one, is in the southwest, the Karun River, an affluent of the Shatt al Arab, coming from the mountains of the Bakhtiariis. In the northeast is the Atrak, flowing into the Caspian Sea and forming in its lower part the frontier with Russia. Parallel with it runs the much smaller Gorgan River. Farther to the west the Sefid Rud descends from the Elburz Mountains into the Caspian Sea near the town of Resht. Even the Zaindeh Rud, important as it is, since it is the source of fertility for the Isfahan region, does not reach the sea, but ends its life in a swamp. Of the other rivers of minor importance some carry water during only part of the year.

The main character of the plateau is barren land—sand, or stone-

desert, or steppe, with ranges or groups of hills, or rugged rocks of fantastic shape and brilliant with various colors—a land which, unattractive, even repellent and terrifying to the average traveler, exhales the silent majesty of the third day of the Creation, before life appeared on earth and cannot fail to reflect upon men's souls the deep experience of nothingness and futility so marked in the manifestations of the Persian genius. The formidable Dasht-i-Kavir, south of the Elburz and southwest of the Khorasan range, and the Dasht-i-Lut, in the southeast, with immense saline swamps, are the purest expressions of the spirit of negation of existence. The steppes and deserts of the Iranian plateau are part of the great steppe-and-desert zone which extends from the Atlantic coast of West Africa into the steppes and deserts of Central Asia. It is called Sahara west of the Nile, Arabian desert east of it, Nefud and Rub al Khali in Arabia proper, Syrian desert in the Near East and Dasht-i-Kavir and Dasht-i-Lut in Iran—a gigantic belt interrupted by the Nile valley (itself comparable to a great oasis), the valleys of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and the mountain ranges of Iran. However, throughout this barren area oases are scattered, varying from artificial wells or natural springs surrounded by shrubs and palm trees to a sufficiently abundant water supply to permit the settlement of a sedentary population. If conditions are favorable and human nature assiduous enough, such communities may grow into regular towns; cities such as Mecca, Medina, and Damascus are oases in origin, character and situation, as are most of the Persian towns of the plateau: Teheran, Isfahan, Shiraz, and most of the other towns. They are islands in an ocean of barrenness, and their existence is due to the toil of man constantly occupied in enlarging the fertile area by irrigation and in defending his conquests against the evil powers of desert and steppe, burning sun, sand, and wind.

Conditions are different in the great Persian deserts, Kavir and Lut; here the saline nature of the soil forbids human settlements, forbids almost any animal and vegetable life. Only at the juncture of these two deserts does a town-oasis, Tabbas, emerge like a *fata morgana* from the barren tract of land with a fresh-water spring,

groves of date palms, shrubs, and flowers—a unique phenomenon as far north as the thirty-fourth degree of latitude.

With her 628,000 square miles, Iran is larger than France, England (England, Scotland, and Wales), Italy, and Spain together, or more than six times as large as the state of Colorado. Iran is a country of truly Asiatic dimensions, and to the continents of Asia, America, or Africa we must turn, or to countries which are quasi-continent, such as the United States or India, if we are to look for the same varieties and extremes of physical and climatic conditions as are contained within the borders of Iran. This fact is clearly indicated by the old saying "Iran has seven climates"; this cannot be questioned, even though science may prefer to choose to state it differently.

Because of the shape and nature of Iran a graphic method of presentation will be more instructive and illustrative than a simple description. Let us draw a line across the country from north to south, starting approximately in the middle of the northern frontier at the town of Meshhed-i-Sar in the Caspian province of Mazanderan and touching the southern border at the town of Bandar Abbas, where the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea meet—a distance of about 700 miles. Another transverse line will start in the middle of the western frontier at a point east of Baghdad and end at a corresponding spot on the Persian Afghan border—about 880 miles. Finally, a diagonal will come from the northwest corner near the town of Maku and reach the junction of Persian and British Baluchistan near the town of Gwatar at the Indian Ocean, a distance of about 1,400 miles, and another, representing about 900 miles, from the estuary of the Shatt al Arab in the southwest, will run up to the town of Lutfabad on the eastern slope of the mountains which separate Iran from the Turkestan steppe.

Meshhed-i-Sar, one of the important seaports of Mazanderan, has grown rapidly under Reza Shah. The almost subtropical climate makes the province the most fertile in Iran. Rice, tea, and tobacco are grown in considerable quantities; fruits of all kinds and all other products of the soil are abundant. The northern slope of the Elburz Mountains is covered with virgin forests and luxuriant veg-

etation. The forests hide small and big game; birds of all kinds, stags, foxes and lynx, even the leopard and the wild boar are found there in large numbers. The fisheries of Gilan and Mazanderan, where caviar of high quality is produced, are among the most interesting industries of Iran. In addition there are silk and other factories, part of the great industrialization plan of the late shah. Like most of his predecessors, Reza Shah favored Mazanderan by selecting it for the location of royal residences.

Bandar Abbas, at the southern end of the line was formerly Gombroon. Today the port is of secondary importance, but in the seventeenth century it was a great commercial emporium, where merchants of all nations met—English, Dutch, Portuguese, Armenians, Turks, Indians, Arabs, and others, and where merchandise arrived and left by caravan and ship. Today it is only important for its coastal navigation. Barren shores extend east and west, and it is one of the very hottest regions on the earth.

The west-east line starts in the mountains of Luristan, where the snow remains on the peaks until the beginning of summer. The mountain slopes are well covered with trees; the oak, the beech, the sycamore grow amidst a large variety of Alpine flowers in lower altitudes, and in the valleys the walnut and the fig, the terebinth and the almond, are to be found. The abundance of water courses accounts for ideal pasturage in the valleys. Wild sheep, mountain goats (ibex), and deer are numerous, as are wolves, wild cats, and the more ferocious animals. On the other end this line passes between the small towns of Birjand and Qaën, both oases in barren and hilly country, and so reaches the Afghan border.

The northwest corner of Iran is the focus of Russian, Turkish, and Persian interests. Here is Tabriz, with a population of 213,000, the second largest city of Iran and an important commercial center. It is situated in the rich plain of Lake Urmia, at an altitude of 4,400 feet, and prior to Isfahan it was the capital of the Safavid dynasty. Tabriz is connected by a short railroad with Julfa on the Russian border and from there with the line to Tiflis. From Tabriz through Maku runs one of the classic roads of the Near East, still of great importance, to Erzerum and Trebizond on the Black Sea

while in the southwestern direction an equally frequented road descends to Rawanduz in Iraq. The railway under construction from Teheran will reach Tabriz in the near future.

The southeastern end of our line finds us in quite different surroundings. The town of Gwatar, one of the hottest spots of the hot Persian Gulf, is a small port of Persian Baluchistan at the frontier of British Baluchistan. Here we are transferred from the Caucasus into precincts where India and Arabia seem to meet and where the camel and the date palm are characteristic features. Through this region Alexander passed when he returned in 325 B.C. from his Indian campaign to meet with his fleet farther west at Hormuz.

In physical and cultural contrasts our fourth line may well be compared with the third. At the estuary of the Shatt al Arab lies the new town of Abadan, one of the great oil emporiums of the globe, where the crude oil, coming through the pipeline from the oil fields in the mountains, passes through the refineries, and is shipped on tankers to all regions of the world. But apart from the oil, the province of Khuzistan, including part of the Biblical Elam, is to be restored to its former fertility by great irrigation projects.

From this region we travel northeast to the town of Kuchan in northeastern Khorasan, not very far, as the crow flies, from the point where the Russian Transcaspian railroad, on its way to Russian Central Asia, almost touches the Persian border. Near Kuchan, Nadir Shah was assassinated in 1747. The town is situated in mountainous country and does not show much of the natural wealth to be found in other parts of the large province of Khorasan.

This survey shows not only the variety but also the contrasts in Iran's soil structure and climate. It reveals, moreover, its centrality, which few, if any, countries on the globe can pretend to rival. Iran's location makes it a crossroads for migrations and a meeting place of civilizations—a terrible asset. Surrounded by highly civilized sedentary populations and by fluctuating nomadic tribes, Iran had to be either hammer or anvil. It had to produce a powerful civilization if it wanted to survive as a cultural entity between the competing Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Turks, yet at the same time it had to be elastic and receptive enough so that

creativity and readiness to spread its own original treasures could be matched by the capacity to receive and assimilate influences from without.

Anthropologically, our network is also illuminating. Of the four diagonal lines, two start and end in or near tribal country. The northwest-southeast line starts in or near the territory of the Kurds and ends in the region of the Baluchis. The southwest-northeast diagonal springs from the Arab tribes of Khuzistan and runs into the plain of the Turkomans, while the west-east line begins in the country of the Lur tribes. The north-south line forms the only exception, leading from and to sedentary populations.

Since the dawn of civilization the tribes have been all-important elements in the life of Iran. Anthropologically and ethnologically they constitute an interesting and valuable part of the population, and in the political history of Iran they have played a large part. Practically independent or semi-independent until about fifteen years ago, these nomads have at times defended the country against foreign foes if they did not prefer to stand against the central government or to put up a dynasty of their own, as the Kajar tribe did at the end of the eighteenth century, when they founded the dynasty which ruled Iran until 1925.

Most of the tribes in Iran are to be found at the periphery of the central plateau. This is a distinctive feature of Iran. Indeed, it would hardly be possible to point to a civilized country which harbors a similar distribution of sedentary and nomadic populations. At all times, of course, it has been the fate of sedentary cultivators of the soil and of great civilizations to be exposed to the invasions of unsettled peoples roaming outside the country's territory. China may be considered the outstanding example; a great civilized country, it has been harassed during its whole history by the peoples of the steppes; the Manchus even succeeded in establishing their rule over the Chinese. In Europe, the Roman Empire in the period of the great migrations mirrors the same situation, while in Africa all the sedentary states bordering the Sahara desert, Morocco in the north and the Fulbe and the Hausa states in the south, suffered the same fate. On the other hand, there are huge countries where,

as in Arabia, the interior is inhabited by a large nomadic population, while the sedentaries are mainly to be found in the coastal areas. It is peculiar to Iran that at its periphery is a chain of tribes who to all intents and purposes are and have always been considered an integral part of the country.

To western travelers the Persian tribes have always been objects of romantic or scientific interest. Depending upon the knowledge, the temperament, and the personal experience of the observer they have been praised and idealized or regarded as primitive barbarians and troublemakers. For impartial judgment a few general remarks are in order. The term "nomadism" comprises different forms and degrees of unsettled life. The Persian tribes never were nomads in the strict sense of the term. They do not belong to the type which the French designate as *le grand nomadisme*, that is, pure nomadism, such as characterizes the bedouins of the interior of the Arabian peninsula, the inhabitants of the Sahara and of the Syrian desert, who, wandering with their flocks and herds, pitch their tents wherever a patch of green is found, each tribe contesting with the others for grazing ground. The nomads of the great Asiatic steppes—Turks, Mongoloids, and Mongols—who populate the vast territories between China and the Lake Aral, are also pure nomads. Such nomads, characteristically enough, have in several periods changed the fate of Asia and of Europe, and in so doing they have made world history: the Arabs, setting out from their deserts in the seventh century A.D. for world conquest; the Turks, advancing in the eighth and eleventh centuries from the Mongolian steppes to absorb the lands of the Caliphate; the Mongols, bringing terror and destruction in every part of Asia and into the heart of Europe in the thirteenth century, yet founding great empires and serving at times as the protectors of civilization.

To this kind of "classic" nomadism that of the Persian tribes bears but faint resemblance. The country itself, in spite of its great size, offers little possibility for real nomadism. Most of the tribes live in the great mountain ranges of western and southwestern Iran. The nomadism of mountaineers cannot be of the same kind as that of the peoples of steppes and deserts, nor can it have the

same scope. In opposition to such "horizontal" nomadism, the nomadism of mountain tribes may be called "vertical," for they go from mountains to plain and back to the mountains, according to the seasons, in search of the best pasturage for their flocks. The only ones whose form of life more closely resembled *le grand nomadisme* were the Turkomans, who wandered in the steppes southeast and east of the Caspian Sea, regardless of Russo-Persian borderlines, and, though to a smaller degree, the Baluchis in southeastern Iran. The second reason for the absence of classic nomadism lies in the fact that Iran has no great deserts comparable to the Sahara and the Arabian and Syrian deserts. These deserts are, with the exception of small areas, not absolutely barren. In the Arabian desert, outside the Nefud, there is annual rainfall, and for a short period large stretches are covered with green. In all three deserts wells have been sunk, around which sparse vegetation is to be found, even though they are not rich enough to give life to real oases supporting a more or less numerous population. These isolated wells and fertile oases, with their palm groves and even agriculture, not only render possible true nomadic life but at the same time they furnish favorable conditions for the great trade routes across the deserts, where caravans since immemorial days have transported goods and ideas.

The great Persian desert is more formidable. Extending from the Elburz Mountains in the north to Baluchistan, it covers almost one-third of Iran. With the exception of the ice belts around the poles, the Kavir is the largest absolutely barren and deserted region on the earth's surface. While in the sand of the periphery some venomous vermin—poisonous snakes and spiders and some salt plants—may be found, the Kavir proper is devoid of any sign of life. The fear of death by exhaustion, thirst, and storm has not prevented caravans from crossing this desert at two or three points, but the imagination has been justified in making the Kavir the home of all sorts of ghastly demoniacal beings. Finally, it is important that all tribes comprise, though to very different degrees, scattered settlements or even centers with sedentary populations.

The general characteristics of any great representatives of tribal

nomadism will agree in essentials, but allowance must be made for individual varieties. The Arab poet al Mutanabbi has admirably condensed the bedouin life and ideals in verse.

I am known by the night, the horse and the desert,
By the sword and the guest, the paper and the pen.

Here is the son of the desert, inseparable from his horse, which carries him on nightly raids, which have a central place in his life; here is pride in the sacred virtue of hospitality and the assertion that the gift of the poet must accompany the warlike qualities. These ideals of the noble bedouin, which are now generally agreed to have deeply influenced those of the knights and troubadours in the early European Middle Ages, cannot be entirely attributed to the Persian tribesmen. However, if we omit "paper and pen," the other elements will be found to represent him. He shares with the bedouin the unbounded spirit of independence, the simplicity of a life rich in hardships and dangers, which he is ready to defend with his blood. He equals him in contempt for the villager and townsman, being convinced that sedentary life means loss of freedom and the corruption of warlike virtues. In this superiority he finds the natural right to make sedentary populations favorite objects of his raids when he is not occupied with tribal and intertribal feuds. Moreover, the activities which we stigmatize by the unfriendly terms "robbery" and "theft" are to him fundamental rights of the strong and the noble. The hospitality of the Persian tribesman, his frankness and generosity once his confidence has been won, have been acknowledged and appreciated by almost all foreigners who have had the opportunity of more than a superficial acquaintance with him. The Persian tribes have indeed been a world in themselves, conscious of their own values and ideals, which must not be easily underrated and disregarded, even though their world had to disappear under the onslaught of modern civilization.

Of the mountain tribes of Iran, the most important are the Kurds, the Lurs, the Bakhtiaris, and the Qashqais. They inhabit the great mountain ranges of northwestern, western, and southwestern Iran. Starting from the north we meet first the Kurds.

Kurdistan, the land of the Kurds, comprises Persian and Turkish, and today Iraq, territory. In former days the Kurds used to move freely from one territory to another, to avoid paying taxes or when pasturage proved insufficient or when intertribal feuds seemed to make migrating advisable. Endless difficulties and border disputes arose between the Turkish and the Persian governments, but the result was that the Kurds became better known than most of the other tribes. These disturbances have become less and less frequent, for the Kurds, in Iran at least, took to fixed settlements long before the time of Reza Shah. They are, in fact, the only great Iranian tribe that has given up nomadism before sedentary life was imposed upon them by force. The settling down, however, did not affect their character or, to any great extent, their ideals. Combining the peaceful profession of peasant and herdsman with what seemed to them the more dignified pursuits of warrior and robber, they continued to live up to the reputation of highwaymen which had been theirs since the days when they (called Kardouchoi by Xenophon) harassed the retreat of the ten thousand Greeks to the Black Sea in 401 B.C. Their fighting qualities have been generally recognized. Shah Abbas II paid tribute to them when he settled thousands of Kurds as a military colony in Khorasan to defend this particularly restless northeastern frontier.

The Kurds, like the Lurs, are considered descendants from old Persian stock. Their language, whether or not derived from the old Persian, is certainly related to the Persian, with the inevitable admixture of Turkish and Arabic elements. As to their religious belief, they belong with the Arabs, the Turkomans, and the Baluchis to the Sunnite Islam. Well-defined and orthodox religion, however, does not carry much weight with the tribes. Reminders of pre-Islamic animistic creeds and superstitions are held in equal if not in higher esteem, and in general a marked indifference to religion characterizes nearly all of them.

The country of the Lurs comprises a wider territory than is indicated by the name of the administrative province of Luristan. This is due to the fact that the Bakhtiari are generally considered a branch of the Luri family under the name "Great Lurs," together

with the Mammassani and Kuhgeluhje, whereas the Feili are designated as "Little Lurs." It has become customary to deal with the Little Lurs and the Bakhtiaris separately. While such a division may not be borne out entirely by anthropological and ethnological evidence, it seems amply justified by the part the Bakhtiaris have been destined to play in the history of modern Iran.

The Lurs occupy the center and the southern part of the Zagros chain—a country of high Alpine character but well watered and fertile. It seems likely that the Kurds and the Lurs have preserved the comparatively pure original Persian type. It must be admitted that the term "comparatively" is ambiguous. It may mean "relative to the original type." The skeptic, however, may feel inclined to contend that "comparative" purity must be understood only with relation to the infinitely stronger admixtures and blendings the original Persian type has undergone everywhere else during the vicissitudes of its fateful history. Pending thorough anthropological investigation, general observation shows that the number of types among the Little Lurs is greater than that among the Bakhtiaris. While the latter seem to be in general taller than the Little Lurs and partly long-, partly short-headed, such a clear division is hardly applicable to the Little Lurs. The Luri language is akin to Persian.

The Lurs share with the Turkomans the reputation of being the most restive and indomitable among the Persian tribes. After the subjection and disarmament of the tribes by Reza Shah was considered completed, the Lurs broke loose once more in a serious revolt which could be quelled only after a long time and by drastic measures. Like the Turkomans, they were the terror of the sedentaries, and when they swept down from their mountains into the plains, the villagers left their fields and sought refuge behind the mud walls of their fortified villages. However, the Lurs' lust for plunder did not stop there, and larger towns, such as Burudjerd were more than once looted.

The Lurs are counted among the adherents of Shiite Islam. It is easy to see that there is little reality in this classification. Their religious cult consists of the worship of "pirs," men that have died

with the character of saintliness, but there is no, or at most only a faint, relation between these local saints and the Imams and Imam-zadehs of the Shiites. Their tombs, scattered throughout the country, are always to be found where there are trees and a spring of water, and at the feast of the saint the trees are adorned with pieces of colored cloth and lighted by candles. All this suggests that the cult was originally, and is perhaps often even now, a primitive worship of trees and springs, and as for the tombs, it may well be that many of them are cenotaphs. Wilson * writes that he has "seen women making their bows and saying their prayers to the high places, lofty peaks" and that he has "seen great rocks in distant valleys red with the blood of recent sacrifice." One is vividly reminded of the Berbers of the African Atlas, with their worship of trees and springs connected with that of local saints, the Marabouts. With them, as with the Lurs, Islam is but a thin varnish which has penetrated neither into their belief nor into their moral attitude. A Lur at Khoramabad said something characteristic in a conversation with us. He proudly asserted that he had killed fifteen Persians. A man of unusually fine physique, tall, long-headed, with a narrow face and an aquiline nose, black hair, clear-cut features, and piercing eyes, he could well be credited with such exploits. Now that such deeds are no longer possible, he had taken to the more peaceful profession of dallal, an agent for everything, with which he was apparently well satisfied. At the end of our talk he said: "Before, I was a barbarian; now, I am a Moslem," identifying in a very illuminating way the Islamic faith with civilization and rejecting his former way of living and probably his former creed—provided he had had one—with barbarianism and paganism.

The town of Khoramabad, with its old fortress, picturesquely situated in a narrow plain, was and is the only settlement of any importance. Some villages made of mud huts existed before the enforced settlement. But the overwhelming majority lived in brown tents woven of goats' hair. The front part of the tent was reserved for the men and served for the reception of guests, while the back part, separated by carpet hangings from the front, was

* Sir Arnold T. Wilson, *Persia*, London, Benn, 1932, p. 73.

occupied by the women, children, and what little there was of household ware, vessels, goatskins for churning and preserving milk, and other possessions. In early summer the whole encampment leaves the winter residence in the plains for the lower mountain regions and, meeting related branches of the clan, moves to more elevated pasturage, following month by month the burgeoning of vegetation in higher altitudes. Women, children, and chickens are packed on horses, together with tent parts and household utensils, while men and older boys take care of the flocks of goats, sheep, and cattle. In fall the journey is undertaken in reverse.

This is the nomadism of the Persian mountain tribes, a "vertical nomadism," I would like to call it, in opposition to the "horizontal nomadism" of the steppes and desert. This, however, is not the only difference between the vertical nomadism and the "great nomadism." While in the realm of great nomadism, particularly in the Arab peninsula and the Syrian desert, the tribes used to contend for pasturage and raiding each other was their favorite occupation, hostilities among the great tribes of Persia seem to have been rare. The main reason for this intertribal peace is undoubtedly that the territories inhabited by the tribes have since prehistoric times sufficed for their livelihood; on the other hand, their seasonal migrations were defined in place and time so that frictions with the neighboring tribes did not occur. Raiding—beside the raiding of the sedentaries—cattle thefts, and blood feuds went on within the tribe itself among the different clans. Under these circumstances the vertical nomadism of the Persian tribes is a nomadism of its own kind—a limited and well regulated nomadism.

The original and normal form of government among the Great Lurs, as among the tribes in general, was ill defined and rather loose. The clan, as the unit of patriarchically ruled large families, was governed by the council of the old men, the white beards. It happened, however, again and again that because of strong personal qualities and influence or by means of wealth wisely dispensed, particularly in times of scarcity of food, a man has brought a number of clans under his sway and succeeded in establishing a sort of feudal regime, which he might even pass on to his descend-

ants. On the whole the Great Lurs were not responsive to this kind of antidemocratic government.

Problems of international policy have made the Bakhtiari better known than the Little Lurs. In the late eighties of the last century, when the Russo-British antagonism in Asia was still in ascendance, the government of India, in whose sphere of influence Iran belonged, became interested in the Bakhtiari country with the idea of developing its natural defenses into a bulwark against Russian aggression. Moreover, a project, of which the British never lost sight, of a trans-Persian railway linking India with the Mediterranean may have focused attention on the Bakhtiari country. As the tracks of the railway would have to run through Bakhtiari territory or south of it, it was indispensable to have a foothold there. British officers were sent to explore the country and to establish friendly and firm relations with the Bakhtiaris. Later, when oil was discovered in the Bakhtiari hills, the importance of the tribe rose rapidly. Large sums were paid to the chiefs to keep the tribesmen quiet, and when the pipeline from the oil wells at Takhti-Sulaiman to Ahwaz and Abadan was constructed, tribesmen worked on the line and were afterwards entrusted with its protection. There were various repercussions from this long contact with Western influence, but on the whole they made themselves felt indirectly through the changes brought about in the positions of the tribal chiefs. Supported by British money and provided with British arms, a powerful dynastic family could establish itself which would be more of a British vassal than a subject of the crown of Iran. While the tribesmen themselves profited little of British money and influence, sons of some chiefs were brought to England to get a modern education. The decisive part the Bakhtiari played in the revolutionary movement led to the Constitution in 1908, and revealed British ideas and guidance.

The mountains of the Bakhtiaris are perhaps more grandiose and more fertile than those of the Little Lurs. This is due to the fact that their country extends farther south and that it profits by the water of the upper Karun and its tributaries.

The religious creed of the Bakhtiaris does not differ from that

of the Little Lurs. However, the tombs of the warriors used to be distinguished by roughly hewn stone images of lions.

The Bakhtiari, as did all nomadizing tribes, lived mainly on the products of their flocks. They practiced, however, as do the other tribes, some modest agriculture. Before moving to their summer abode in the mountains, they sowed seeds of wheat or barley and left the fields under the guardianship of some tribesmen. The harvest took place when they returned in the fall.

The veiling of women is unknown among the tribes. With them polygamy was never a universally accepted habit. The Kurds are mostly monogamous, so are most of the Lurs. In these tribes young men and girls meet freely, they join in old folk dances, and the courting of the marriageable girls goes on in the old forms, in which quick wit and repartee are combined with spontaneous or traditional poetical expression of feelings. Where polygamy prevailed, as it did among the Bakhtiari, such individualized relations are less likely.

As fighting troops, the Bakhtiari rank with the Kurds. The cavalry of the Persian kings, which has been highly valued by all European observers, was composed mainly of these two tribes. Many Bakhtiari families had been settled as hostages in villages around Teheran. This measure was intended not only to guarantee the loyalty of the tribe but also to assure the provision of a specific number of men for the king's army.

The Qashqais are presumably of Turkish origin. Their summer quarters extended over the highlands between Shiraz and Isfahan, where they were immediate neighbors of the Bakhtiari. In winter they returned with their flocks across the mountain ranges to the hills and lowlands northwest and west of Shiraz. During the first World War they created much trouble for the British.

The origin and racial character of the Baluchis are one of the numerous anthropological problems of Iran which still wait for elucidation. The diversity of types which confronts the observer seems to outweigh the unity, and the attention of the observer is diverted more to a search for the composite racial elements than to the establishment and description of a Baluchi species. The assertion that

they are of Arab origin, among the Baluchis as among other members of the Islamic world, an outgrowth of tribal pride and a claim to aristocracy, has to some extent a sound historical basis. Arabs have come as conquerors to Baluchistan since the conquest of Iran in 641, they have set up dynasties on the coast of the Persian Gulf, and they settled as merchants in the coastal area even before the time of Mohammed, dominating the trade between India and Arabia and the West. So Arab settlements and Arab chieftains existed everywhere in Makran. In quantity the contribution of Arab blood cannot have been an important or even a determinant factor.

More relevant may be the Turkoman influence, which some find even in the Baluchi tribal organization and customs. Not only are there in the Bampur district in the heart of Persian Baluchistan a considerable number of Tajiks (old or original stock of the population in Turkestan and northern Khorasan), but since Baluchis are settled in Seistan, the country between Khorasan and Baluchistan and even farther north, while the Turkomans came as far south as Seistan and not only as raiders, the admixture of Turkoman blood was probably not negligible. Certain not-rare negroid features seem to indicate African immigration or slave importation, if they may not be considered the heritage of an aboriginal negrito population which in all likelihood once spread from Africa along the shores of Persia into India.

The most important element in the Baluchi people of today seems to have come from India. Persian Baluchistan forms with British Baluchistan a geographical and in all probability an anthropological unit. Branches of tribes coming from India proper are scattered throughout British Baluchistan. Considering the Baluchis as a whole, one can hardly escape the conclusion that early Indian stock is predominant. The Baluchi language is supposed to be of Persian origin. This factor, of course, cannot be excluded, though it would be difficult to deduce that the Baluchis have some right to claim the Persians as their ancestors.

A considerable part of the Baluchis used to live in fixed settlements before the late shah disarmed them and garrisoned the

country. Their villages, consisting of mud huts, palm-leaf huts, or tents, were grouped, as in British Baluchistan, around the fortified stone house or castle of the khan. After the destruction of these strongholds the resistance was virtually at an end. The wealth of the Baluchis consists of their camels, sheep, and goats; the palm tree and the culture of barley and wheat provide the other part of their food. Though considering themselves Sunnites, their faith, like that of the Lurs, consists chiefly of animistic ideas and the worship of local saints.

Descendants of the Arab conquerors, or such as claim this origin, are scattered throughout Iran, although after twelve hundred years it may not always be easy to identify them. The caliphs settled many Arabs in Khorasan for the defense of the frontier, and Arab dynasties ruled for centuries in Seistan, Qaën, Mohammerah, and other regions. The tribes of pure, or comparatively pure, Arab blood are to be found in southwestern Iran, in the plains of Shush-tar and Dizful, and in the swamps and marshes of the Tigris River where Iraq and Iran join. It is quite natural that it should be so, for in these regions they are near their Arab homeland and their brothers in Iraq. Here they live in villages of mud huts or settlements consisting of reed dwellings—an artful reed architecture has developed—tending their flocks, working the soil, cultivating their date groves, and fishing and hunting in the marshes and lowlands. Theirs is one of the most fertile regions of Iran, Khuzistan, formerly Arabistan. Arabs in today's Iran cannot be compared with the conquering Arabs of former centuries or with the Bedouins of the Arab homeland.

The home of the Turkomans in Iran is in the steppes east of the Caspian Sea as far as the source of the Gorgan River, but they are to be found from the mountains and hills of northeastern Khorasan over the whole high plateau as far south as Turbat-i-Haidari, even as far as Seistan. The invasions which have changed the face and the fate of Iran came from the southwest and the northeast. From beyond the Euphrates and the Tigris and the plains of Arabistan the Arabs rode into the mainland of Iran to make of it a part of the caliphate. Northeast, from the Khorasan mountain range,

came to Khorasan in the second century A.D., later the Seljuks and Ottoman Turks, then the Mongols of Genghis and of Timur. The Turki tribe of the Kajars, which has given to Iran the dynasty preceding the one now reigning, were brought from Turkistan into Iran by the grandson of Genghis. Out of another Turki tribe, the Afshar, came one of the greatest Persian conquerors and soldiers, Nadir Shah. The pride in their warlike qualities, which the modern Turks share with all these peoples, is amply justified by conquests and the foundation of empires, whereas their skill in organization and administration, though far from being negligible, cannot match their military virtues.

The tribes reflect the history of Iran. The old Iranian stock is represented by Kurds and Lurs, the Arabs and Turkomans are derived from the conquering peoples, while the Qashqais have come as immigrants, as have some of the Turk tribes. Estimates for the last hundred years agree that the nomadic tribes make up for about one quarter of the population of Iran. Two things, however, must be kept in mind when pondering the problem of the tribes. First, that nomadism seems to have been declining as we approach present times. Quite apart from the outstanding example, the Kurds, who practically took to sedentary life during the nineteenth century, the number of fixed settlements among all the other tribes increased, even though slowly. Furthermore, it may be assumed that the tribal population was diminishing rather than increasing, and for various reasons. The process of natural selection must work harder among people whose lives are in every respect rougher than those of sedentaries. Since the tribes constituted the largest and the best part of the king's armies, death took a considerable toll, and fighting within the tribes and blood feuds worked to the same end. It has been mentioned that polygamy was far from being a general habit among the tribes; this is another reason why the rate of propagation must compare unfavorably with that of the sedentary population. Also, they suffered considerable loss when certain groups were transferred to distant regions and never rejoined their tribes. Such transplantations have been frequent in the past. The kings adopted this measure when the defense of the

frontier, notably the northeastern frontier, required the use of high-class troops. Arab and Kurdish tribesmen were settled in Khorasan. Some transfers were made as an efficient measure to disrupt the power of an unruly tribe. When Aga Mohammed Khan had broken the power of the Zand dynasty, he moved parts of the Lakh tribes, from which the dynasty came, from the province of Fars to a northern province in order to render impossible any revolt in the future. In due course these communities merged with the other inhabitants of their new homeland. Finally, a small but steady loss was inevitably sustained by the tribes when during the seasonal migrations some men stayed behind and settled in non-tribal villages or when on trading expeditions to the towns some yielded to the attractions of sedentary life.

The tribal elements are scattered throughout Iran. While in many cases language and physical characteristics make identification easy, more frequently, perhaps, they have been so completely absorbed that differences have been wiped out.

Here we touch an important demographic fact. If such losses impaired the strength of the tribes, with regard to racial hygiene they fulfilled a unique and wholesome function. The tribesman is a fine type, virile and with moral qualities which, though not always easy to bear, deserve appreciation. Women as well as men have physical and moral strength; they are unspoiled by the diseases and the corruptive influences of town life. For this reason the settling of tribal people outside their native regions could not but produce a salubrious result.

The economic importance of the tribes has always been considerable and has been recognized as such. Many conflicts between Iran and Russia and Iran and Turkey were caused by the desire of these countries to induce tribes which had left their territories, to return. As great cattle breeders they provide the towns with the products of their flocks, meat, milk, churned milk, butter, and cheese. In fact, Persian towns depend for their living upon these products. This became apparent when as a result of the interruption of the traditional tribal life by the enforced settlement there occurred a serious shortage of animal products in the towns. Ani-

mal hides and charcoal are other commodities which the tribes exchange in town for their various needs, inasmuch as these needs are not satisfied by their home industries, although indigenous industries have developed among all the tribes. The art of pottery is known everywhere, the blacksmith provides tools and arms, and there are other kinds of craftsmanship which show considerable skill. Particularly for the arts of spinning and weaving the tribes have become justifiably famous. The carpets, for which each tribe has developed its own pattern and technique, betray almost unequaled good taste and imagination. The same qualities distinguished their costumes, which excelled in variety and originality of style and richness of material. A well-known example was the dress of the Luri women. Even the simple clothing for daily use was marked by good taste, since it was well adapted to their living conditions. For instance, the felt coat and hat of the Lurs, original in shape, warm and impenetrable to rain and humidity, and almost infinitely durable.

The tribal world is a world of its own; the tribesman's idea of independence, of the right of the stronger to kill and rob, is, of course, to be challenged and condemned from the viewpoint of our own civilization. But as a nursery of human values, primitive but strong and well adjusted to tribal purposes and ideals, the tribe should be measured by its own standards. Naturally, the tribesmen had, as everybody has, the vices of their virtues.

Large numbers of sedentaries live beyond the great mountain ranges which encircle the Iranian plateau. Most of them inhabit the Caspian provinces from the Russian border to the Turkoman steppes. To the south they inhabit the province of Khuzistan, which consists of alluvial soil, like the lower part of Iraq, and competes with the latter in fertility. Also, they occupy the more or less inhospitable regions of the Persian Gulf, coastal strips, and towns. However, the great majority of the sedentary population is to be found on the high plateau. Here, not in the lowlands of the Caspian Sea or in the plains of Khuzistan, the Iranian civilization developed, and here it reached the various peaks of its history. It may even have originated on the plateau in the regions close to the

mountain ranges of the southwest or in the valleys flanked by these ranges. Such an origin would distinguish the Iranian civilization from that of the other great civilizations of Asia, Europe, and Africa. The civilizations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, the Indus valley, and China were born in the alluvial plains of great rivers, or at least in regions favored by geography and the fertility of their soil, such as Attica and Latium, the homelands of our Western civilization. It seems as if the genius of civilization had followed the line of least resistance and selected spots where abundance of water satisfied the essential needs of life and where the ocean invited exchange of material and immaterial goods with other peoples. If so, fate had other intentions in assigning to Iranian civilization a birthplace where the first and paramount task was not so much to make use of the opportunities it offered as to triumph over the obstacles nature itself had placed in the way of bare existence and cultural evolution. Obstinate energy, circumspect activity, and stern optimism, rooted in profound metaphysical and moral conceptions, were necessary to take up the fight and to pursue it to a glorious end.

The Iranian plateau resembles a triangle, whose acute angle lies in Azerbaijan. The sides are formed by the Elburz range and the Zagros range with its continuation, while the Irano-Afghan border and the Irano-Indian border form the base of the triangle. The plateau includes about 600,000 square miles. Its average height above sea level is 400 feet, varying from depressions of 500 feet to elevations of 8,000 feet above. The plateau itself would not be Persian if it did not harbor various even contrasting geological and climatological conditions. The great salt deserts Dasht-i-Kavir and Dasht-i-Lut fill the major part of eastern Iran and extend from the Elburz range to Baluchistan. Sand deserts and stone deserts and steppes cover the rest, interrupted by more or less developed patches of green, but large and uninterrupted fertile regions like the plains of Hamadan or the great oasis of Isfahan are exceptional. A similar exception is the fertile part of Khorasan, the granary of Iran. Sand and aridity are ever-present enemies, evils in themselves. Compare with this the conditions in China, where the only

threat comes from the excess of the good—the inundations caused by great rivers, which break through the dams—and in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India, where the civilized rivers lend themselves willingly to irrigational systems without revolting against the hand of man. On the Iranian plateau almost every foot of fertile soil must be wrested from the powers of evil. When it is finally under control, indefatigable toil must defend it against their ever-impending wiles, their efforts to convert the land into desert again. Bring water to the land, and it will reward you by performing the miracles you ask of it. But if you forget to surround your paradise with a mud wall, the sand will reclaim it, and if the supply of water is stopped, vegetation will disappear in a trice, without leaving a trace. The Persian saying “When man dies, the tree dies” states the fact with monumental simplicity. Whereas in our climates the life of man depends, as it were, upon the tree, in Iran the tree—the outstanding symbol of vegetative life—needs the hand of man in order to exist at all.

So it is not incidental that the Persian genius has invented a method of irrigation more ingenious than anything man has created to secure for himself the use of the most indispensable element—water. This is the qanat system. A well is sunk, if possible on the slope of a hill. When water is reached, a tunnel is dug which carries the water over long distances to towns and villages. No water is lost by evaporation, an inestimable advantage in a dry climate, nor can water be stolen, which is equally important where water is so scarce. At certain distances openings (wells) are sunk into the qanat to make repairs possible.

The people who in the middle of the second millennium B.C. occupied the high plateau and from whom the modern Persians are descended called themselves Aryans, the noble or best. Their native tongue belonged to the Indo-European language group. What their physical appearance was we do not know except that they probably had the general traits usually ascribed to the ancestors of the Indo-European family. Nor is it certain whether there existed on the Iranian plateau an indigenous population before the arrival of the Iranians. No skeletons throwing any light on this

problem have as yet been excavated. Henry Field has advanced the theory, well supported by general considerations, that Iran may have been one of the nurseries of the *homo sapiens* and that it may have given birth to a specific type of the white race that was "equal in importance to northern Mediterranean and Alpine race." However, the anthropological proof of this interesting theory is yet to be found.

Whatever was the indigenous population of Iran, it had to be destroyed or absorbed by the Aryan invaders, and from that time the Iranians of the plateau mixed their blood with that of immigrants and conquerors to an infinitely higher degree than did the mountain tribes. To this inevitable reason for the admixture of foreign blood, imposed by historical events, must be added another, which must not be underrated. From early times probably, but at least since the Islamic conquest, an increasing number of the women of the royal harem and of the harems of the nobles were slaves, coming from all countries and races. We know, for instance, that under the Safavids, Caucasian (Circassian and Georgian) women were especially coveted and valued, and their importation stopped only when the Russian Empire was extended into the Caucasian regions. In these blendings the Turk and the Turko-Tatar, together with the Arab element, were probably the most dominant, since the overwhelming part of immigrants and invaders stemmed from these races. In any case, the result of this merging of races was a happy one. The Iranians of the plateau, men and women alike, when they are not worn out by poverty and toil, are among the best representatives of the Indo-European family—well-built, graceful, and often possessing expressive features, all in all similar to the Mediterranean types, especially those of southern France and Italy. Perfect specimens of this Iranian type are existent today, as we know it from the miniatures and the pictures of earlier times.

We have, of course, no way of knowing to what extent this type resembles that of the ancient Iranians. From observations that prove the usual persistence of successful and characteristic racial types in spite of foreign admixtures it may be inferred that the old

Iranian pattern again and again breaks through, sometimes in relative purity and sometimes as the decisive component in the shaping of the modern Persian. On the other hand, an observer can hardly fail to be impressed by the differences existing between the modern Persian type as it has developed, roughly speaking, since the Arab conquest and those groups which are considered to come nearest to the original Iranian type. On the plateau its representatives must be sought first among the remnants of the Parsis or Zoroastrians. As a community which does not admit converts from other creeds, they must have faithfully preserved the Persian type of Sassanian times. There may be also included in this line the Lakh tribes, most of them settled in the province of Fars, which have given to Iran one of its notable dynasties, the Zand dynasty, 1750-1794. Some scholars consider certain inhabitants of Seistan as representatives of the classic type, and I myself found in the town of Birjand, in southern Khorasan, a group of wealthy and distinguished merchants whose claim appears to be no less solidly founded than that of the other groups. These assumptions are necessarily based on evidence of varying trustworthiness, but they are indications and suggestions for systematic, scientific research, which might shed some light on one of the most fascinating problems of anthropology. Measurements on a large scale, the excavation of skeletons, accurate descriptions of physiognomy, archaeological findings, and historical documentation, should unite for the attainment of solid results.

The sedentary population contains various elements of non-Iranian origin, which are easily distinguished by physical characteristics or language. By far the most important are the Turks. They have been settled for centuries in more or less compact groups in the towns and even more in the villages north of a line beginning at Lake Urmia and running through Hamadan, Kasvin, and Teheran south of the Elburz Mountains to the Russo-Afghan border. Some branches—the Afshar tribe from which came Nadir Shah—the Kajars, the Shahsavan, and the Karagozlu have played a prominent part in the history of Iran. Turkish dialects, still in many places the spoken language, will now rapidly

be replaced by Persian under the influence of compulsory military service and of the extension of elementary education. There are the Arabs of the Dasht-i-Mishan region west of Ahwaz, in Khuzistan. They live a simple picturesque life in the marshes of the Tigris, near the border of Iraq. The Armenians, of uncertain racial origin, probably the product of a race mixture in historic times, the Jews, and the gypsies from northwestern or western India must also be mentioned.

RELIGION

THE RELIGION of modern Iran is the Shiite branch of Islam. However, in order to understand the psychology of the Persians and the spiritual problem they are facing today it is indispensable to get acquainted with the religious efflorescence of pre-Islamic Iran. Without such an insight the comprehension of the religious life, even of the Islamic period, would be defective.

All great religions were born in Asia. Iran has always been an unusually fertile soil for the growth of religions. Relative to the size of the country and its population, it is not inferior to India with regard to the number and importance of the religions that have sprung up there. Early Persian religion is connected with the prophet Zarathustra, who was born about 660 B.C. in northwestern Iran. Zoroastrianism is the only one of the great religions of the world that is dualistic in essence. It proclaims the existence of two principals, the Good and the Evil, both spiritual and eternal, contesting with each other for the domination of the universe. This is not only a highly original concept but also one which demands an intellectual and moral courage hardly to be surpassed. Let us remember that in all religion the existence of Evil, its origin and justification, is one of the central problems, if not the central problem. In Christian theology the idea of God as the God of Love makes the theodicy a particularly troublesome question. Other religions and religious philosophies, such as those of India, deny the existence of Evil as a power in itself and explain it away as an illusion derived from the lack of the right metaphysical insight. Zoroastrianism does not try to avoid the issue. It faces things as they present themselves and affirms that there is Evil and that apparently it is as powerful and substantial as Good.* This, of course, is

*The Yezidis (very inappropriately called devil worshippers), of whose origin and history little is known, have drawn a strange but consistent conclusion from Zoroastrianism, which seems to be the ancestor of their religion. Recognizing in principle the Zoroastrian dualism, they do not feel it necessary to worship the power of good—

not an intellectual and demonstrable thesis. It is a great vision and can be just as little ascertained by argument as Buddha's affirmation that life is pure suffering. Different as these visions are, so are their consequences. Both aim at perfection and deliverance. But whereas Buddhism leads logically to a negativistic attitude toward the world, the Zoroastrian outlook is definitely positive and active. Throughout the whole universe runs a breach separating what is good from what is evil. At the head of the two realms are two spirits, Ahuramazda—the spirit of Good, and Ahriman—the spirit of Evil. The cleavage is by no means limited to these spirits and to the sphere of men. It divides everything created—angels, men, animals, plants, and material things—so that Ahuramazda and Ahriman each dispose of a complete realm and are constantly at war with each other. It is the eschatological belief of Zoroastrians that at the end of time the spirit of Good will overpower the spirit of Evil. But in the fight Ahuramazda appeals to men as his helpers to destroy the Evil under whatever form it may hide. The sun and the flame burning on the fire altars, remains of which are found throughout Iran, are the noble symbols of this stern, yet optimistic faith. The believer in the Good, purified by a strict ritual to preserve body and soul from contamination by the Evil, will rise up from the dead and receive the reward, and the evil one will suffer just retribution. This is a profound and sober creed, idealistic and stubbornly realistic at the same time—a union not often found—and it permits one to infer the nature of the mind that conceived it. It is the sign under which a rising world power could adequately fight and vanquish. The proud inscriptions which the Achaemenian kings left not only reflect personal feelings but they manifest at the same time the religious conviction that the Persian king is the mandatory of Ahuramazda, of the power of Good, to administer in his name the countries of the earth. Not war and politics only but also peaceful enterprises are man's destiny. Just as Zarathustra

apparently for the convincing reason that the Good cannot be anything but good. What is essential is to appease the power of Evil, so they dedicate to the evil power a propitiatory cult, but by no means a cult of worship. The name given to them is therefore entirely misleading. There are only a few of them in Iran, in western Kurdistan. Their real home today is north of Mosul, in Iraq.

had preached the superiority of settled life, agriculture, and cattle breeding, so later the Zoroastrian merchants became renowned for their honesty, skill, and success. The Parsis in Iran (numbering between 16,000 and 17,000) have maintained this prestige throughout the centuries, and it has accompanied them to India, where they form, particularly in Bombay, a wealthy and highly respected community of about 110,000 persons.

Zoroastrianism was and has always remained a national religion, universal only in so far as it conferred upon the Persian king the task of ruling the world. Two other religions originating in Iran in pre-Islamic times are, though to different degrees, distinguished by a universal and missionary character—the cult of Mithra and the religion of Mani. Both have spread widely outside of Iran, and both have exercised a powerful influence on the West.

Mithra, the supreme god of the pre-Zoroastrian Persians, personifying the luminous firmament, or the sun itself, who rose to an increasingly important rank as emissary and intermediary of Ahuramazda in the later development of Zoroastrianism, acquired a universal role in the lands west of Iran. There, in the syncretistic atmosphere of the Semitic Orient and Asia Minor, always eager for additions to its pantheon, he became the center of one of the numerous mystery cults, such as those of Adonis, Attis, Cybele, Isis, and others. He was easily fitted into the form and ritual of these cults, in which the sacrificial death of the god and the mystical participation in it through the ceremony of the sacred symposium guaranteed immortality to the initiated. The taurobolion, the killing of the sun bull by Mithra, which in the esoteric sense means the self-sacrifice of the god, since the bull is not only the emblem of the sun god but also the god himself, is depicted on many sculptures which are found in the Mithraea's, the Mithraean sanctuaries, from the Near East to Great Britain and Germany, for from their campaigns in western Asia the Roman legions brought the cult of Mithra and spread it wherever they went. It appealed to them, because it was, unlike the other mystery cults, a masculine religion—not in vain were the followers of Mithra called his soldiers. We know that for a time the religion of Mithra seriously contested

with the Christian faith for place as the common creed of the Western world, and it very nearly succeeded in making Europe accept a religion of Persian origin.

Mithraism owed its spread over such wide areas and its chance of becoming a world religion less to some inherent quality justifying so high an honor than to the incidental fact that it became the favorite creed of the Roman armies. Manichaeism, on the contrary, was meant by its creator from the beginning to be the religion of the universe. It was, indeed, properly equipped for a universal mission, because it was an eclectic faith, uniting elements of all existing great religions under the one central idea of salvation. Manichaeism, so-named after Mani (born about A.D. 215 near Baghdad, the son of a Persian who came from Hamadan to Mesopotamia); is of all Gnostic systems the most impressive and fascinating. None has fused with such will power and imagination occidental ideas with elements of Semitic and non-Semitic origin. The system of Mani is a gigantic attempt to eliminate the barriers and differences between the East and the West and to unite the human universe in one faith, irrespective of race, history, or language.

From Zoroastrianism, Mani retained the fundamental idea of the existence of the two antagonistic principles and the eschatological expectation of the final victory of the light principle. He differed, however, basically from Zarathustra in that the interlacing of the elements of light and darkness, which characterizes the actual state of the world, is to him the cause of a radically pessimistic view of world and life. While Buddhistic doctrines may have influenced his ascetic ideal, the figure of the Primal Man, the celestial archetype of humanity, who is created and sent to redeem the light essence from the powers of darkness and falls a victim to them, reminds one, like other features of his system, of Christian ideas. Strictly in opposition to Zoroastrianism and, perhaps, Christian or Buddhistic in origin is Mani's identification of matter with Evil and of spirit with Good. It follows from this conception that only a life of complete renunciation can lead to individual redemption, just as it is the only means to bring about the final deliverance

of the light substance from darkness. Mani distinguishes three types of man, corresponding to the triadistic idea of man as composed of mind (spirit), soul and body: first, the elect, who are bound to a life of extreme austerity, including the vow of celibacy; to them falls the missionary and propagandistic task of preaching and explaining the faith; secondly, the hearers, who, while not sufficiently advanced to live up to the ideal, believe in the truth of Mani's teachings; thirdly, the *massa perditionis*, those who, ignorant of the gospel or refusing to recognize its truth, live a life of sin and contamination.

The eventual fate of Manichaeism was as tragic as that of Mani himself. Mani was exiled from Iran by the Sassanian king, Shapur I. After leaving the country, he is said to have traveled to Khorasan, India, Tibet, and the western parts of China, preaching his doctrine everywhere. Having returned to Iran, he was seized by order of king Bahram and suffered the cruel death of a martyr in 274. Zoroastrians, Christians, and Mohammedans combined to stem the advance of Mani's religion, which spread in spite of, or perhaps because of, the persecutions to which its followers were exposed. The zealotry of the Manichaeans yielded to them considerable success in the Byzantine Empire, not less in the Roman Empire, where the Cathari in the northern part of Italy caused much concern to the Catholic Church. It spread to southern France, and there in the early thirteenth century secular and ecclesiastical power united to extirpate the heresy in long and sanguinary campaigns. By the ruthless suppression of Manichaeism in Europe its deep and far-reaching effects were by no means annihilated. Manichaean influences can be discovered centuries later in various intellectual and spiritual movements of the Occident. In North Africa the fascinating charm of the faith is amply demonstrated by the fact that Saint Augustine had been for years a Manichaean before his conversion to Christianity, whereupon he, like so many other Church fathers, became a fanatic enemy of the Manichaean creed.

Another offspring of Zoroastrianism is the communistic gospel which Mazdak preached about A.D. 500. Retaining the dualistic conception of Zarathustra, he held the belief that the three funda-

mental forms and roots of evil in man are jealousy, wrath, and greediness. These three passions apparently poison the relations between men, and they are responsible for economic and social inequality. What is good in man, his very essence, asks for equality for all men, especially equal distribution of property, as the decisive procedure for the realization of good. Strange to say, Mazdak's teaching enjoyed for a time royal approval. His end was, however, no less tragic than that of Mani, and with him perished thousands of his followers. What aroused against both men and their doctrines passions of such extreme ferocity was probably less their teachings than the practical results emanating from them. The Manichaean ideal of celibacy meant the extinction of the human race; Mazdak's theory put into practice the dispossession of the leading classes, so the reaction of the ecclesiastical and secular powers is easily explainable.

The Zoroastrianism which invading Islam found in Iran had changed greatly since its dawn in Achaemenian times. It had succumbed to the fate of all human institutions, especially religions. The first spontaneous and creative manifestations had been steadily curbed by rigid form, and the Zoroastrianism of the later Sassanian period presents itself more as a complicated system of ritualistic and scholastic distinctions than as the fiery faith of the classic times. A creed which makes of moral and physical purity, of the fear of contamination by evil in its physical and immaterial forms, and of the rites of purification its essential elements offers less resistance to this process of petrification than other religions. The great and inspiring intuition of Zarathustra disappeared behind scrupulous formalism. Only the learned priesthood could interpret the complicated system of taboos and apply the expiatory ceremonies which they had built up in the course of time—if not with the purpose, in any case with the result of strengthening their control over the masses.

Whether this development must be considered one of the reasons for the decay of the Sassanian Empire or—and this may be nearer the truth—one of its main symptoms, it is certain that at the moment of the Arab invasion the Persian people clung to their

religion as fervently as ever. The Persians did not have to decide between conversion and death—alternatives often presented to subjected peoples by the Arabs. This does not mean that restraint and persecution did not occur. Such violence was almost inevitable, but it was still not the official policy. However, in the first days of Islam the pressure on a subjected people, permitted to preserve its religion, was such that it worked most of the time just as well for conversion as open compulsion. It is all the more remarkable that many persons were not willing to renounce the religion of their ancestors, since they risked life and property by remaining faithful to it, whereas premiums and advantages were offered as a reward for conversion. For hundreds of years a slowly dwindling minority bravely defied all material difficulties and moral and social defamation, until there remained in Iran only a few thousand Parsis, who, by the legislation of Reza Shah, have regained the legal equality and the moral and social rehabilitation they highly deserve.

The Persians adopted Islam; but in spite of all conscious sincerity, in spite of all religious fervor and devotion, which at least the masses professed, in spite of all the important contributions made by the Persians to Islamic philosophy and theology one is entitled to doubt that the Persian mind ever wholly absorbed and incorporated Islam. If the Persian mind yielded to Islam, this does not mean that it accepted Islam unconditionally.

Nothing could be more significant for this state of things than the fact that the Persians almost at the moment of their conversion showed especial predilection for and very soon embraced the schismatic creed which bears the name of Shia, that is, party or schism, in opposition to the orthodox Sunni Islam, the creed of the overwhelming majority of Moslems. The word "party" assumes in connection with the Shia a specific meaning, it is the party of the House of Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet. The Shiites maintain that the only legitimate heir and successor of Mohammed is Ali, both by right of birth and by the will of the Prophet. The first three caliphs, Abu Bakr, Omar, and Othman are therefore accused of having deprived Ali of his right and are considered usurpers.

After Ali became caliph this unlawful group continued to dispute his right, in the defense of which he and his house met their doom. Ali was stabbed, and his second son, Hussein, and his family were killed in battle in 680. The issue of the schism was therefore political, if in these early times the political and the religious, the temporal and the spiritual, can be separated in Islam.

Mohammed himself was all in one—the prophet and lawgiver, the leader in prayer and the political leader of the community. While the first two qualities and functions died with him, his successors, the companions—bearing in mind his example and his sayings—continued to unite in their persons the functions of leadership in prayer, that is, the highest religious function, and of political leader of the faithful. Indeed, the union of the two powers remained an undisputed principle in Islamic theory. When Mustafa Kemal separated the temporal power from the religious one in 1922 by abolishing the Ottoman sultanate, maintaining the caliphate as representing the spiritual overlordship of the Islamic world, he broke with Islamic theory and practice in order to do away with both institutions as far as the Turks were concerned. As a matter of fact, the caliphate was abolished only two years later.

While the union of the spiritual and temporal power in one person was considered necessary by theological authorities and in general Moslem opinion, the Shia branch of Islam evaluated these functions quite differently. Such a problem could not have arisen during the patriarchal times of the first caliphs. But as the Arabs rapidly developed from desert nomads into a world power, the secular power and its efforts to enlarge the domain of Islam and to protect its interests overshadowed the religious aspect of kingship. The power element became so strong that it even outweighed the expressed or traditional will of the Prophet, according to which the leader of the Arabs, and consequently of the Moslem world, should be selected from his own, the Prophet's, tribe—the Koreish. Later, however, when non-Arab conquerors, converted to Islam, rose to paramount positions, the faithful could only comply with existing conditions and recognize them as the legitimate successors of the Prophet.

The Shiites, banished because of the annihilation of the House of Ali from the leadership of the Islamic world, could not but choose the other alternative. To the Shiites the secular function of the ruler was less important than the religious, and they remained inexorable in their conviction that no ruler who could not prove his descent from Ali had any legitimate claim to authority. To the Persians allegiance to the House of Ali seemed particularly justified by the pious legend that Hussein had taken in marriage the daughter of the last Sassanian king, Yezdegerd III. In fact, all the ruling dynasties of Iran were considered usurpers, with the exception of the Safavids, whose genealogical tree seemed to offer the necessary justification.

Such an unrealistic and inflexible attitude could only have come from an oppositional group far from practical tasks and responsibilities and lost in its own ideas and ideals.

This is still more obvious when we consider the conception of the Imams as it developed within the Shia world. The term "Imam," originally designating leader in prayer, assumed also in Sunnite usage a broader meaning. To them he was also the secular and spiritual leader of the Islamic community—a well-defined and entirely rational idea. The Shiites, on the contrary, very soon attributed to Ali and his house superhuman and mystic qualities and functions. It is as if Ali had received in the heavenly sphere a thousandfold as much glory and splendor as he had had while he walked on earth. Many Sunnite theologians and authors—it is interesting to note—are almost as fervent in their praise of Ali as are the Shiites. He is for them, too, the great hero and a paragon of devotion, and numerous are the words of the Prophet which have come down by tradition, such as "He who does harm to Ali, does it to me" and "Thou [Ali] art a Lord in this world and in the world beyond." But it is the Shia which confers upon Ali and his house the halo of saintliness and dedicated to him and Hussein a cult, elevating them in the minds of the masses above the Prophet himself. Obviously Ali could not have derived this exalted position as the head of the faithful simply by election, as the first three caliphs had been appointed. Not only was Ali related to Mohammed by

blood but also he inherited from the Prophet charisma, the divine grace and blessing, this being the condition for his mission for the welfare and salvation of the world. Ali transmitted this divine charisma to his sons, who passed it on to a line of Imams—four according to one doctrine, according to another, nine. The first branch of the Shiites, recognizing seven Imams, is represented in the Arab kingdom of Yemen, with about one million inhabitants, the so-called Zeidites, and by the Ismailis, about three to four millions, in India, by the Alauites and the Nosairis in Syria. The other and more important branch of Shia, believing in twelve Imams, the Imamites, with sixteen to eighteen million adherents, dominates in Iran with about fourteen million, is widespread in Iraq, and has followers in Syria, Afghanistan, and India. The last Imam, according to the belief held by the Imamites, mysteriously disappeared in 844 in Samara, near Baghdad, but lives on and will return as the Mahdi, the Guided One, at the end of time to bring forth the blessed age by re-establishing the right faith and order.

This is the theory of the Imams, in whose conception neo-Platonic and Gnostic ideas may have played a not unimportant part. For the way in which God imparted, through the intermediary of Mohammed, his grace on Ali and his successors, the chain of Imams, is a reminder of the emanations, sephirot, archons, and similar ideas occurring in those systems. All the Imams participate in the Prophet's infallibility and sinlessness, and they alone are qualified to interpret the divine law. It follows that the Shiites do not recognize most of the traditions (*hadith*), so important in Sunni Islam, which complete the teachings revealed in the Koran by the sayings of the Prophet, his companions, and other authorities. For the Shia only the traditions derived from the Prophet, from Ali, and from the Imams are binding. The Imams are by divine designation the only legitimate temporal and spiritual rulers. Any other regime is usurpation or a compromise—as was that of the Safavids in Iran. Since there must always be an Imam, the Imam of the age, it is assumed that the hidden Imam, the one who has disappeared mysteriously, is the Imam of this age.

The cult of Ali, Hussein, and the other holy Imams is the core of

the Shia religion. This cult is a worship of martyrs. For, like Ali and Hussein, the other Imams are reported to have met violent death, with the exception of the last, the hidden Imam. The suffering and martyrdom of saintly quasi-deified personalities, gives to the Shia its color. There is an atmosphere of melancholy around it which is likely to arouse deep emotions and passions and may easily incite outbursts of fanaticism. In all these respects the Shiite religion has some resemblance to Christianity, especially to the Roman Catholic Church. Just as in the church the worship of a suffering Savior is surrounded by an extensive cult of saints, many of them martyred saints, so the Shia recognizes a pantheon of saintly personalities, most of them connected more or less directly with the Imams. Whereas the Imams and some of their nearest relatives are worshiped in sumptuous sanctuaries of great beauty and splendor, mosques are dedicated to the cult of other saints. There are numberless minor shrines scattered throughout Iran, where saints of all kinds, many of them local saints, are revered. They are called *Imamzadehs*, sons of Imam, though these men and women were in most cases not related to the Imams. Connected with the cult of the Imams is the belief in miracles and the worship of relics—also suggestive of the Catholic Church. An even more striking similarity between the Shiite religion and the Church is that in both their real life is concealed in an invisible church, established and guaranteed by a godly person whose sacrificial death, voluntary in the one faith, involuntary in the other, is the center of the creed and of the cult. They also have in common a belief in the return of their savior. Another parallel, this one of a more political character, is to be found in the close relationship between spiritual and temporal rule in both religions. But, whereas in the Catholic Church the union between them was realized for more than 900 years, until the suppression of the pontifical state in 1870, for the Shiites it has remained a dogma and a dream, only incompletely realized during the Safavid period.

The Shia found popular and colorful expression in the *tazzihs*, the passion plays. In the dramatic performances which took place during the first ten days of the holy month of Moharram the mar-

tyr death of Ali and his house was acted with the utmost realism. They lasted for several days, and no expense was spared to make them as impressive as possible. They were acted with much ceremony and pomp at the seat of government, where the shah and the whole court and harem attended the play; in the provinces, too, the governors tried to make them memorable shows. Even in the smallest villages devotion to and compassion for the martyrs, as well as fanatic hatred against the Sunnite slayers, were not less profound because scenery and costumes were touchingly simple.

Pilgrimages and worship at the tombs of saints and martyrs are of great importance in the Shiite cult. While the pilgrimage to Mecca remains their foremost duty, the Shiites are more strongly attracted by the greatest sanctuaries of the Shiite world, Kerbela, the burial place of Hussein, and Nedjef, that of Ali—both situated in Iraq, not far from Baghdad. In Iran the shrine of Imam Reza, in Meshed, is the goal of every believer. The tomb of the sister of Imam Reza makes Qum one of the holy cities of Iran, and there are numerous other cherished places to which pilgrimages are still made.

Of the numerous branches of the Shia that of the Ismailis became fatally famous at the time of the Crusades. The sect had, as did the Shiites, a political origin, the defense of the cause of the Fatimide dynasty in Egypt. The Persian Hasan ibn Sabbah, in his youth a friend of Omar Khayyam, espoused the cause and worked for it in Syria and in Iran. About the year 1100 he seized the castle of Alamut in the Elburz Mountains, and from this stronghold he extended his power by assassination (the word "assassin" deriving from *hashishin*, eaters or smokers of hashish, the Indian hemp, *canabis Indica*). His followers, fanaticized by a secret mystic creed, were sent on missions to remove political adversaries. For 150 years the emissaries of the *shaiikh ul jebel* (the old man of the mountains, as he is usually called) were feared at the courts of the Western and the Eastern princes, until in 1256 the Seljuks destroyed the sect and its strongholds. *The Mongols*

Descendants of the sect, peaceful people, are to be found in India under the name Khojas. Their head is the well-known Aga Khan

(whose family claims descent from Hasan ibn Sabbah himself), an outstanding figure among Indian Moslems and a strong supporter of the British. There are in Iran members of the same sect in a large fortified village south of Qaën, in southern Khorasan—where the fortifications were constructed against the invasions of the Baluchis. They, too, recognize the Agha Khan as their head.

The Shiite creed did not originate in Iran, but on Persian soil it found its homeland. There its doctrine and theology were developed, and there the Safavids raised it to the rank of a state religion. This union with the political power, though it could not lead the Shia to the domination of the whole Islamic world, at least assured for it the place of a national religion, which today it still holds. During the first two centuries of Arab rule in Iran the Shiites were scattered in small groups throughout the country, and often they had to conceal their creed from hostile neighbors.

It is of the utmost significance that the first truly Persian dynasty which emerged as an independent power from the Arabian caliphate supported and developed the Shiite creed. This was the Samanide dynasty, which ruled from 875 to 999 in the far northeast of Iran, with Bokhara as their capital. It was also in the court of the Samanide princes that Persian literature began to effloresce and found generous and appreciative protection. There can be little doubt that the favor shown to the Shia by the Samanides had political and psychological motives. They saw in the Shia a means of severing the Persian nation from the Arab world. But—and this fact is of greater moment and is demonstrated by their deep interest in the development of the literary movement—they felt that, while there was no question of casting off Islam, the Shia had greater affinity with the Persian mind, or at least could be shaped so as to permit its efflorescence, if only under cover. Indeed, the mystic and speculative character of the Shia, the scope allowed by the creed for imagination and play of passions, gratified essential elements of the Persian mind. It is as much to the credit of the instinct of the Persian people as it is an unforgettable merit of the Samanide princes that they had the insight to find a way to elude

the impact of Sunni Islam and thereby to preserve the Persian personality.

To this determination to safeguard the national personality as a spiritual entity Persian mysticism bears witness. This is part of Islamic mysticism and is called Sufism after the woolen garment worn by the first Sufis. Whereas the Shia is, so to speak, a concealed expedient to make the best of a harassing situation, Sufism comes out into the open and without directly attacking the official creed unfolds before its eyes. This, it may be argued, has at all times been the attitude of mysticism whenever it sprang up beside an orthodox and dogmatic religion. There is, however, a remarkable difference between Western mysticism and Eastern mysticism. In the Western countries mysticism made every effort—and not always with the best of conscience—to appear in harmony with the orthodox belief. In spite of such endeavors, even the greatest of all occidental mystics, Meister Eckhardt, more than once escaped by a hair's breadth condemnation by the Inquisition. In spite of the martyrdom of a considerable number of Sufis during the first centuries, official Islam during its later stages showed more tolerance to mysticism than did Christianity. The cause of Islam's more liberal attitude may be a broader conception of religion or the fact that the simpler religious principles of Islam are not as susceptible to violation as is the subtle and elaborate Christian dogma. As to the Shia, its attitude toward Sufism may be said to have been always particularly difficult and delicate. The Shia is in itself mystical, or contains at least a basic mystical element. It had, therefore, a deeper affinity to and understanding of Sufism. On the other hand, it is just this affinity which, if for no other reason than self-preservation, made a clear condemnation of Sufism just as necessary as it would have been difficult and in some ways contradictory. We find that the Shiite clergy always watched the Sufis with suspicion and disapproval and considered them skeptics and freethinkers, yet they dared not wage open war against them. In any case, Persian Sufism is outstanding in its absolute unconcern of the official creed.

To the great mystic movement in Islam, which originated in the

ninth century, Iran has contributed many, if not most, of its distinguished representatives. Mysticism has penetrated deeply into the hearts and lives of the people beyond the immediate circle of the mystics and their disciplines. This does not mean, of course, that the number of real mystics has greatly increased, for true mysticism can never be popular—but for the extent of comprehension, appreciation, and veneration of mysticism in Iran until recent times it would be difficult to find a parallel. Men of all classes, particularly of the cultured class, often gathered around a mystic or someone versed in mystic tradition to receive at least a touch of the mystic spirit.

Moreover, Persian poetry is so deeply imbued with Sufism that the line between them is difficult to trace. The Sufi poets, Jalal ed Din Rumi, Hafiz, and Sadi, to speak only of the greatest, were and are read from Egypt to India, and they enjoy a comprehending veneration such as few of our western poets can claim. Their verses are quoted, and quoted with the obvious delight of sympathetic appreciation, by humble people and their books are to be found in the libraries of the educated. Everywhere their mission seems to be not only to satisfy the sense of beauty but also to give solace and superior wisdom in difficult situations, as the Bible serves the Christian. In Iran it has become a time-honored custom to take augury from the "Divan" of Hafiz as one does from the Koran—a rite practiced particularly at the tomb of Hafiz in Shiraz. The maxims contained in the stories of Sadi did more to teach, to direct, and to enlighten people than did orders, sermons, and moralizing harangues.

Sufism itself is a creation of Islamic civilization. Since this civilization grew on the cosmopolitan soil of the Near East and the Middle East and soon reached into India, the elements of which it was composed (Hellenism, Christianity, Parsism, and Hinduism) could not but influence Sufism too. However, as the Arab spirit fused the various components into a new and extremely vital creation, Islamic mysticism cannot be denied originality simply because the same influences may be recognized here and there. This is true also of Persian Sufism, which occupies within Islamic Sufism

a place of its own. Islam seems to have stimulated the rise of mysticism for two reasons. The relentless determination with which Islam emphasized the absolute unity and uniqueness of God in the face of the Christian Trinity, Zoroastrian dualism, the Hindu pantheon, and other creeds and sects in which the idea of God receded behind the myth of divine emanations, gave a new and unambiguous direction to religious feeling and focused religious thought at one point. This is the very condition of any mystic effort. On the other hand, the rigidity of the Mohammedan idea of God made God himself unattainable and inaccessible. In a religious atmosphere in which belief in the gnosis, the immediate knowledge of God, had been dominant for centuries, the rigorous monotheism of the Koran could not but incite a counter movement, which, while recognizing, even pushing to the extreme, the uniqueness of God, brought him nearer to the intuition of the mind and to the desire of the heart by divesting him of his narrow anthropomorphic character.

Persian scholars have suggested that mysticism may have existed in Iran before the Islamic period, but proofs for this assumption appear to be lacking. From a general psychological viewpoint, it would not seem unlikely that it did exist. Zoroastrian dualism, momentous and bold as its conception is, goes straight against man's innate desire for unification. If in the later evolution of Zoroastrianism there was an increasing tendency to remove or to alleviate the dualism by making Ahuramazda the supreme, even the only, god, the same motive could easily have produced a mystic solution of the problem. As it is, we must be content to recognize that Iran was particularly predisposed to the unfolding of a great mystic movement.

Sufism, like all mysticism, is just as difficult to approach by theory as by results. In all other fields of human knowledge theories are meant to explain existing facts or to prepare for expected facts. Mystic theory, too, is meant to explain a fact, that is, the mystic state, or to prepare for it. There is, however, this difference: the central fact of mysticism, the state of unification, or whatever it is called, is beyond adequate definition and description. This circle

loses its viciousness when one decides to start on the mystic path under the guidance of a Sufi. It cannot and need not be otherwise, since the theories and doctrines of the mystic schools are not meant for scientific purposes, but for actual mystic practice. There are mystics in the West and in the East who tried to dissect their mystic experiences into terms of philosophy; yet one cannot help feeling that poetical imagery and symbolic language are more adequate means of communicating some faint idea of what they want to express.

The attempt to penetrate the meaning of the mystic union, to find out whether and to what extent and in what sense the personal ego is supposed to be preserved in such a state of union, to ask whether the godhead itself retains personality—all these and other pertinent questions are not within the scope of our task. Interested mainly in Persian civilization and in the Persian mind, our attention is focused rather on the psychological aspect of Persian Sufism. In making this statement we must, however, immediately be aware that in dealing with mysticism all our distinctions, such as the opposition of psychology to reality and content, are artificial. We may, therefore, be confident that the psychological aspect of Sufism will also reveal something of the mystic experience.

Arab and Persian historians and systematizers of Sufism have often distinguished the Sufi schools according to the idea they hold of God. Adopting one of the widespread classifications, we assume five characteristics of absolute reality: God as thought, God as will, God as beauty, God as love, and God as light. If we examine Persian Sufism as a whole and the utterances of the prominent Sufis, it would appear that beauty and light predominate as the attributes of the divine essence. The exaltation of beauty is indeed well in accordance with the aesthetic taste of the Persian and his artistic creativeness. The deification of light points back to the light god of Zoroastrianism and thereby to the active optimism of old, which, though it has deteriorated and has been repressed in Islamic times, has not disappeared in Iran. These distinctions are not meant to exclude one from the other. They are accentuations, revealing the

personalities of the Sufis rather than a definite theory, but as such they are highly noteworthy and characteristic. It is easy to see that there is an inner relationship between light and thought, since there is no more adequate symbol than light for the lucidity of thought; we might better speak in this connection of intellectual intuition. Likewise beauty and love are linked together, and in the verses of the Sufis they often appear side by side. Taking these combinations into consideration, we can affirm with some certainty that Persian Sufism is primarily the experience of divine beauty and light.

A few quotations taken haphazardly from Sufis and Sufi poets will serve to indicate how they have expressed their experience:

. . . but Beauty cannot brook
 Concealment and the veil, nor patient rest
 Unseen and unadmired; t'will burst all bonds
 And from its prison casement to the world
 Reveal itself. . . .

JAMI (b. 1414) *

In me Thy beauty love and longing wrought:
 Did I not seek Thee how couldst Thou be sought?
 My love is a mirror in the which
 Thy beauty into evidence is brought.

JAMI

Whence the charm of a fair face?
 Not earthly beauty only
 Can so allure us with its loveliness
 We see as in a cloudy mirror
 The faint reflex of the Perfect face.

SHABISTANI (d. 1320)

Here the Platonic idea, so often found in Sufism, that the world is but a faint reflection of the Absolute and that its only function is to awake in us the intuition—in Plato's philosophy the remembrance—of the Absolute. The vision of God as light is expressed by al Hallaj (tenth century): †

* Jami, *Lawa'ih, a Treatise on Sufism*; tr. by E. H. Whinfield and Mirza Muhammad Kazvini, London, Royal Asiatic Society, 1928.

† Quoted by A. J. Arberry, in *The Doctrine of the Sufis*, Cambridge, Eng., The Cambridge University Press, 1935.

Now stands no more between the Truth and me
 Or reasoned demonstration
 Or proof and revelation:
 Now, brightly blazing forth, Truth's luminary
 Has driven out of sight
 Each flickering, lesser light.

In the market, in the cloister—only God I saw.
 In the valley and on the mountain—only God I saw.
 Him I have seen beside me oft in tribulation;
 In favour and in fortune—only God I saw. . . .
 I opened mine eyes and by the light of His face around me
 In all the eye discovered—only God I saw.
 Like a candle I was melting in His fire. . . .

BABA KUHI OF SHIRAZ (thirteenth century)

Every moment the robber Beauty rises in a different
 shape, ravishes the soul, and disappears.
 Every instant that Loved One assumes a new garment,
 now of old, now of youth. . . .

JALAL ED DIN RUMI (1207-1273) †

Philosophers devoid of reason find
 This world a mere idea of the mind;
 'Tis an idea—but they fail to see
 The great Idealist who looms behind.

JAMI ‡

That the true mystic state, the fulfillment of the mystic desire, is
 more than a sublime emotional experience and more than a God-
 drunken vision is admirably said in the verses of al Junaid: §

In ecstasy delighteth he
 Who finds in it his rest;
 But when Truth cometh, ecstasy
 Itself is dispossessed.

* Reynold A. Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*, London, Bell, 1914.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Jami, *Lawa'ih*.

§ Arberry, *The Doctrine of the Sufis*.

Once ecstasy was my delight;
 But He Whom I did find
 In ecstasy claims all my sight,
 And to the rest I'm blind.

Here God is truth, and the intuition of truth communicates intellectual intuition of unsurpassed greatness and amplitude, which may be illustrated by verses such as the following:

Lo, for I to myself am unknown, now in God's name
 what must I do?
 I adore not the Cross nor the Crescent, I am not a
 Giaur nor a Jew. . . .
 Soul and body transcending I live in the soul of
 •my Loved One anew!

JALAL ED DIN RUMI *

Not until every mosque beneath the sun
 Lies ruined, will our holy work be done;
 And never will true Musalman appear
 Till faith and infidelity are one.

ABU SA'ID IBN ABI 'L-KHAYR
 (tenth century) †

Love is where the glory falls
 Of Thy face—on convent walls
 Or on tavern floors, the same
 Unextinguishable flame.

Where the turbaned anchorite
 Chanteth Allah day and night,
 Church bells ring the call to prayer
 And the Cross of Christ is there.

HAFIZ (d. 1389) ‡

Here, indeed, all earthly limitations are left far behind, and here, too, the genius of Iran reaches its summit. We are, of course, far

* Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Ibid.*

from pretending that non-Persian Sufism did not reach the same mystic insight and perfection. However, there can be no doubt that the mystic experience in Islam did find its richest and its most exalted expression through the Persian mind. And it is equally certain that nowhere else has Sufism so attracted and, if only superficially, affected the hearts of the people. Nowhere else has it left its mark on the minds of so many, although the true mystical spirit was by its very nature the privilege of a few, who united speculative power and intuition with the expressive imagination of the poet. It is probable that Sufism kept the fire of the Persian soul glowing during all those centuries when the Persians had to undergo the ordeal of subjection to foreign creed and foreign rule.

The most recent creation of Iran in the field of religion takes us back to the core of the Shia creed, the idea of the hidden Imam and the Mahdi. It is the religion of the Bab, which developed into what is called today Bahaism.⁴ Sayyid Mohammed Ali, the founder of the sect, was born in Shiraz in 1819. The name, the Bab (the gate), under which he is known, derives from his claim to be the gate through which the access to and the communication with the hidden Imam is kept open. It was the belief of several Shiite sects, among them the Shaikhi sect, of which the Bab had been a member, that there must always exist an intermediary through whom the hidden Imam may communicate with the world and confer his grace upon it until his return as Mahdi. It seems that later the Bab thought of himself as the Imam and that he was, in fact, considered the manifestation of God by the rapidly increasing number of his followers. He was arrested, but his armed supporters traversed the country, particularly the northern provinces, creating unrest and announcing everywhere the appearance of the Mahdi. The Bab was executed in 1850. But the relentless persecution of the Babis set in only after some members of the sect had attempted to assassinate the shah, in 1852. The Babis defended themselves with fanatic courage in some towns, but they had to succumb. The leaders who were left fled or were exiled. They went to Baghdad, from there to Adrianople and to Acre, and from there they started their world-wide propaganda and missionary activities.

The second successor of the Bab, Baha-Ullah, the Splendor of

God, freed Babism from all specific Persian elements and made it a creed of universal character bearing his name. The doctrine of the Bab had been entirely in the line of Shiite thought. However, it was obvious that neither the Government nor the Shiite clergy were prepared to recognize the Bab's claim to be the hidden Imam and the Mahdi. Other points of his gospel which caused offense and scandal were his rejection of all ritual and the social reforms he wanted to introduce, among them a change in the position of women. On the other hand, his mystical theology, combined with and expressed in cabbalistic symbols and numbers, showed him deeply related to the secret lore of Persia and the East. Baha-Ullah did away with all these elements. It is impossible to say whether or not the old doctrine of the Bab is still living among Persian Bahais. However, as far as is known the Persian Bahais adhere to the gospel of Baha-Ullah as do all the rest of his followers, who spread over the whole world—Europe, India, Japan, the United States and other countries.

In this country the temple of light and universal worship the American Bahais have constructed in the village of Wilmette, Illinois, on Lake Michigan, bears witness to their faith and their devotion to the cause. The gospel of Baha-Ullah is one of universal brotherhood and peace. Other creeds and convictions are not attacked, but rather they are encouraged in so far as they contain the elements of truth. But Bahaism claims to be the sublime idea in which all other creeds converge. Bahaism does not know a professional priesthood or clergy or rites and ceremonies. It gives, as it were, a great ideal and leaves it to the individual to worship, pray, and meditate in his own way.

It may be asked whether the religion of the Bab would have taken this universal and in a sense suprareligious turn had their leader not been exiled and forced to flee from Iran and whether this evolution is due to its estrangement from Iran and the Western influences. However, as the last great religious effort of Iran, Bahaism deserves our interest and appreciation.

Groups of Persian nationals professing religions foreign to Iran are the Christians (Armenians, Nestorians, and Greek orthodox) and the Jews.

SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT

THE CIVILIZATION of the ancient Iranians of the plateau was sedentary. As cultivators of the soil they felt superior to the nomadic barbarians of the steppes. Their highly spiritualized creed, in which the supernatural powers stood out clearly defined in appearance and function, contrasted sharply with the primitive animism of the Turanians. However, modern Persian civilization is not only sedentary; it is a city civilization comparable to our Western civilization. There is one marked difference. Occidental civilization, as far back as we can trace it, started as civilization of cities. The petty kings of the Homeric period ruled over fortified towns. Later the city-states of Greece, like those of Italy, became the symbol of all the achievements the West can boast of in its evolution. Not so in Iran. The Achaemenian Empire is a rural society of peasants, serfs, tenants, and great landowners. The agglomerations grouped around the royal residences and those of the satraps in the provinces cannot be called towns. They consist of the richly composed households of kings and governors, their warriors, officials, servants, and the neighboring village communities. They have nothing in common with the Western town as it appears in classic times and in the Middle Ages—there a production center of the crafts, a market where such products were exchanged for those of the open land and goods coming from other regions, and a community with a stratified social structure and a more or less developed autonomous administration. It seems likely that “towns” (in the Western sense of the term) sprang up in Iran during the Hellenistic period as a consequence of Alexander’s conquest and in his lifetime. In fact, cities laid out by Greek architects after the traditional Greek plans spread over the territory of the former Achaemenian Empire as far as the Oxus and the Indian borders. Later, once a part of the empire of the caliphs, Iran profited by the example of the great cities of Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia

created by Romans, Greeks, and Byzantines, enlarged and transformed by the Arabs themselves. From that time Iran was a country of a rich city civilization, where every city developed its own personality and way of life, just as it became famous for its special crafts and arts.

The Iranian plateau has been compared to a triangle whose two sides are formed by huge mountain ranges, both extending almost as far as the base of the triangle, the Afghan-Indian frontier. With very few exceptions the important cities of Iran are situated at the periphery, along the inside of the mountain chains, where the soil profits by the humidity held by these ranges and where wells can be drilled on the slopes and springs are available so that water can be conducted to the settlements by qanats. Beginning with Tabriz in the northwest corner and following the northern side of the triangle there are Kasvin, Teheran, Semnan, Damghan south of and near the Elburz chain, Sabzawar and Meshed south of the Khorasan Mountains. On the other side of the triangle in a north to southeasterly direction, are Kermanshah and Hamadan, on the easterly slope of the inner range Kashan and Isfahan, and still farther inland Yezd and Kerman.

Greatness does not depend upon nor is it to be measured by great numbers. A comparatively small territory—that occupied by the towns—became in the sixteenth century the scene of what may be called a renaissance, or at least a new efflorescence, of Persian civilization. The form of this civilization may be best understood by examining the structure of Persian society.

The structure of Persian society corresponds essentially with that of the societies in other Moslem countries. However, the Persian mind has filled the framework with a life of its own. The result is that in Persia man develops his potentialities in a distinctive and unusually colorful fashion, uniting the most contradictory attitudes and carrying to extremes the negative ones no less than the positive. Certainly there are not many national families in which human nature unfolds—one is tempted to say explodes—with such exuberance. One often wonders how the social frame could have been strong enough to sustain the pressure without surrendering

country and people to chaos. As it is, Iran succeeded in creating a civilization in spite of this inner strain, even under foreign barbarian domination and in times of political anarchy. Momentous achievements in all the fields of human activity, outstanding models of greatness in saintliness and statesmanship, civic virtue, and the excellencies of family life coexisted with individual and collective vices astounding even for Asia, where excesses are often greater than any known in the West.

It is customary to compare Islamic society with Western society during the Middle Ages until the French Revolution. The feudal form of society is the common denominator which is supposed to embrace both of them. Without tackling the thorny problem of defining and describing the various phases and varieties of feudalism, it suffices to emphasize three essential differences between society in the West and Islamic society in general—of Iran in particular—in order to demonstrate the superficiality of such a comparison.

Such unlimited power as the Asiatic rulers exercise is almost unknown in the West. Whenever it occurs in the West it is due to a coincidence of abnormal circumstances—the rise of an extraordinary personality and the decline of social, juridical, and political institutions. In Asia and in Egypt despotism is the exclusive form of political rule. We refer, of course, to civilized peoples, not to despotism among the primitive and half-civilized. Exceptions are negligible, and they are to be found—which is also characteristic enough—among Semitic peoples, that is, in the city republics of the Phoenicians and the regime of the judges of Israel.

There is in Islamic countries no well-defined hereditary aristocracy comparable in composition and functions to the aristocracy which has played an almost unique role in all the Western countries.

Since the later Middle Ages the liberal professions—scholars, writers, lawyers, doctors, engineers—have played an ever-increasing part in the political and social life of Western society. In Islamic society and in Asia individual representatives of the liberal professions have now and then reached influential positions, but the class

or group as such has remained without political importance. It cannot even be said that members of the liberal professions have made up a distinct and distinguished part of the bourgeoisie, as they did in Europe, still less that they developed into a well-defined class. These differences between Western and Islamic society are not incidental and secondary, they permeate the very structure of the social body itself. A description of Persian society will reveal this fact with even greater clarity, just as it will emphasize the traits which separate Persian society from the rest of the Islamic world.

Despotism has been in the past the form of government in Iran as in practically all Asiatic countries. The autocratic power of the shahs, not being restricted by law and institutions or by tradition, reached just as far as his personal capacity and ambition or his whims permitted. Whatever the reason, the fact is that in its Islamic period autocracy gave to Iran less stability of government than to most of the other Asiatic countries. It is true that the dynasties of the Safavids and the Kajars remained long in power—the first for a period of 223 years, the second for 129 years—but at what a price! Seldom was succession to the throne undisputed and decided without bloodshed. Even when the legitimate heir or the pretender had secured the throne he felt that he had to defend it against intrigue and enmity. Suspicion and fear conjured up phantoms of conspiracy even when there were none and magnified the existing dangers. Grand viziers and other grandees fell for no other reason than they had become too powerful or that they were personally admired by influential groups or by the people as a whole. The slaughter by means of which Aga Mohammed Khan, the founder of the Kajar dynasty, tried to remove all potential rivals so as to secure the throne for his nephew Fath Ali Shah is but a somewhat exaggerated example of normal happenings. And yet in spite of such precautions Fath Ali Shah had to remove not less than six pretenders before he could enjoy the throne in safety.

Frequently the members of the shah's own family were the first victims of distrust. Just as in the Ottoman Empire to be the heir to the throne meant that one's life was constantly in danger, so in

Iran the position of the eldest son of the shah used to be a questionable honor. Even Shah Abbas the Great, who passed into history as the greatest ruler of Iran during the Islamic period, planned the murder of his eldest son, a young man of unusual gifts, when his growing popularity began to alarm the shah, and after having had his two other sons blinded he appointed the son of his eldest son heir to the throne, a boy too young to be suspected of criminal intentions. Not until two European great powers, Great Britain and Russia, took a determined interest in Persian affairs, was a peaceful succession secured. The undisputed enthronement of Mohammed Shah, in 1834, was due to this foreign influence, and his march from Tabriz, where he had been governor-general, to Teheran, escorted by the British and Russian ministers, marked a break with the past and foreshadowed the approaching end of Persian independence.

However, with few exceptions the rulers of Iran cannot be accused of having been sinister tyrants, indifferent to and remote from their people. Accustomed to yield to their slightest mood or whim, they yet evinced much of the patriarchal type of kingship. Although in some of the shahs personal ambition, the desire for and the enjoyment of power, often overshadowed any concern for the welfare of the country, there were others who may be compared to the monarchs of enlightened absolutism in Europe or to ancient patriarchs. The kings of Iran administered justice in public and received in person complaints and petitions. The old Roman axiom *minima non curat praetor* (the praetor does not concern himself with trifling cases) was certainly not theirs. It is quite noteworthy that when Nasr ed Din Shah tried to remedy the corrupt administration he ordered a sort of mailbox put up in the large squares in Teheran and in the provinces where people could deposit their complaints. He also created a special "court for the oppressed." This kind of procedure is in the best line of Persian tradition. It shows the strictly personal character of a rulership, in which the king can think only of his own intervention in order to set things right. It shows at the same time the limitation of the personal regime; for it was easy for the provincial governors to render the institution of the boxes ineffective by having spies set to report

the names of those who ventured to use them, and it was in the power of the ministers to bar from the Imperial Court those whose testimony might endanger their own positions or the interests of other influential persons. Farsighted kings considered it an honorable duty to improve trade by constructing caravanseries in towns, as well as at the roadsides, and posthouses where horses could be found and to build bridges; some of them even had paved roads built, such as that in Mazanderan, the work of Shah Abbas I. The protection which almost all the rulers granted to art and science is too well known to require elaboration.

Whereas in the West the king is apparently the peak of the social hierarchic pyramid, the ruler in Iran faces a mass of people who are all equally subjected to his will. The reason for this typically Asiatic phenomenon is the lack of an aristocracy in the proper sense of the term, such as we find in all Western countries. There a mighty hereditary class (which sometimes closely resembled a caste) with more or less well-established rights and duties, originally based on landed property, was closely connected with political offices and monopolized the higher posts. Often they enjoyed with the heads of the religious hierarchy the undisputed privileges of the highest social rank and they played their historical role from the early Middle Ages until well into the nineteenth century. By birth and interests the kings in Europe belong to and depend on this class, even if at times they lean on the bourgeoisie to neutralize the influence of an all-too-exigent nobility. On the other hand, the nobility is always ready to support, if not the person of the monarch, at least the institution of monarchy. The price the monarch had to pay for this support varied, but the wearer of the crown found his *bon plaisir* limited by the interests of his nobles.

In Iran no such a distinct nobility has ever developed. The Persian kings do not feel it necessary to rely on a privileged class, and they would have resented the mere existence of such a group limiting their power. Apparently there never developed among the great landowners who were in Iran, as elsewhere, designated to form a hereditary nobility, a class consciousness sufficiently strong even to attempt to impose their will on the king. Individualism

prevailed. Otherwise, how could the fact be explained that the great of the kingdom, high officials and landowners, tolerated the traditional practice of the shah to expropriate a man when his fortune became large enough to make confiscation desirable? No doubt the shah considered this measure not only an expedient means to increase his treasury but also a right resulting from the principle that everything—the land, the people, and their possessions—belonged to him. At the same time it was an infallible means of preventing the formation of a hereditary and mighty class which would threaten the king's monopoly of power.

Consequently, it seems all the more strange that there never was a political revolutionary movement to deprive the king of such monstrous prerogatives. Apparently nobody thought of questioning the idea of autocracy, with all its consequences, fatal as they might be. The king remained the only temporal power. Since he was not the head of the nobility and did not lean on any other group, he appears to have been in complete isolation, so much so that even the court of ministers is, so to speak, absorbed by him. The importance and the colorfulness of the royal courts in Europe derive from the fact that they are composed of noblemen who, though bound in fidelity to their lord, feel and possess a dignity and a position of their own. This situation does not even change during periods of absolutism when the monarch regards his ministers as his personal servants. An outstanding example in our times is Bismarck, who considered himself the personal servant of his "most high master," yet retained all the pride of the member of the Junker class. The absolute monarch would seldom dare to infringe on the written or unwritten rights of the nobility or on those of the other estates on whose good will he depended at least for his financial needs. In Persia, as in all Islamic countries, the ministers, who are not backed by an aristocratic class, were but the servants and the instruments of the king—his possessions. This they remained even under the late shah. Nothing stood between the king and his subjects so as to weaken his power.

If there was no noble class or estate, this does not mean that there were not individuals and groups which for various reasons enjoyed

world, are numerous in Iran. Formerly easily recognizable by their green or blue turbans and belts, they are to be found in all groups and professions. The distinctive position they enjoy is peculiar, since it cannot even be said to confer on the sayyeds social pre-eminence in the usual sense. The descent from the Prophet, while claimed by too many not to arouse doubt within the educated classes, yet carries a certain prestige among the masses and is often supposed to communicate to the sayyed a kind of charisma, grace, in which the believer may share by cultivating the society of the sayyed or by conferring on him benefits of any kind. For the rest the sayyed does not enjoy any privileges, nor are priestly functions connected with his status.

The place of the clergy in a secular society is always difficult to determine. As a body which derives its dignity from another and a higher source, it must claim precedence over all temporal power. Not always has this claim been fully recognized, and more often there has been open or hidden competition, with the result that even when the political problem was solved in favor of the temporal power that of the social rank of the clergy persisted. So the clergy of almost all creeds and countries occupies a distinctive place, but a place apart and difficult to define, in the framework of society.

Religion, or to use a more general term the "spiritual realm," has at all times and in many forms attracted the Persian mind. If only for this reason, the representatives of religion were assured of public respect and esteem. Therefore, while the clergy could in no way be called an aristocracy in the proper and Western sense of the term, we are justified in giving it a place immediately following the king and the nobility. This upper stratum of Persian society was, with the exception, perhaps, of the sayyeds, far from orthodox in its religious conviction. Many were or called themselves Sufis, and covered by this name were ideas and attitudes which descended from mysticism, maintaining some links with freely interpreted dogmatic religion through all kinds of philosophical mysticism and metaphysics down to agnosticism. However, just like many of their counterparts in the West, they considered it their duty to pay due honor to the traditional faith, to profess it publicly, to partake

in the rituals and ceremonies, and to maintain a definite solidarity with the priestly caste. The higher clergy, the mujtaheds, were particularly honored members of their society, since they combined with theological authority the knowledge of religious law and philosophical and literary culture. Among the masses of the people the mollahs, the lower clergy, held a similar position and influence.

The difference between the higher and the lower ranks of the clergy was determined exclusively by scholarship and personality. Comparatively few went through the whole curriculum of theological studies, such as that in the great Islamic university of Al Azhar in Cairo and that of Kairouan in Fez in Morocco, which took from ten to fifteen years. In Persia this higher learning was connected with the medressehs, the colleges adjoining the great mosques, where theology, philosophy, Koranic lore, literature, astronomy, astrology, and perhaps the traditional theory of medicine were the main subjects. It is noteworthy and one of the many proofs of Persian individualism that no established difference in rank existed among the mollahs such as exists in the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church. Personality and knowledge alone won fame and veneration and thereby authority and influence. The extent of their power may be best illustrated by the well-known fate of the tobacco monopoly in the early nineties of the last century, when the people protested against the concession which granted to the British Imperial Bank of Persia the exclusive control over the production and sale of Persian tobacco. The public felt that this monopoly exercised by a foreign power would interfere with their economic structure and traditional way of life. The most esteemed and authoritative mujtaheds took the lead of a movement against the concession and published an order prohibiting smoking throughout the country. This order was faithfully obeyed and the shah had to cancel the concession.

The education of the ordinary mollah did not take more than a few years. After the successful termination of his studies, which was certified by a mujtahed, he was ready to perform the various tasks, such as preaching in the mosque, organizing the worship in the innumerable Imamzadehs (sanctuaries of local saints), attend-

ing the ceremonies which accompany man's life from the cradle to the grave, teaching in the elementary (Koranic) schools, administering waqfs of minor importance, giving decisions in minor lawsuits falling under the religious law. In addition to these professional functions, he was called upon to perform still other functions in the life of the people, which though less defined enhanced his importance and influence. He might be and, in fact, often was asked to settle disputes between merchants in the bazaar. He might have to play the part of the physician and is still consulted by simple people, particularly by women, in the wide and obscure sphere where religion and superstition meet. So he still may write and sell amulets and charms for all purposes and even predict the future by means of the Koran and other venerable books.

A class which had such firm and manifold grips on the people, from the purely spiritual to the daily secular preoccupations, had not only the power to defend its own interests but may at any time extend its influence into the political field. Often enough it has opposed successfully the intention of the king. There was only one class which shared this power with the clergy—the merchants. Indeed, because of the impact on the masses of the priesthood and the vital importance of "big business" the autocratic power of the shah has at times hurt itself in combat against unwritten and invisible barriers.

Because of its central geographical position, the Near and Middle East, quite apart from trade in its own products, became the all-important agent between the Far East and India on one hand and the West on the other. For this reason and because there was no aristocracy there was guaranteed to the merchant class a social rank and an economic and political significance which for centuries was superior to that which the same class occupied in the West. In the Arabian Nights the merchant is second in importance only to princes and ministers; he is the great traveler, explorer, and adventurer and with the princes he competes in wealth and education. In all these respects the Persian merchant is the peer of his brother in Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad, and Basra. What we call the bourgeoisie, or middle class, in Iran practically

consisted of the merchants alone—in sharp contrast to the West, where since the early Middle Ages the liberal professions have formed an essential part of the middle class. It was this element which, rapidly increasing in influence, transformed the clerical civilization of the Middle Ages into the modern secular and scientific civilization—the philosopher and the scientist, the physician and the engineer, the jurist and the writer. These groups became the natural allies of the rising urban *bourgeoisie* in their fight for a new world order.

In Islamic countries there was no such development. Religion and tradition held thought and effort in their spell and kept the new ideas and discoveries from expanding their creative energies into the sphere of general culture. Such was the situation in Iran in spite of the greater independence of many of her thinkers and writers. The philosopher would continue in the line of Aristotelian thought as it was handed down to him through the Arabic translations and commentaries, the physicians followed the Arabic treatises and commentaries on Hippocrates and Galen. Koranic law dominating practically the whole jurisdiction, evolution of juridical thought was out of the question. The philosopher-poets and Sufis were the only ones to defy courageously the official creed. Under these conditions it was without any practical significance that the merchant *bourgeoisie* was supplemented by the liberal professions. The class itself, apart from its economic and political importance, bears little resemblance to the progressive *bourgeoisie* of Europe. It was decidedly conservative, even reactionary, in spirit and may be said to have taken in this respect the place aristocracy occupied in Western countries.

The bazaar, as the community of merchants is often called, moved only when its immediate interests were at stake. But when it did act, the situation so created could not be trifled with. Cases were not rare when even powerful kings had to withdraw their decrees once the bazaar had decided to close its doors in protest and had threatened to stop the economic life of the country. Those familiar with the recent history of Iran will remember the part the bazaar played in the fight for the constitution in 1906. The

resistance they offered to the shah's arbitrary measures by closing their offices and taking refuge within the walls of the British Legation determined victory for the constitutional movement. The initiative on this occasion was only partly theirs. Probably they acted chiefly on the instigation and in imitation of the higher clergy. It would be erroneous to assume that the majority of the merchants and the clergy were inspired by the idea of liberty and the desire for parliamentary democracy. While it is well known that some of the leading men were influenced by Western thought, the general motive was negative—to put an end to the shah's weak and at the same time tyrannical regime, which threatened the security of life and property.

The power of the bazaar is not only the result of the economic importance of the merchant class. There is another reason for it—the bazaar is well organized. As a matter of fact, the merchants and the arts and crafts are the only classes which can boast of an efficient organization, resembling that of the guilds and corporations of our Western history. There is, however, a noteworthy difference: the guilds in Europe were public persons representing an authority delegated to them by the state. This applied to the guilds of the caliphate for only a short period during the first centuries of Islam and to the Persian guilds not at all. In Iran the craft guilds and merchant corporations were organizations in their own right, functioning by their own initiative, under their own laws, and maintaining their own power and importance. Not even the clergy, lacking a strict hierarchical order, could claim more than a professional solidarity which in many cases proved strong enough for successful action. The other groups, high and low, lacked even this solidarity. Neither officialdom nor great landowners thought of uniting in defense of their interests, they remained what the French designate by the illuminating expression “une poussière d’hommes.”

The visible expression and symbol of this powerful organization in all Persian towns is the bazaar. “Bazaar” designates first location and buildings, then what is housed there, the workshops where wares are produced (blacksmith shops, ceramic works, leather

works, etc.), the shops where the wares of local production and of imported merchandise are sold, the offices of the big merchants (the bazaar in the narrower sense) who dominate the local market and the import and export business and speculate in commodities like grain, rice, opium, and so forth. There are also the bankers and the money-lenders. The bazaar is industrial center, market, exchange and produce exchange, and shopping center—all in one. It is a world in itself, the life center of the town and of the region. It contains places of worship—many of the most beautiful mosques are in the bazaars—public baths (*hammam*), eating houses, great caravanseries, where the caravans arrive and start and which contain storehouses for wares and accommodations for travelers. The bazaar becomes naturally the news agency and the center for the formation of public opinion and thereby a political power. In the bazaar the news arrives first from everywhere; here it is first discussed and decisions are made. Here, too, start “the bazaar rumors,” known all over the Orient, a wireless telegraphy whereby news, ideas, and movements are spread with almost incomprehensible rapidity over wide areas.

The bazaar realizes to perfection the sharp separation of the residential quarter from the business section. With the oriental idea of the absolute, almost sacred seclusion and privacy of home life the exercising of any professional activity in the home itself is incompatible. That the oriental house does not front on the street makes it unfit for this purpose. In the West the separation of home and business developed late, when the growth of the cities and trade made the concentration of commercial activity necessary and under the pressure of rising ground rents private homes gave way to apartment houses. Before that it seemed just as natural as it was convenient to have one’s workshop, shop, or office connected with the home; it remains so here and there in smaller towns. In the Orient a settlement of any importance possesses its bazaar.

In the large towns the bazaar is a town in the town, a system, or often a labyrinth, of long, mostly rather narrow galleries covered by arches which are often adorned by beautiful stucco work. Each craft and profession occupies its own section, just as the merchants

of the more important towns used to have their own caravanseries in the bazaars. The great bazaars of Teheran, Isfahan, Shiraz, and other cities still stand; they are still filled with life, and imagination may not find it difficult to conjure up the past. But the time of their charm and splendor, so often enthusiastically described, is gone. Gone are the old costumes, and modern European dress does look quaint and inconsistent in the old surroundings. The famous products of Persian craftsmanship and those of other oriental countries with which the bazaars used to abound have made room for modern merchandise, by no means all of which is imported from without. The economic importance of the bazaar, too, is rapidly declining. New avenues and streets, cutting relentlessly through the old quarters, are fringed with houses in European style, and the bazaar loses more and more to the modern shops which spring up where the wealthier part of the population is now gathering.

The bazaar comprises what could be called the Persian *bourgeoisie*—the wealthy merchants constituting the upper middle class, the shopkeepers and craftsmen the lower.

In Iran, as in all agricultural countries, the peasant bears the chief burden. Though he lives in most parts of the country in conditions of real indigence, at least according to our standards, he has preserved a natural dignity and politeness appreciated by all that have come in touch with him. About two-thirds of the land is in large estates or is crown land, today as in the past. The peasant of a village belonging to one of these domains is theoretically free to move, yet he is practically tied to the soil for the same reasons that everywhere and at all times have deprived him of the use of this right.

Descending still farther the ladder of society, we meet a multi-colored and confused crowd with all kinds of petty and odd professions and haphazard activities, even with no jobs at all—a changing medley so expressive of the phantasmagoric aspect of life, which though only a partial aspect of the oriental's attitude toward life is yet very dear to him. There are the dancers and singers, the monkey- and bear-leaders, roaming musicians, soothsayers, conjurers, jugglers, buffoons, and all sorts of vagrant people. While these types may be said to follow professions of a certain stability, there are

others whose profession it is to have no specific profession and to be ready for any kind of service: go-betweens for all purposes and foul tricks, *dallals* agents and intermediaries so indispensable in all Near and Middle Eastern countries.

Two types that cannot be classed properly in the social structure are best mentioned here, the *luti* and the *dervish*. In the whole throng just described the most picturesque and the most influential figure was the *luti*. It is almost impossible to give a clear idea of this type, so characteristic of Persian life in the past, because the *luti*, like Proteus, assumed many shapes and was bound to none. Mountebank, brawler, and rowdy, he dressed and posed as a dandy and a beau, and wore a beautiful dagger in his belt with ostentatious pride. A jovial merry-maker, he was the man of the moment and ever ready to exploit present events to his advantage. Though by origin he did not necessarily belong to the lower classes, he liked to be among them and maintained with them the best relations. For the masses were the instrument of his power. A skilled troublemaker himself, he was always the first to start something, was always observant, had mates everywhere, and was able to form a center of real power in a society where in the absence of anything like a reliable police force there was practically no public security. As a matter of fact the *lutis* were often hired by individuals and professional groups to protect life and property, and it is obvious that they were not slow to exploit such connections and their influence on the masses. Among the host of beggars the *dervish* occupied a distinguished position. The *dervishes* became public nuisances. While there were without doubt sincere and pious men among them, the majority had put on the *dervish's* attire in order to live a life of idleness, speculating on the religious feelings of the people, who did not fail to support them.

Slavery in the Orient never assumed the proportions nor the inhuman aspects it did in the West. When Snouk Hurgronje, the well-known Dutch Arabist, made his famous visit to Mecca, he was surprised to see the humane, almost egalitarian, treatment received by the slaves, male and female. The main reason is that they were never employed in hard work, not even in agriculture. In

Iran, too, slaves were exclusively house slaves, and since the prices were high, only the wealthy could indulge in the luxury of owning slaves. In the patriarchal households they were treated like the other servants, and the Persian if he did not always pay his servants well, at least used to be a kind father to his retinue. Consequently it rarely happened that the owner would sell a slave, and liberation was not considered a boon by the slave himself. A slave could easily rise to confidential positions and could become the guardian and instructor of his owner's sons, as slaves did in Greece and Rome. Female slaves were much respected as nurses and used to enjoy, together with the mother, filial affection and might even be cared for throughout their lifetime or become, as legitimate wives and concubines, members of the family. Most of the slaves came from Abyssinia and from black Africa. White slaves were much coveted, but they were rare, and since the occupation by the Russians of the Caucasian provinces they were no longer available.

The choicest slaves were the eunuchs, employed mostly as guardians of the harem. This responsible function yielded to them the confidence of their masters and a prominent place in the household. It happened not infrequently that eunuchs of the royal court rose to high positions. Under Fath Ali Shah and Mohammed Shah eunuchs of Caucasian origin became governors of Isfahan and Yezd, though they remained slaves until death.

The picture of Persian society would not be complete without mentioning four groups which lived at the periphery of society. These are the Armenians, the Jews, the Parsis, and the gypsies.

The position of the Armenians was one of social inferiority. Though they were not persecuted, their treatment depended upon the arbitrary will of the authorities. Their situation improved during the nineteenth century as a result of the influence of the foreign powers. Some of them rose even to positions of high honor. The majority of the Armenians lived and lives in one of their two large communities, one in Azerbaijan, the other in Julfa near Isfahan, where they were settled by Shah Abbas I, who hoped that his new capital would benefit by their skill in trade and business. Most of

the Armenians, however, are occupied with agriculture and gardening.

The Jews were at all times considered pariahs. They lived, most of them in great poverty, in separate parts of the towns, were liable to a poll tax and the objects of exploitation and ill treatment. They earned their livelihood as glasscutters, silkweavers, and jewelers and contributed largely to the musicians, the dancers, and the singers.

Somewhat better was the status of the Parsis, who still clung to the faith of their ancestors. Numbering between 16,000 and 17,000, they lived (and live) in Kerman and Yezd, some in Isfahan, Shiraz, and Teheran, where they were known as honest and successful merchants. But they, too, were subjected to disgraceful discriminations.

The gypsies, not differing from those in other countries, were known as fortunetellers, worked as blacksmiths, and the royal runners, who preceded the royal carriage, were usually chosen from them.

Society in Islamic Iran presents a certain resemblance to former European society. This resemblance is limited to the fact that groups or strata in both societies are defined by professions and that their place in the social order is determined less by their economic importance than by the impact of spiritual values and power—the political element. Otherwise, the comparison is imperfect and superficial. It is imperfect because in Iran there is no class of hereditary nobles based upon large landed property or monopoly of high office. It is superficial because Persian society is not a true hierarchy as is that of the West, for two reasons. First, in Persian society sharp class distinctions such as prevail in Western society are unknown. In Western society it has been exceptional to rise from one class to a higher class, particularly from the middle class into the nobility. Not so in Iran, where the lack of a clearly defined secular hereditary nobility deprived class distinctions of their chief characteristics. Nobility, such as it was, was constantly augmented and replenished from below, even from the lowest levels; the aristocratic

families themselves were rather short-lived. Generally speaking, a rise from one group into another through personal merit and skill, as well as through intermarriage, could occur without difficulty. Secondly, in Europe the three upper classes obtained very early, together with liabilities, well-defined rights and privileges which, written or unwritten, conferred upon them the status of persons of public law. These reasons support each other in explaining the lack of a genuine social hierarchy in Iran. For, as the clear and successfully upheld distinction between the classes is the condition for their elevation to persons of public law, so their legalization constitutes the most efficient means of reinforcing class distinctions. The designation "estates" given to the classes as persons of public law is highly significant, for it indicates that they are "states," that is, lasting and ever-effective conditions and institutions. In Iran, on the contrary, the clergy and the merchant class, the bazaar—the only organized groups—lacked any legal and official relation to the government; only in case of emergency, when their immediate interests were at stake, did they use what factual power they had to exert pressure on the king. In the West, the existence of the estates prevented the absolute monarchy from being really absolute, and only under unusual circumstances did it degenerate into despotism. In Iran the people, as the sum of all the individuals, faced the government, the shah, and his ministers without any lawfully recognized intermediary order. Such conditions make despotism possible.

There is, however, another aspect of the picture. If despotism and the people as the sum of the individuals are correlated phenomena the people will inevitably acquire a feeling of human egalitarianism not to be found in society having a pronounced class hierarchy. This experience of fundamental equality will, of course, not wipe out economic and social distinctions, but it will remove the obstacles in the way of rising from the lowest strata to the higher ones. Just as the king may without prejudice raise any of his servants to the rank of minister or even Grand Vizier if he considers the man of his choice a trustworthy instrument of his designs, so any step of the socio-economic ladder is accessible to any-

one who possesses the necessary skill and aggressiveness. Probably this absence of a rigid social hierarchy and the equal opportunity for all must be held responsible for the "democratic spirit" so often attributed to Islam. Expressed in this form, the statement is erroneous. The spirit of Islam as a creed certainly does not emphasize the fundamental equality of man any more than the other monotheistic creeds. If Islamic civilization in its various forms gives a well-founded impression of a democratic spirit, it is not, or only in the slightest degree, due to the fact that the influence of the Islamic faith is stronger than that which Christianity, for example, exerted over its followers. The democratic spirit of Islam is the direct outgrowth of the patriarchal living conditions of the Arabs. The despotism which sprang up with the conquests and founding of empires retained some features of the old patriarchal times, and is the result of the correlation of despotism with some democratic trends. The Islamic religion as such has little or nothing to do with it.

The position of the temporal power in the Shia world is far from being as simple and as clear as in Sunni Islam. The latter has shown an admirable capacity for adjusting itself to changing political conditions. Mohammed combined the quality of the Prophet, that is, religious authority, with the functions of leader in prayer and secular ruler. Having died without designating his successor—even the tradition according to which he had stated that his successor should be taken from his own tribe, the Koreish, is not authentic—it was assumed that the leaders of the Islamic community should be elected by the common consent of the believers. This principle, though upheld in theory, could be applied only in the patriarchal simplicity which prevailed in the time of the first four caliphs. With the rapid extension of Arab rule and the conversion of subjected peoples to the new religion, it had to give way to the force of facts, and often enough a ruler's claim to descent from the family of the Prophet, or even his purported Arab origin, was considered a sufficient reason for the legitimacy of the dynasty. And when later non-Arab invaders, Turks and Mongols, overran the countries of the caliphate and sat on the throne of the caliphs, it

became an established principle that the Moslem ruler who possessed the power to defend the faith and the interests of the Islamic world had to be recognized as caliph. It is well known that such a compromise was responsible for founding the caliphate of the Ottoman sultans, while the ceremonial conferring of the caliphate on Sultan Selim by the last ^{Abbasid} Fatimid caliph of Egypt, in 1517, was meant to bestow on the fact the appearance of legitimacy.

The Shia viewpoint in matters of politics is less realistic. Although sometimes it had to bow to facts, it never complied with them so as to sacrifice principle and theory to political reality. The criterion by which the Shia measured the legitimacy of temporal power, the descendancy from the House of Mohammed through Ali and his sons to the Holy Imams, remained unimpaired. Obviously the mystic character of Shia theology made this uncompromising attitude possible, if not necessary. According to their doctrine all spiritual and secular power is vested in the Saint Imams. Since there is actually no Imam on earth, the last Imam having disappeared in 873, and in expectation of his return as the Imam Mahdi (the Messiah, supreme judge and savior), any worldly power is illegitimate in the eyes of Shia orthodoxy. In its absence the high ranking Shia clergy, the mujtaheds, claim true authority. In only one case did they think it admissible to take a more moderate attitude and to recognize the comparative legitimacy of a dynasty.

The Safavids who ruled Iran from 1499 to 1722 and who elevated the Shia to the religion of the state were derived from the line of Imams, since the founder of the dynasty, Shah Ismail, was a descendant of the seventh Imam, ^{sa}Musa ^QQazem. The shahs of the Safavid dynasty considered themselves the lieutenants of the Imam as is indicated on their coins, which bear the inscription "Bande-i-Shah Valajat," slave of the king of the land (which means the twelfth Imam). So we find in this strange and probably unique situation that temporal rulers exercise their power not only as viceregents of God or a deity, a frequent form of the theocratic regime, or as successor-deputies of a deceased superhuman being, but as the lieutenant of a being which is supposed to appear,

strictly speaking to reappear, in the future. In the land of Sunni Islam the inherent right of the temporal power and its recognition by the clerical body were undisputed; the collaboration of the priesthood with the ruler, the *union des cloches et tambours* (the union of bells and drums), was an established fact. In Iran the secular power was from the religious standpoint not only transitional and defective but a usurpation. For this reason the Shia clergy maintained with regard to the kings an attitude of reserve and distrust, at times even of hostility. There always existed a feeling of solidarity between the priests and the people, and the clergy was inclined to make the people's cause its own.

The shah considered country and people his property and acted accordingly. His relation to his ministers has been described above. With the exception of ministerial posts, and sometimes even these, all positions were obtained by bartering. The provincial governors paid fees to the shah and indemnified themselves by selling the places of subgovernors and others to the highest bidders, and so it went down the scale to the working people, particularly the peasants, who had nobody below them to extort from and who were the ultimate victims. The result of this system of extortion and rapacity was a great strategy of self-defense by which the inferior tried to slip through the meshes of the net thrown around him. There developed a technique of cunning, simulation, and ruse which the Persians learned to master with rare perfection; its shocking and humorous aspects are the subjects of innumerable stories and anecdotes.

Persian functionaries, like those of all Asiatic countries, lacked professional training. Traditional procedure and common sense took the place of laws and regulations, and the character of the administration depended upon the person and the arbitrary will of the officeholder. More significant than a lengthy description is the fact that no distinction existed between the public treasury and the private purse of the shah. At the seat of the royal power the revenues were received and the expenditures decided. Nowhere, neither above nor below, was there an exact rendering of accounts or control, and the budgets were based on rough estimates only.

The absence of a clear distribution of financial burdens continually created emergencies which had to be met by drastic measures. When, for instance, an Austrian military mission arrived in the early days of Nasr ed Din Shah to instruct the army, the expenses were simply allocated to the province of Khorasan, and it was left to the governor to decide how to provide them. A similar procedure was the conferring of the income of villages as a royal favor or as a reward for special services. The beneficiary forthwith ruled as sovereign over the villages and squeezed out as much income as possible within the time he enjoyed the usufruct; of course, his interests clashed with those of the proprietor of the villages and with those of the peasants. Since there was no court to appeal to, ordinary administration suspended and abuses were unmolested.

Beside the regular revenue derived from ground rent, customs, and so forth, and the barter of offices, confiscation was an important source of income. It was considered a sovereign right of the king, who by such acts only took back what belonged to him. It was not confined to grand viziers, ministers, and the governors of provinces, who were in a good position to accumulate large fortunes in a short time and with whom a second motive of confiscation was political, namely, to deprive them of the means to indulge in the pursuit of ambitious aims dangerous to the throne. One of the ministers of Fath Ali Shah who succeeded in escaping the common fate revealed, as his ruse, that he never accumulated money or property. He had a small inheritance in land, which according to usage could not be confiscated; otherwise he spent what he got. "The king knows this," he used to say, "and he laughs and says: I should not gain one piastre by the death and plunder of this extravagant fellow." Rich merchants, too, thought it wise not to display their wealth too openly.

This irregular system of administration prevailed without much change until the time of Reza Shah—a fact which must be kept in mind in order fully to appreciate his achievement in introducing a modern administration based upon a well-trained bureaucracy with fixed and regularly paid salaries. On the other hand, it would be unjust to condemn unconditionally the state of administration in

Iran before Reza Shah. Without even stressing the fact that the conditions in most of the Asiatic countries did not differ much from those in Iran, one is bound to recognize that they have not prevented Iran from enjoying periods of political power and economic prosperity, nor have they impeded intellectual and spiritual efflorescence.

For those who are used to government and administration based on elaborate codes of law executed by thoroughly trained officers and controlled by all kinds of authoritative bodies, an arbitrary regime such as that of Iran seems to be synonymous with anarchy and evil domination. It would be indulging in self-complacency to forget that even in our so thoughtfully organized and supervised society there is ample opportunity for injustice, corruption, and larceny of all kinds. Apparently vice is capable of getting the better of even the best regulations and precautions. Inversely, even in a regime which is open to any kind of abuse virtue is not barred from entrance. There everything depends on the personal character of the officeholders. Where institutions and regulations are nothing and the person is everything the struggle for life is harder, and this will produce, besides estimable qualities, many decidedly undesirable ones. However, it would be contrary to human nature if good purposes and the will to enforce them were not to gain control at times, and there are numerous examples of rulers and ministers in Iran who have used their power to eradicate evils. But what these men achieved did not last, and the traditional abuses soon closed in on them and their exertions.

PERSIAN PSYCHOLOGY

HUMAN NATURE possesses an almost miraculous capacity for adapting itself to circumstances. Just as man succeeds in living under the most meager conditions—and some regions in Iran are proving this—so he is able to conform to the most oppressive social and political surroundings. When irregularity becomes the rule and arbitrariness the environment, he may simply bow to the force of circumstances and drag out his life as best he can or he may discover and develop psychological means to frustrate the oppressor just as animals in the course of evolution grew appropriate organs in order to adapt themselves to and to fight new and difficult surroundings. In acknowledging that the Persians had to become masters in the art of deluding an administration which used to work more for itself than for the people, it is appropriate to consider to what extent the form of government may have influenced the character of the people.

Since our interest is concentrated on modern Iran, there is no need to go back to classic times. Descriptions by European travelers cultured and unprejudiced enough to be trusted can hardly be found earlier than the sixteenth century. What these observers have to say about Persian psychology does not differ essentially from the more enlightening records and experiences of the nineteenth century and later. Another reason, more urgent and more significant, suggests that it is better not to make a psychological analysis of the Persians earlier than the sixteenth century. As if it were not enough for Iran to be under foreign rule for a period of more than 850 years, from the defeat by the Arabs of the Sassanian dynasty in 642* until the rise of the Safavids in 1499, the country passed through a time of terror and anarchy which may be said to begin with the disintegration of the Seljuq Empire, after the

*It is not necessary to discuss in this connection the Persian dynasty of the Samanids which reigned as an independent power in Khorasan from 878-999 and other minor dynasties of limited importance and territory.

death of Malik Shah, in 1092; it ended only with Shah Ismail, the founder of the Safavid dynasty. If it is permissible to compare the big with the small, we may look at the Thirty Years' War in Europe as a parallel phenomenon of an equally disastrous magnitude. The Thirty Years' War, indeed, meant to central Europe devastation, depopulation, disruption of civilization, and it is no exaggeration to say that not all its consequences have been entirely overcome even in our day. Yet the comparison is unrealistic, for in Iran, Asiatic dimensions take the place of European with regard to the duration of the fatal period and the destruction was Asiatic in magnitude, as well as the number of atrocities committed and the amount of annihilation and shifting of populations and the influx of new elements. From this cataclysm, which laid half the country in ruins and wiped out millions of its inhabitants, Iran never fully recovered. If there has been a change in the psychology of the Persian people (and in their features too), it must have happened as a result of these fateful centuries, which contain all the elements necessary to bring about a transformation—ininitely more than the adoption of Islam, which, as we suggested above, did not affect the essential components of the Persian mind.

This is not the place to discuss at length in what way changes in the material and immaterial environment may influence the psychology of a people and whether such influences can mean more than a blending of existing qualities and elements. J. R. Green, in his *History of the English People*, has suggested that a real transformation occurred in the English psychology as a result of their change from an insular people to a seafaring nation. According to a theory widely held the characteristics of the German people underwent a basic change when, in the eighteenth century, Prussia substituted herself for Austria as the leading power in the empire. In France, on the other hand, such vital characteristics as *rerum novarum cupidi* (the desire for new things) and, particularly, the *arguti loqui et gloriose dicere* (the pointed speech and vainglorious talk), which struck the Romans as the distinctive traits of the Gauls, seem to have outlasted two thousand years of history rich in all kinds of achievements and vicissitudes.

For our purpose we may well dismiss this fundamental problem. Suffice it to state that if there ever was a definite change in the psychology of the Persian people, it is not likely to have happened before the time we are interested in. For there is good reason to have "modern" Iran, modern in a broad sense of course, begin with the ascension of the Safavids, just as we start the history of modern Europe with the Renaissance period. The problem of a change in Persian psychology reappears only in our time, when it must be asked whether and to what extent the process of Westernization is going to affect it.

Considering the impact on the Persian mind of the centuries of Mongol invasion and domination, it can be safely said that anarchy, as the etymology of the word suggests, means absence of order and authority. In times of anarchy the individual will be thrown back on himself for the defense and the protection of his interests. Small groups may spring up that will try to perform some of the functions which the disintegrated larger units, particularly the state, leave undone. So personal, as well as local and regional, individualism grew in strength. It is in harmony with such a development that this period, deplorable as it is from the national and political point of view, abounded in great personalities. To find among them mystic philosophers and poets might not surprise those who consider mysticism a natural reaction to the sad circumstances of the world, but such a view is too narrow, at least in our case. The Persian genius produced at the same time architects, geographers, historians, scientists, and eminent artists, and the crafts attained one of their highest summits. As a matter of fact, the pantheon of creative personalities during this epoch must be interpreted as a kind of sublime confirmation of the general individualistic trend.

Despotism may work to the same psychological end, the creation of individualism; it did so in Iran. Bent on absolute subjection of the people, despotism sees its success achieved and guaranteed only by the dissolution of all groups and organizations. As a natural reaction, the components of this completely disintegrated mass, the individuals themselves, will try to defend their right to exist.

It seems very likely that the sometimes inhuman despotism of Shah Abbas, to whom fell the task of securing and enlarging the Safavid Empire, was not primarily inspired by a congenital instinct of cruelty. After centuries during which the ethnical homogeneousness of the people had been disrupted and their feeling of unity undermined, when by the force of circumstances the individualistic incentives outweighed all others, there was no other way of impressing upon the people the existence of a central power and of building the fundamentals of national unity. The security of the country, praised by all European travelers, the restoration of trade and prosperity, the resumption on a broad scale of international political and commercial relations within a short space of time could not be achieved without extremely harsh methods.

However, not even despotism at its worst could suppress in the Persian mind that admirable gift for dealing with adverse circumstances. Just as the Persian had never failed to overcome by skill and toil the opposition and hostility of nature, so he unfolded the rich resources of his mind to make life, even the good life, possible in spite of tyranny. And how could it be otherwise? To the Westerner life, individual and group life, is in principle something well ordered, full of significance, governed by more or less recognizable rules, and he himself has done everything to shape it so. The Asiatic, especially perhaps, the Persian, has a different outlook on the world and on life. To him this life resembles a game of hazard, where incalculable chances, good and bad, emerge and disappear, like bubbles on the surface of the water. There is no meaning whatever in this play, but he who wants to incur the risk may try to avert the evil and to seize the favorable opportunity. If he fails, he must pay a high price; but then it was fate, and he would suffer the inevitable consequences in complete surrender and with a stoic mind. Such an attitude takes, of course, different shapes according to the personal and social standards of the individual. There are endless stories and anecdotes—and daily life confirms and enriches them continually—concerning the tricks, cunning devices, and artful dodges whereby personal advantages are gained or escape from unpleasant and dangerous situations is worked out.

On a higher level this same talent develops into the technique of stratagem and intrigue.

To find one's way and walk erect in this haphazard world was the problem that fascinated the Persian mind. Nature was hard to man; its whims could not be foreseen, and man had no choice but to toil and to wrest from it by artifice and craft the field to reap and the tree under whose shadow to rest. The world of man was no friendlier. Like nature, it had no laws to rely upon, safety was a dangerous illusion, happiness a capricious companion who might or might not join a man for a short distance along his path. On all sides hostile intentions and designs were lurking which had to be considered with uneasiness and distrust. Such was the unchangeable structure of the world of men. He who felt that he could not or would not stand the test, who thought that it was not worth while to endure the trials, to him Sufism opened the door of mystical wisdom which ensured another and a lasting happiness. Those who remained attached to this world had to fight its battles. But to fight with an open visor is the privilege of only the few whose power permits them to dispense with camouflage. The others, high and low, have recourse to all the subtleties of contrivance. And so the game of life was played. This phrase is more than a metaphor. It is meant to suggest that to the Persian mind the encounter with life has not the same kind of sober and sore reality that it has to the Westerner.

Iran's attitude toward life, as it is borne out by the lives of its simple people and those of its great men and as it is expressed in its philosophy and literature, is peculiarly complex. Involved as the Persian is in life—and the gift of appreciating life in all its sweetness and bitterness has been fully granted to him—he nearly always retains a certain aloofness from the world and from life as the innermost determinants of his soul. If he shares this attitude with most of the oriental peoples, he has perhaps given to it the most human and diversified expression.

The soul's most subtle constituents are also its most powerful agents, and they are of the greatest moment in determining its nature and value. So it is here that psychology verges on meta-

physics. For we feel immediately that this attitude of aloofness indicates and implies a definite conception of reality. Keeping in mind the objective side of the phenomenon, we turn first to an appreciation of the aspects the subjective attitude of aloofness may assume.

Its highest expression is, of course, the Sufi, who has triumphed over the world and has become one with the Divine. Pure asceticism, as we saw above, is not often to be found among Iran's philosophers and philosopher-poets. World and soul are transformed into and absorbed by the Deity, serving as its mirror and reflecting divine beauty, wisdom, and love. Here the aloofness is absolute, since its object, the world, has been entirely or almost entirely dissolved. Sufism, however, has not been considered in Iran irreconcilable with the world and its preoccupations. Numerous were the men—and some of them are still living—who lived an active life, but nevertheless claimed to be and were recognized as Sufis. Here the term obviously cannot convey absolute significance; it means superiority to actions and emotions. Not a superiority won by and based on arduous self-discipline, but the result of deep insight and unique metaphysical experience. This insight and experience reveal and realize man's true destiny and confer upon him a freedom and a peace that no action or emotion can disturb, however vehement they appear to be. This is not the overbearing superiority of the man of the world or of intelligence and knowledge, but the superiority born of wisdom and humility. There was, not long ago, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs an old man serving in a humble position. Often after the offices were closed he might be seen getting into an elegant car, being greeted with the greatest respect by its occupants, who would drive him to their home. He was a Sufi, and so his presence was considered an honor and his company was sought by men of the highest rank. He had several times been offered an opportunity to retire and have his few needs provided for, but he had always refused, preferring to work as long as he was able. This type of perfection, until recently discussed and revered in groups cultivating the Sufi tradition, will hardly survive, even as an ideal, the onslaught of Westernization.

In Asia desires and passions have been more violent and impetuous and their expression and effects have been more drastic than in the West. Yet no one who has come in close contact with Asia can escape the feeling that there is in the Asiatic mind something akin to an inner voice which seems to say, "Yes, but still . . .,"—a voice which, while not always strong enough to influence passion and deeds, warns, not unlike the voice of conscience, that this life is not all or even the real. It is a fascinating psychological exercise to interpret the excessive dimensions of passions and emotion in Asia as overemphasis due to the natural human instinct to escape from and drown the inner warning. Another version of the same idea—psychologically different, but having the same significance—would interpret the vehemence of Asiatic emotions and their expression as basic phenomena. The warning voice would then be aroused as a beneficial reaction, or it would appear as a power summoned from another realm to interfere with the demon. Whatever be the psychology connected with this experience, its meaning is unmistakable. It is remoteness from the phenomena of the world as well as from those of the soul. The experience of remoteness, perhaps the distinctive element of the Asiatic mind, can be overcome, but the remoteness itself cannot be annihilated. The term "reserve" might be substituted for "remoteness," but the latter is more exact. Nobody who has ever talked to a true Oriental can have failed to feel this inner remoteness or reserve; it permeates his whole being and bearing. It gives to his attitude toward the world the decisive note and to himself a calm dignity which has at all times impressed the man of the West.

Strange to say, there is not necessarily any connection between this dignity and high moral quality; it may be found in men of average and even of mean character. Yet it would be rash to explain it away as simply hypocrisy or the superficial result of education. On the contrary, its independence from any psychological and moral qualities confirms our point that this dignity (to be more exact, the remoteness and reserve on which it is based) belongs to another and deeper part of the soul. It is, indeed, as we said above,

a structural element of the Oriental soul, perhaps its distinctive element. Now this remoteness, or reserve, may just make itself known to the observer as an underlying current. Or it may assume various psychological hues, specifically of skepticism, or resignation, or of *Weltschmerz* (world woe), but these are nothing more than expressions of character, they do not affect the deeper experience of remoteness. Where they are dominant, of course, there is no longer a fundamental attitude of remoteness. But as long as they remain superficial, they do not interfere with this reserve and superiority.

It may be said that a certain aloofness has always permeated the life of Iran—in all shades and grades of intensity, the higher ones by no means limited to the upper classes. A people with such an attitude will not as a rule pass simply along life's path. It would, indeed, be difficult to find a truly naïve Persian. The Persian is as conscious of life as he is of himself; otherwise he could not look at life as a game and at himself as one of the players. If he does not stand above life and himself, at least he stands beside it and becomes an onlooker as well as an actor.

The Persian humor, more than witty, must be understood in this light. We need not go into the complicated analysis of humor. Its simplest form, crude exaggeration for the purpose of rough amusement, must be distinguished from the finer and higher forms. Among these there is one in which humor is used as a means of self-defense. We sometimes take to humor, kind or sharp, to free ourselves from a situation which we are unwilling or incapable to master. While this kind of humor may indicate flight from a situation, that is to say, weakness, it may also mean the triumphant overcoming of a situation. Persian humor is essentially of the second type. It springs from aloofness; in dealing with a situation by superior humor, the mind is able to neutralize or to frustrate hostile surroundings. So this kind of humor becomes one of the most valuable assets in the struggle for existence. Not only for the individual himself, as a sort of self-treatment to parry the thrusts of fortune, but accepted and valued for dealing with difficult situations, which can often be settled by the use of humor. Adequately

to illustrate this argument would require a whole volume of historical situations, anecdotes, and personal experiences. Two stories chosen at random will have to serve our purpose.

About 150 years ago, when the family of Haji Ibrahim, grand vizier under Aga Mohammed Shah and Fath Ali Shah, occupied many of the highest offices in the country, a merchant of Isfahan was summoned to appear before the governor, a brother of the grand vizier, on the ground that he had not paid his tax. After having listened to what he had to say, the governor replied: "You will have to pay, or you must leave the town." "But where shall I go?" asked the merchant. "Go to Shiraz!" answered the governor. "I can't go to Shiraz—your nephew is governor there." "Then go to Kashan!" "Your brother governs that city!" "Then go to the king himself and complain!"—"Your brother Haji Ibrahim is grand vizier!" "Then go to hell!" retorted the governor. "Haji merhoom, the pilgrim of blessed memory, your father, is dead," answered the merchant modestly. "Well, my friend," said the governor laughing, "if my family bars you from all places of refuge, both in this world and the next, I will pay the tax myself." *

It is reported that Timur, when his conquering campaigns brought him to Shiraz, bade Hafiz appear before him. Hafiz, who lived poorly, presented himself in rather shabby attire. Timur eyed him and addressed him: "I have subdued the greater part of the earth, I have depopulated cities in order to exalt by their riches Bokhara and Samarkand. And thou, a wretch, sayeth in your verses:

For the mole on the cheek of my beloved Turkish girl
I would give the treasures of Samarkand and Bokhara."

Whereupon Hafiz answered: "O Lord, it is just this prodigality which has put me in the state in which you see me." It is said that Timur was so amused by the answer that he bestowed rich gifts on Hafiz.

It is well to remember in this connection the figure of the Persian popular hero, the buffoon Mollah Nasr ed Din, whose stories have been translated into many languages. Unlike his European counter-

* *Sketches of Persia; from the Journals of a Traveller in the East*, London, 1828, Murray, I, 258.

parts, Nasr ed Din was not occupied with more or less coarse tricks. His stories are accessible to and appreciated by all, yet not to everybody do they reveal their true meaning. They show the contingency of the world and man an errant in the world, foolish when he thinks himself most wise. His forte was to deal with situations so that seeming naïveté conceals the real and original superiority of mind that has seen through all the perplexities and therefore is aloof from them. In the figure of Mollah Nasr ed Din we find, perhaps, the purest and simplest expression of what is best in the Persian mind. This man who wandered about eating and enjoying himself like others, involved in the good and the bad of this world, is incorruptible and unimpressed by the noise and pompous manners around him. Undeceived by the interests of the mass and by what they call good and bad, he looks down upon the world, in full possession of himself.

Not every Persian is a spiritual descendant of Mollah Nasr ed Din. Although he may be called typically Persian, this does not mean that he is universal. The type, using the term in a philosophical sense, is rarely realized; there are only partial and occasional realizations. To present even a limited number of the many varieties of the type would require nothing less than the compilation of a psychological cross-section of the Persian people, a stupendous task, fit only for a literary genius. So let us be content to see how the sublime is transformed into travesty. In all groups of Persian society is to be found a type usually known by the Arab word *fuzul*. A *fuzul* is a man who busies himself with affairs which are of no concern to him and acts with as much eagerness and officiousness as he lacks authority to do so. Bent on exploiting any situation for his own benefit, he knows all the arts of adulation and intrigue. His zeal for truth is equivalent to his skill in representing things as he wants them to be, and the good is identified with his own interests. Yet it would be erroneous to imagine the *fuzul* going around like Cassius "with a lean and hungry look" and devoured by greed and envy. He is, on the contrary, an amiable rascal, by no means void of humane feelings and quite happy to let others enjoy themselves as long as he is not excluded from the bright side of

life. Being aware of men's motives and actions, he indulges in a lofty amoralism and suffers the blows of fortune with good humor and with absolute elasticity. He plays the game of life, fully aware of the world's ways and of his own, cherishing no illusions about either. Eventually he may succeed in sneaking into the favor of a great man and may become himself a man of importance and influence—a career quite common in the Iran of the past. If this happens, his experience and his knowledge of men and affairs will make him fill his place well enough. The city of Isfahan was especially noted for having produced this type, and Morier has immortalized it in his famous book *Hajji Baba of Isfahan*. It would, of course, be paradoxical to pretend that there exists any serious link between this type and the types characterized before. Yet the awareness the fuzul has of actions, men, and himself and his imperturbable and often humorous equanimity may seem to justify the idea that he may be regarded the last and degenerate offspring of an illustrious line of ancestors. He is, indeed, a burlesque figure—a grotesque yet infinitely human parody of a great model. So it will be adequate to say that the Persian mind, embracing fully everything that is human, against a background of profound remoteness, was obliged to produce the high and the low types with equal perfection.

This attitude, with all its facets, has necessarily had a strong bearing on the Persian's experience and the conception of the world. It affects his evaluation of the world and its reality. To the Persian mind the world could not have appeared as consistent and steadfast as it has presented itself to the Westerner even before modern science had established its objectivity on natural laws. The contingency of all earthly affairs, of which we talked above, implies a lesser degree of reality and to this corresponds a certain devaluation intellectually as well as emotionally. Such a statement might seem in flagrant contradiction with the view expressed above, namely, that the oriental soul is deeply, perhaps more deeply than that of Western man, involved in this world. This seeming contradiction can easily be dissolved. As the reactions to life become deeper and more violent, the causes or stimulants, things and

events, become altered. They waver and become unsteady; they lose objectivity and reality. Instead of presenting a clear front against the perceiving and reacting mind, externals are, so to speak, absorbed by the soul and its movements. They are, we might say, denaturalized, disfigured, and devaluated in favor of the subjective reactions they cause.

All this is in strict opposition to the Western mind, whose fundamental attitude has always been directed, though not always with equal determination, to objective reality, that is, to a conception of reality characterized by the greatest possible elimination of the subjective factors. Facts are sacred to the Westerner; they are less so to the Oriental, who has always been more interested in the psychological and human aspects of phenomena. What to him is important, what, as a matter of fact, is real, is not the object in its supposed "objectivity," but its significance for man. This deeply human viewpoint is—almost paradoxically—illustrated by a conversation Lord Cromer, the founder of modern Egypt, reports to have had with one of the shaikhs of the university of al Azhar in Cairo. Lord Cromer asked the shaikh whether he thought that the earth revolved around the sun or the sun around the earth. The shaikh replied that he thought the earth revolved around the sun, as has been taught for centuries. "Well," replied Lord Cromer, "but you know there are those who contend that the other is true." The shaikh's answer was, "Yes, I know; but, after all, what does it matter?" Not even the man of the European Middle Ages would have gone so far in turning his back on objective truth and belittling its value. But, after all, "what does it matter?" The shaikh did not recognize the astronomical fact as one of the keystones of modern physics, and even if he had he would probably have denied the value and importance of our scientific conceptions, their technical and general consequences. Apparently he denied that there is a truth in itself, and he implicitly affirmed that even if there were it would be of no interest or consequence provided it had no positive bearing on man's inner improvement. In establishing as the standard of truth its relevance for man's soul the shaikh might seem to have adopted the viewpoint of pragmatism, but in a deeper

sense. For the pragmatic belief that truth can only be tested by the practical consequences of an assumption, he substituted the conception that the meaning of truth is to be sought in the bearing it has on the improvement of the soul. This, however, would not do justice to the shaikh's philosophical standpoint, for the simple reason that for him the soul was an indisputable reality, whereas for the pragmatic philosopher there are no realities of any kind.

If, however, such an exalted view is disregarded, what remains is an acute interest in the psychological life, one's own as well as that of others. So in dealing with the Oriental there arise continually situations for which the Westerner finds himself wholly unprepared and for which he may propose all-too-simple interpretations. What appears to us exaggerated politeness, if not hypocrisy, in words and ceremonials, or at least expedient adulation, is in reality enjoyed just as much by him who offers it as by him who feels honored and gratified thereby. The readiness with which the Oriental gives erroneous information instead of confessing his ignorance is motivated by reluctance to disappoint; this motive often makes him give an answer which he considers agreeable to the questioner. In such cases and many others the desire to please and to feel obliging has a tendency to make one ignore plain facts.

Or consider the bargaining in the bazaars. The classic oriental custom of asking too high a price and then reducing it steadily according to the buyer's ability to pay or his insistence is by no means primarily and exclusively simply an attempt to cheat the buyer, who in any case would not have consented to the first price asked. It is a sort of agreeable game and contest whereby the merchant tests the buyer and his knowledge of the merchandise and of the market, while the buyer feigns lack of interest or unwillingness to buy at the prices asked. Tricks are employed, passions are aroused, often to the amusement of both the merchant and the buyer and also of the bystanders, and, since time is not expensive, the game may go on for a long while, terminating eventually to everybody's satisfaction. Here, too, the human factor prevails, for the object of the barter is almost forgotten and the wrestling of two intellects is the center of attention.

The same "unobjective" attitude may be found on higher levels and in more refined form in business and diplomatic negotiations. It is this turn of mind which is often so perplexing to the objectively- and technically-minded Westerner, who sees no fun in the game and is not willing to play. Persian intelligence and finesse has had a large share in this feature of the Oriental mind. The Westerner affirms the specific things of the world. Proceeding according to the principle that he who affirms the parts must affirm the whole, he logically takes a positive attitude toward the world as a whole. The East does not follow this line of thinking. For the Asiatic an affirmation of specific things does not necessarily imply a positive attitude toward the whole. His creativeness in arts and crafts, his capacity to enjoy life in all its forms with the most refined taste, his rare gift for accepting even ill fate and bitterness with full awareness and comprehension show clearly enough that he neither ignores nor depreciates or despises the things of this world. Yet his attitude toward the world and toward existence as such fails to agree with his attitude toward their components; it diffuses over the latter a subtle atmosphere of uncertainty—with a reserve which is closely related to the experience of remoteness. It is the instability, the impermanence, of all things which confirms and justifies this attitude, even if it is not its basic cause.

Nowhere, perhaps, on earth has transiency been so deeply impressed upon the mind as in Iran since the collapse of the Sassanian Empire. The rise and fall of dynasties, the sudden changes from glory and wealth to utter misery, the springing up of cities and palaces where others had fallen in ruins, and the general uncertainty of individual fate warned that the present, whatever its appearance, is but an illusion. Nowhere, perhaps, has this feeling found an expression so powerful and at the same time so beautiful as in Iran, where poetical art, philosophical thought, and mystical experience combined to give it shape and thereby to free the soul. On the other hand, the desire to grasp a moment of happiness "in annihilation's waste" was natural enough, and it became the more irresistible as the rapid change of fortune fascinated and terrified the mind. The will to live and the lust for earthly possessions grew

in proportion to the risk and the difficulties requisite for their gratification. It is characteristic—as is so often related by Western travelers—that a man caught in the act of lying or cheating, far from showing embarrassment or resentment, may appear unconcerned and even show frank amusement. The Westerner who is ready to accuse the criminal of lack of moral sense and consciousness is on the wrong track. The man has lost a game, but why should he worry? And seen against the background we have tried to depict—is it not as if he wanted to say, “What kind of world is this in which I have to resort to such tricks in order to get my share?”

This is the psychological background of the often reported Persian greediness. While almost all observers in the past and in recent times agree that greediness is one of the outstanding Persian characteristics, few, if any, have recognized that the accusation conceals an interesting problem. All the terms designating human qualities which we use so constantly are but temporary expedients to come to a quick understanding with other people for the practical purposes of daily life. So “laziness,” “kindness,” “cruelty,” and all the other terms in common use describe superficially manifold kinds of behavior. Seldom are any of these attributes realized; that is, cases of complete laziness, of kindness pure and simple, and of absolute cruelty are extremely rare, and in any specific case they require very subtle analysis. In common usage such terms are but signposts. We have tried to show the cogent circumstances which in Iran conditioned men to greediness—despotism, resulting in social and political disintegration. It must, however, not be forgotten that if the Persian has a sound and sometimes excessive appetite for the good things of life, he has always been a lavish spender, particularly for the benefit of his family and his friends. His hospitality has been proverbial, and his bequests for pious works of public charity speak for themselves.

Having traced this so-called national vice to its origin and true meaning, we may safely say that there is a good deal of greediness in Iran. This, however, is not surprising, for where is it absent? Our Western world is certainly free from any reluctance or even modesty in its lust for gain, and if it seems less apparent than in

Iran, it is because the covetousness of the individual is hidden behind anonymous groups. What is astonishing and a psychological problem in itself is that the Westerner in oriental countries, perhaps not only in oriental countries, but in all countries except his own, becomes extremely sensitive to their deficiencies and shortcomings while he forgets what is wrong at home. Exceptions are comparatively rare. The Comte de Gobineau, one of the finest and most impartial observers of Iran during his long stay as a diplomat, in a letter written in 1865, after having stigmatized the inclination to fraud and imposition in Iran, speaks of the European legations in Teheran—the Russian, the British, and the French—as displaying such a disregard for the simplest loyalty that they could have no right to accuse the Persians. And he also says that the few Europeans living in Iran, absolutely destitute of shame, are denouncing one another to the Persians. All those who observed the business methods of representatives of Western nations in Iran, particularly since the last war, resorting to all kinds of tricks in competing for government orders, begrudging each other every cent, slandering and casting suspicion and blame one upon another before the Persians, will be deeply ashamed of this deplorable spectacle, will resent the irreparable damage to the prestige of the West, and will at the same time understand that Persians, high and low, are only too eager to pay the foreigners back in their own coin.

In former times the European was an intruding foreigner—the man of wealth and, above all, the infidel, who (looked down upon because of a feeling of superior faith and civilization) became the natural objects of Persian exploitation. Now that times have changed and that superiority is no longer generally acknowledged, the Westerner gives such a degraded and utterly immoral impression that the effect cannot but be the same. During the nineteenth century, when foreign influence steadily increased and contributed to the undermining of traditions, what purpose could the average man consider more urgent and desirable than to win for himself as much as he could?

Two important conclusions will bring to an end the present chapter. The first relates to the possibility that Persian psychology

has changed. We are now better equipped to give a plausible answer to that question. Three causes have worked to effect a change: the impact of a new religion, the long period of foreign rule and the consequent disintegration of the old institutions, and unrestricted despotism.

Only the impact of Islam needs a detailed explanation. The dethronement by Islam of Zoroastrianism, a process which it took centuries to accomplish, revealed the strong bond between the people and their creed. Zoroastrianism is not only original, it may truly be called a unique religion. With an affirmation of the world and its goods that is not even found in Judaism, it combined the idea of man as an indispensable helper of the Supreme God in the great struggle for the final victory of the good. Its purification ritual, pervading man's whole life and embracing the physical as well as the moral sphere, above all its complete lack of any tendency toward proselytism, distinguished and separated the Zoroastrian community from all other nations and religions, arousing in the chosen people an understandable pride. To assume that an indigenous faith of such independence and grandeur could be completely eradicated and replaced by a foreign creed of the utmost simplicity imported by a half-civilized desert people is contrary to psychological probability. Noeldecke's opinion, quoted by Sykes,* that "Iran was penetrated to the core by Arab religion and Arab ways" is admissible only with clear caution and after a definition of terms. If we define "religion" as dogmatic belief and outward ritual and "penetration to the core" as the sincerity of the believer in the religious practices, there is not much to be said against Noeldecke's assertion. But if he intended to express the conviction—as he probably did—that Islam effected a complete change in the Persian mind, uprooting everything that so far had been called Persian, he certainly overstepped the mark. This, however, is the only true sense of penetration of religion and of religious belief. For religion is not only belief, be it ever so sincerely professed, nor is it outward religion ever so devotionally practiced. It is inner transformation or it is nothing at all.

* *History of Persia*, 3d ed., 1930, II, 536.

In this legitimate sense there was no "penetration to the core" by Islam among the Persian people. A change there was. As could be expected, the infiltration of Islam incited the resistance of the innermost part of the Persian soul. While the victory of Islam to all intents and purposes unquestionably penetrated far below the surface, it was no total victory. The deepest stratum was left untouched. There the Persian soul developed, with an instinctive and at the same time lucid certainty, the means of warding off, in some respects even of overcoming, the aggressor. This process was, of course, hidden from the consciousness of the masses, but it was felt by many, and the illustrious representatives of the Persian mind were with few exceptions fully aware of it. Sufism and the Shiite form of Islam were the protective weapons by means of which the original Sunni Islam of the Arabs was, as it were, held at a distance. Of the two, Sufism is the more piercing, yet the more subtle, weapon. Persian mysticism, much less confined than is that of the West to the religious realm and penetrating philosophy, and poetry and influencing the lives of many, is of all the forms of mysticism probably the most unorthodox. The Shia clergy were always suspicious of the Sufi movement and identified Sufis with unbelievers, but so deeply rooted was the Sufi way of thinking and so unquestioned and widespread the veneration and worship paid by the people to the Sufis that the clergy dared not declare open warfare upon Sufism. Understood or not, it was cherished and appreciated by the masses of the people, regardless of the official creed.

However, even the Shiite creed itself must be interpreted as a defensive measure which does credit to the instinct of self-assertion and self-preservation of the Persian mind. The Persians adopted and developed Shiism because its mystic character struck a congenial note and offered a wide field for theological and metaphysical speculations, as well as for varied emotions. No doubt in the recesses of their souls the Persians, at least those of the first centuries after the Islamic conquest, identified themselves with the persecution and martyrdom of Ali and his house. They, too, were a defeated and humiliated people whose rights and deepest con-

victions had been violated and trodden upon. At the same time their fate derived from that of the Alides a sort of consecration, and they could cherish the hope that just as Ali and his sons had obtained heavenly bliss because of their martyrdom, so they themselves might hope for a brighter future. The great psychological function of the Shia schism was the same as that of Sufism—defense and self-protection against the new religion. If Sufism triumphs over Islam, the Shia succeeds at least in separating the Persian mind from the original Sunni Islam.

This cleavage which may not always have reached the threshold of consciousness found its expression in a peculiar custom which is another confirmation of our thesis, the custom of *taqiyyah* or *ketman*—the dissimulation of faith by mental reservation. According to this belief, it is not only admissible but also legitimate for a Shiite to conceal his faith. As an opportunistic measure, in order to protect life and property, the right to disguise one's religious conviction was often enough advisable. At times it was even a necessity, when the believer was not only at variance with the surrounding community but also, because of the rejection by the Shia of the Omayyad and Abassid caliphate, the object of political distrust and persecution. Yet this dissimulation could claim another esoteric function—that of hiding the highest spiritual truth from the contaminating contact with a hostile world; only in this way could the secret truth be passed on from generation to generation unspoiled by foreign elements.

It is this idea of the *ketman* which agrees especially with the whole character of the Shia—that of a mystic and in essence secret doctrine. In this religious sphere is the most powerful cause of the change which to all appearances occurred in the Persian mind, giving the Persians their distinctive characteristics. In Sufism the Persian spirit maintains its purity. The Shia, on the other hand, is an admirable, but inevitably only partly successful, attempt to discard Islam; it is, psychologically speaking, more of an escape than a solution. It is understandable that the long period of national decline and dismemberment, with its uncertainties, was also very likely to foster such a mentality. That the clear-sighted des-

potism of the Safavids, aiming so successfully at national resurrection, was bound to develop it still more deeply has already been explained.

Surveying Persian society, its composition, and its mentality, one may wonder less that the Persians as a nation survived so well than that they survived at all. Iran's tortured history after the Safavids and until the Kajars, when more than once the nation rose, only to be again disintegrated, and then its fate under the Kajar regime, when Western political ambitions entered the scene, amply justify surprise and even admiration. Lacking the stable class structure of Western society, deprived of any established political influence, Persian society showed tenacity in spite of the most severe trials, cohesiveness in spite of highly developed and individualistic tendencies, and vitality notwithstanding widespread corruption. All these qualities were centered in and took their force from the inner reserve and remoteness which permeates all aspects of the Persian atmosphere. It gave to the individual and to the nation in the midst of utter enthrallment and misery a sort of independence without which life would have been unbearable.

If Persian society was unanimous in its effort to fight an administration which considered the people milch cows, it did not fail in the attempt to exploit the exploiter. The most successful means of accomplishing this purpose was, of course, to obtain an administrative position with the exploiters or to get into the retinue of a great man. These were, as a matter of fact, almost the only links between government and people. Under such conditions society had to evolve a life of its own, having nothing to depend upon but its own resources. So it developed a tenacious strength and a virtuosity for self-preservation which most critical observers have not sufficiently appreciated—if it has not been entirely overlooked.

What made the task less difficult was the unhesitating recognition the Persian has always shown for personal merit. While he bows readily to power and wealth, with every outward sign of oriental submissiveness, he reserves free and unlimited respect and

reverence for superiority of wisdom, of knowledge, of integrity, and of justice. Authority of this moral kind has always carried weight in Iran and has contributed constantly to the maintenance of social order and peace. To the Persians can be fully applied what Napoleon said of the French—that they are characterized by “*amour d’égalité et amour de distinction*.” The Persians are true democrats in the sense that they consider everyone any man’s equal, but they are by nature opposed to a leveling process which would ignore individual differences and make life colorless and boring. This, indeed, is the last thing a Persian would want to happen. He has a fine appreciation of psychological differences and human values, and he has never failed to pay due homage to greatness—spiritual, moral, or intellectual.

and nothing to rely upon but himself. After he became a commissioned officer his career is well known. But when we try to discover the roots of his inner life and evolution, we are at a loss. There is no information available, nor is the absence of biographical material accidental. Had he been a man of the West, an enormous amount of written and oral documentation would be at hand or might be brought to light by the historian: living witnesses, relatives, friends, mistresses would be interviewed and would testify; autobiographical material (letters and notes from his hand) and letters addressed to him might be found; casual references and conversations might be reported. Quite apart from the particular circumstances of his life, the general attitude of the Orient is detrimental to the gathering of such records. The East is more impersonal, more indifferent to the individuality of its great men, and they themselves feel neither compulsion nor desire to talk about themselves. Under these conditions the intuition and the interpretation of the historian will assume greater importance.

The testimony of a British officer is all the more valuable because of this scarcity of material. F. A. C. Forbes-Leith * says:

Early in the year 1919 while stationed in the city of Kasvin I received a call from two officers of the Persian Cossack Brigade. One was a Russian, Colonel Slivetski, an intimate friend of mine, and with him was one of the most distinguished and handsome Persians I have ever seen. He was introduced to me as Major Reza Khan. His manner was reticent, and I felt that he must be rather bored with our conversation, but when I offered to show him around my mechanical transport lines his whole attitude changed. The Persian major was in his element. He fired question after question at me for over an hour, but it was a pleasure to give him the information he asked, for it was obvious that he was a keen soldier. Everything he inquired about dealt with matters of import, and I was amazed to find how quickly he grasped the most difficult points.

This episode reveals the man in the light of later events. Reza Khan was unswervingly possessed by one idea—unwilling to make

* *Checkmate; Fighting Tradition in Central Persia*, London, McBride, 1927, p. 22.

any concessions, ready to sacrifice everything and everybody—including himself—to the realization of his plans. This passion seems to have lifted him above his compatriots and made him powerful in this chaotic period of his country's history, which Morgan Shuster, the American financial adviser, described so well in a book bearing the ominous title *The Strangling of Persia*. Iran, then being used as a tool by Britain and Russia, offered few opportunities for men whose aims transcended social ambition and office holding for the purpose of self-enrichment. The influential ministerial posts had been made objects of barter by the great powers—Great Britain, Russia, and during the first World War Germany—which offered huge premiums to the man who was willing to promote their interests. These deplorable conditions reached a climax with the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919.

The British government, in view of the disturbed situation in Russia, felt that the moment had come to liquidate the Persian problem. The Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907, which had eliminated the antagonism between Russia and Great Britain at the expense of Iran by dividing the latter country into spheres of influence, had been nullified by the downfall of the czarist regime. The Asiatic policy of the Bolshevik government was still uncertain. If it chose to be aggressive and imperialistic it was imperative for Great Britain to have all lines of defense strengthened and a foothold in Iran secured. From such considerations sprang the decision to end the anarchic conditions—by no means the fault of Iran herself. This decision took shape in the fateful Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919. Much has been said—and with good reason—stigmatizing this diplomatic instrument as an example of ruthless imperialism. Indeed, its stipulations involved complete tutelage of Iran and the loss of her independence and sovereignty, which had until that time been at least formally recognized. The agreement provided for taking over the whole administration and the officering of the army by Great Britain; in return, Iran granted important commercial advantages and agreed to the construction of a railway from Teheran to the Persian Gulf. No further comment is needed. Iran not only pays heavily for the benefits be-

stowed upon her, but it is obvious that her gains—sound administration, a well-trained army, and good communications—are the very means of guaranteeing to Great Britain political and commercial monopoly in Iran.

Undeniable as these facts are, impartiality calls for an additional observation. British policy was based on true insight—Iran could not go on as she was, and something radical had to be done. This fact was all the more impressive since Iran would be unable to defend herself against the impact of Bolshevism, which had openly begun a struggle for world revolution. It was, of course, out of the question for the British to simply depart under these conditions. Such a step would have meant an invitation to the Russians to march in. These considerations lent some justification to the egotistical role of saviors that the British readily assumed. However, fate had decreed otherwise. From the ranks of the Persians themselves came the man who was to initiate a new epoch in the history of Iran.

Conditions were favorable for his appearance. This circumstance does not in the least dim his worth and his merits, for we must ever be reminded of Goethe's words: "How closely linked are chance and merit." More than in any other field the necessity of interchange between personal merit and chance appears on the political scene. In any great political reform or innovation it can be demonstrated that the time was ripe for the man and that he was born, so to speak, out of the needs of the situation. This was certainly true of Reza Khan. Yet his unusual capacity for espying opportunities and acting at the right moment cannot be ignored.

To bring the agreement to a conclusion the British had to resort to bribery on a large scale. Three cabinet members, one of them the prime minister, were paid handsomely. However, to become valid the agreement had to be ratified by the parliament. If the prime minister, Vusuq ed Dowleh, hesitated to bring the matter before the mejlis, the chief reason was probably that he felt that the parliament still had enough national pride and a strong enough instinct of self-preservation to refuse ratification. Ahmad Shah himself seemed to be by no means hostile to the treaty,

which would have freed him once for all from the burdens of government. At the right moment a patriotic mollah, sayyed Zia ed Din, assumed power and immediately appealed to the Cossack brigade for support. Reza Khan did not hesitate to answer the call. He marched on Teheran with a few thousand men and arrested the government. He entered the new cabinet as minister of war in February, 1921. One of the first acts of the new cabinet was to nullify the agreement.

The British, playing for high stakes, had maneuvered themselves into a difficult position, particularly because the Russians, inspired by true political wisdom and acting with undeniable diplomatic astuteness, seized the opportunity and turned the situation to their advantage. Earlier, challenging the British policy in Iran, they had occupied Gilan and Mazanderan, the two rich Caspian provinces, and threatened to march on Teheran. Now, well aware of their chance, the Soviet government reversed their policy and renounced with one gesture all the privileges they had held so far: the Persian debt was canceled, the Imperial Bank of Russia was turned over to the Persian government, and the Julfa railway was ceded to Iran. At the same time the Russians evacuated the occupied provinces.

While these magnanimous acts may have been at least partly the result of a difficult domestic and international situation, in the eyes of the Persian people they contrasted sharply with British imperialism. Ironically the new Russo-Persian treaty was signed on the very day when the Anglo-Persian agreement met its final doom in the mejlis.

The British, however, were not slow to extricate themselves from the impasse at which they had arrived. Since it had proved impossible to monopolize Iran and to turn her into a satellite, they decided that their interests might be best safeguarded by building up Iran as an independent power under a capable ruler. It does credit to their perspicacity that they accepted and supported Reza Khan. Since Reza Shah's idea of independence did not agree with the views of the British, they might not have got all they expected. But since the leading motive of the shah's foreign

policy was suspicion and fear of Russia, their interests were served well enough. It is not necessary to assume that the British were mixed up with the march on Teheran and the choice of Reza Khan, as has been sometimes suggested. Their attitude may well have been caused merely by a realistic recognition of the *fait accompli* and the fact that they must make the best use of it in order to ward off the Russian impact. Later events proved that the independence of Iran under an energetic ruler not only cleared the path to her recovery and progress but also furnished a better safeguard for the legitimate interests of Great Britain and Russia than rivalry and distrust would have been.

Reza Khan became prime minister, and in 1925 he was elected shah of Iran. The election gave evidence of Reza's diplomatic adroitness. Public opinion, haunted by the memory of the last three unworthy shahs, mindful of the heroic fight for the constitution and, perhaps, inspired by the example of Turkey, had at first veered toward a republic, with Reza Khan as president. But when Mustafa Kemal began to divest Islam of its traditional form and to reduce it to a sort of rationalistic monotheism, the Persian clergy recoiled from the example of Turkey and violently opposed the founding of a republic. It is at least doubtful whether Reza Khan was ever attracted to republicanism, despite the example of Mustafa Kemal. Reza's ambition and idea of power fitted better with a monarchy. Seeing his opportunity, he bowed to the authority and the influence of the clergy. The republican form of government was dismissed as incompatible with religion and tradition. The monarchy was proclaimed.

The life work of Reza Shah can be better understood, better appreciated, and more justly judged if seen against the background of his personality. It is important to realize that he was of Persian blood. This fact would seem natural and normal, but actually the preceding dynasty had been Turkish in origin, and many Persians resented it as foreign. No doubt Reza's Persian origin combined with other more important factors to make him acceptable, for he was Persian in mentality as well as in blood. True, he could not pretend to the traditional Persian culture, which

demands high intellectual equipment and refined sensitiveness and has always been the prerogative of the upper classes. The ties that linked him to his country lay deeper, far down in the unconscious and instinctive attitudes he shared with his country. Iran's old civilization did not mean much to him, and it is very doubtful whether he had any true understanding of the Western civilization which he set out to introduce into Persia.

Paradoxically, the modernization of Persia was accomplished by a man who could hardly be called cultured—a man who recognized his own limitations by insisting that he was just a soldier. Unlike the upper-class Persian, he did not feel the spell of many centuries of civilization; free of the fetters of the past, he could institute reforms and thrust obstacles aside with ruthlessness and rude vigor. A man who was deeply rooted in the national culture, however thoroughly convinced of the need for modernization, however anxious to change the customs of his land, might have been trapped and hampered by his own legacy to the point of yielding to the resistance of the people and ending by compromise and lethargy. Delay, doubt, and hesitation might have meant jeopardizing the whole program and missing the historical moment. As it was, Reza Shah in a few years eradicated usages and practices that had seemed part of the very tissue of Persian life. He transformed institutions and uprooted convictions which had been held sacred. The suffering and anguish he caused troubled him not at all, for he was himself untouched. Doubtless a radical operation was under the circumstances preferable to more gradual treatment.

His reform was more difficult to accomplish than that of his great prototype, Mustafa Kemal. For centuries preceding Kemal the West had been perhaps the most important factor and problem in Turkish life and society. This contact with the Occident had not been limited to the European part of the Ottoman Empire; it had extended into Asiatic Turkey as well, particularly into Syria and Egypt. Non-Turks, Greeks, Armenians, and Albanians—whether converted to Islam or not—often held significant posts. In the nineteenth century modern ideas and customs spread rap-

idly. On the contrary, in the earlier centuries Iran had had only casual and transitory contact with the West, through merchants, travelers, and explorers. Only in 1807, when Napoleon sent a military mission to the court of Fath Ali Shah, did Persia enter the orbit of international policy. The purpose of the mission was to modernize the army in order to use it against the British in India. The scheme amounted to little, and modern ideas had only superficial effects in Iran until the end of the century. Even then there were few upper-class Persians who had visited Western countries or had sent their sons to be educated in Western institutions.

Furthermore, after the Ottoman Empire fell, Turkey was left with a homogenous people, with an almost insignificant mixture of non-Turkish elements. The Persians, though once of Aryan stock, are made up of diverse elements, and the tribes, which are of immense importance, are derived from different origins and races.

The Turkish population is by overwhelming majority peasant; the towns play a relatively small role in the national life. In Persian history and civilization the townsmen have traditionally wielded the dominant influence, and the upper classes of the cities kept their dominance until modern times. Obviously, these highly-educated and tradition-minded groups proved more difficult to transform than did peasants.

True, Turkey, in possession of the sultanate and the caliphate, had been the leading power of Islam. But despite this fact the Sunni branch of Islam is less fanatic and passionate than the Shia faith, which Abbas the Great had adopted as the Persian national religion.

The Turks are a warrior race, hardened and disciplined in the last decades by a series of wars. They are accustomed to obeying orders. The Persians, despite much warfaring, have become in spirit a peaceful, civilized people, with strong tendencies toward individual liberty. Turkey had no civilization that might properly be called her own; she had instead excelled in the arts of war and skills of administrative organization. Therefore the minds of the Turks were better disposed to change old ways to new than were

the minds of the Persians. A cultural evolution of twenty-five hundred years had left the marks of its own creative spirit in the Persian soul.

The two countries, then, required different types of men to achieve modernization. Mustafa Kemal came from European Turkey and was partly of Albanian origin. Trained in the military academy of Saloniki, and like all the other members of the Committee for Unity and Progress, who started the constitutional movement in the reign of Abdul Hamid, he was much affected by Western civilization and was well acquainted with Western ideas and methods. Reza Shah was self-made. His only contact with the West came when he was in the Cossack Brigade; his only experience of the world outside Iran was a journey to Turkey, undertaken after he had ascended the throne. His reform mirrored in its shortcomings some of these limitations, but he was the type of man needed for the modernization of Persia.

The title which Lord Cromer gave to his book about Egypt, *The Making of a Nation*, might fittingly be used to characterize the achievement of Reza Shah's life. He envisioned a renewed Iran, worthy of her past and capable of competing with all other nations in every field of peaceful achievement. To realizing this dream he dedicated the unshakable force of his will. To him the nation was all, his own person of little consequence. In this he was unlike the earlier rulers, who had looked upon country, people, land, and property as their personal belongings to be used at will. With the exception of Nasr ed Din Shah, Fath Ali Shah was the best ruler of the Kajar dynasty and, according to traditional standards, a capable and even benevolent monarch. In 1800 he had a conversation with the British envoy extraordinary to Iran, Sir John Malcolm, in which they discussed the English form of government. The British diplomat explained to the shah the meaning of liberty and all that it implied, saying that "no man was so high in England as to be able to do anything contrary to the law of the land." The Persian king rejoined: "I understand all you have said. Your king is, I see, only the first magistrate of the land. Such a condition of power has permanence, but it has

no enjoyment; mine is enjoyment. There you see Suliman Khan Kajir and several other of the first chiefs of the kingdom—I can cut all their heads off. . . . That is real power, but then it has no permanence. When I am gone my sons will fight for the crown, and all will be confusion.”

Reza Shah's purpose in ruling was not “enjoyment.” In personal life and habits he was almost ascetic. He stood for “permanence”; he wanted to stabilize Iran and to insure the rule of his dynasty as a means of safeguarding the new order. He certainly enjoyed his power; the very expression in his extraordinary eyes when he looked over a low-bowing assembly betrayed the satisfaction he drew from his unlimited authority. But he used that authority neither for the sheer sake of power nor for his own pleasure. Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that for the first time the state had become an entity separate from the person of the ruler.

The shah's capacity for work was enormous, in proportion to the revolutionary task he had set himself. Unwilling to leave anything to others, he undertook to initiate as well as to control. It was not unusual for him to appear at the office of some government department at the opening hour to make sure that the functionaries were arriving punctually. The administration was totally reorganized; new branches were created, and the spirit of discipline and disinterested service which emanated from him began to pervade the whole. His awareness of the devastation wrought on the morale of country and government in the last few decades led him to use all means, including continual pressure and fear, to achieve what he considered necessary. His demands were unflagging; they were often beyond the capacity and willingness of his subordinates and sometimes not adjusted to the reality of the actual situation. It was not rare for his irascible temper to carry him beyond harsh tones to acts of violence. He might very well have invented the motto: *Cito, cito, quod dixi, dixi*. His eagerness to crowd into a few years changes that should logically have evolved gradually, his fear that death might claim him before Iran was safely on the road to modernization, his somewhat

faulty idea of the requirements of Western civilization—all these factors influenced his work. His efforts and his achievements were not always directed and co-ordinated so as to yield the maximum benefit.

Himself a paragon of energy and self-sacrifice, Reza Shah demanded the same spirit in others; therefore he became—as he wished to become—the scourge of his nation. Inevitably he regarded his subjects as mere instruments for accomplishing his purpose. This almost inhuman—and in its effect degrading—aspect of his rule developed in the later years. It seems to have been connected with the death of Timurtash, the mighty minister of his court, who had been his confidant and intimate collaborator for almost ten years. The justice or injustice of the shah's suspicions and accusations of Timurtash need not be determined here. He was arrested and imprisoned, and the tragic episode had a most unfortunate effect on the shah's mind and behavior. Thereafter his distrust and contempt for men grew, and he shut himself off from old friends and from counsel. He lived in a sort of sealed isolation and developed the mind of a tyrant, demanding submission pure and simple. He, who with his unusual moral and intellectual qualities might have been the great educator of his countrymen, instead marred much of his own work. His attitude produced the response that is always the answer to tyrants—Byzantinism, servile flattery, which only confirmed and finally increased his own distrust and contempt for others. No man of clear insight could be blind to the progress the country was making under Reza Shah's leadership, but the dangers in a regime which fostered mute obedience and hypocrisy could not be overlooked. Now that his iron grip is no longer in control, it is to be hoped that the pendulum will not swing to the other extreme.

Worldly pleasures had no place in the life of the shah. Unlike his predecessors, who lived surrounded by their ministers and courtiers, he refrained from any kind of court life. Even after the discarding of the veil, when court receptions in the Western style could have established a closer relationship between the dynasty and the people, he persisted in his isolation. His work and his

family absorbed him. Into his family life he poured all his deepest human feeling. Though he married a Kajar princess as his second wife, probably for political reasons, his real affection stayed with the old queen, his first wife who had been his companion in the years of obscurity and in his rise to power. He idolized her son (who is today the shah of Iran). No one who witnessed the scene when the crown prince returned to Iran after several years in a Swiss school could forget the deep emotion the old shah displayed in welcoming his son and in thanking his tutor for having brought the prince safely back. Love for his son may, indeed, have been the major motive which impelled the shah to abdicate when the Allies occupied the country in 1940, for this decision and his departure from Iran saved the throne for his son. Had he refused to yield to the Allies—a course which would have accorded better with his character—the dynasty would have fallen. So the old king abandoned Iran. He had secured the independence of a country which had been for decades the puppet of foreign powers and he had set the feet of his people on the paths of modern life. Now he gave the country over to hands that had not yet proved their strength and skill to steer the country through a stormy present into an unknown future.

Had he lived in the eighteenth century, when the great powers had not yet included the Near East in their sphere of interest, Reza Shah might have been a warrior king. After subduing inner foes, he might have widened the borders of Iran as did Nadir Shah, the last in the line of the Persian conquerors. In the twentieth century great military exploits were not to be considered. Reza Shah's ambition was a peaceful one—to make Iran a modern nation. We should not do him justice and should ignore the true meaning of his enterprise if we looked at him simply as the man who led Iran on the path of modernization. Modernization itself was to him only a means to build a nation. But—so we may ask—was not Iran, with her well-defined boundaries, her comparative racial homogeneousness, her venerable traditions and civilization, a nation even before Reza Shah appeared?

The Orient has at all times and through all its representatives

displayed a natural self-assertion and pride which was often characterized by haughty superiority. The West, recognizing in the oriental civilizations its ancestors and masters, used to acknowledge their right to this attitude until the power resulting from modern techniques reversed their positions. The self-confidence of the Orient began to waver or to become mute, unshaken in many instances, though less apparent. It was fully restored and returned to the foreground when the Western nations abused their power and, moreover, offered to the world a repulsive picture of discord and jealousy so little in accordance with their professed ideals of Christianity and progress. But when this self-assertion of the Oriental nations appeared, or reappeared, it was in a changed form. Under the influence of the evolution in the West, it absorbed the political element and rapidly developed national feeling and ideas. Previously, in the experience and self-assertion of the oriental people the political element had played a minor part as compared to religion, civilization, and the ethnic factor. The reason is obvious. As a result of oriental despotism the relation of the individual to the state has always been much looser than in the West. The state was readily identified with government against whose exactions individuals and groups used to be on the defensive. Under these circumstances the experience of the nations as politically united peoples could not grow, still less predominate. Iran has shared this evolution. Only in the rare cases in which a regime combined impressive power with well-balanced benevolence so as to guarantee stability and prosperity by protecting the country from outer and inner foes could a sort of national feeling develop. Even then religion, culture, and ethnic community were infinitely stronger ties than the political bond.

In Iran, however, there was a special obstacle to the shaping of a national consciousness. The Persian mind has always been torn between local patriotism and universalism. Each region dominated by the greater cities developed its characteristic physiognomy. The easygoing and witty Shirazi and the shrewd and miserly Isfahani competed in stigmatizing each other with caustic humor, the man of Kashan was the object of friendly-unfriendly teasing and,

like the others, the hero of innumerable anecdotes; thus it was with other important towns and regions. The local dynasties, independent or half-independent, which often enough sprang up on Iranian soil contributed to particularism of more than usual strength. In his native town and region the Persian felt at home. The man of culture and knowledge was elevated almost immediately to the height of world-embracing thought and feeling. If he was proudly conscious of being a Persian, his pride was based on Persian civilization, and to be Persian meant to possess the noblest and therefore the universal culture. Between local patriotism and universalism small space was left for truly national feeling. With but little exaggeration, it may be said that the educated Persian was too civilized to indulge in the narrowness of nationalism. This superior self-assertion and self-esteem of the Persian maintained itself unimpaired until well into the first half of the nineteenth century. It received its first blow from Persia's defeat by the Russian armies and the resulting territorial losses. After that it was tested to the utmost by the impact of European politics and civilization. When it reappeared, at the beginning of this century, it had assumed a decidedly political coloring under the two-fold influence of Europe. The new national feeling, culminating in the constitutional movement and the revolution, was at once a product of Western liberal ideas and a reaction against the aggressive policy of Russia and Great Britain. It fell a tragic victim to the first World War, when Iran became the battlefield of the great powers. The other and quite different obstacle in the way of creating a modern national feeling was the existence of tribal country. The tribes lived a life of their own at the periphery of Iran—"periphery" in the proper and in the figurative sense. As long as they were not definitely subdued and incorporated into the country, nation and national feeling remained incomplete.

These were the first and basic difficulties Reza Shah had to face and to overcome. To accomplish the task a strong central power was needed such as had not existed in Iran for more than a hundred years. The shah had begun to reorganize the army while he held the post of minister of war. After his ascension to the throne

the improvement and enlargement of the army remained his constant concern, and to help him in this task he availed himself of the services of a French military mission. Among his officers he felt at home. At the great spring parade of the Teheran garrison the aging monarch, in spite of the imperfect state of his health, stood erect for hours and hours to watch with legitimate pride the defile of the troops—infantry, cavalry, mountain artillery, followed by a few pieces of heavy artillery, while squadrons overflowed the parade grounds. As soon as the army was sufficiently strong the shah turned against the tribes. Ruse and ruthlessness combined to reduce them to submission. The chiefs were invited to Teheran, some were kept as hostages, some were imprisoned, and others disappeared. The campaign itself was carried out relentlessly. Harshness could not be avoided if the spirit of defiance and independence was to be broken once and for all. But looting paralleled warfaring, and after years of fighting the tribes were defeated, disarmed, and left impoverished. The millenarian epopee of the Persian tribes had come to an end, and they are now an integral part of the realm.

A reliable police corps such as the country had not seen since the short-lived attempt under Nasr ed Din Shah was created. It comprised, besides the regular police, the road police whose services are responsible for a safety throughout the country comparable only to that existing in the time of Shah Abbas I, which was so greatly admired by European travelers. A secret political police was inaugurated which became another and certainly the mightiest instrument of his power, and the executive received strength especially from a newly-formed modern bureaucracy. A well-organized body of trained functionaries whose preparation for their positions was steadily improving superseded the old arbitrary and incompetent officials.

Iran is a constitutional monarchy. The constitution of 1906, granted by Muzaffar ed Din Shah, has not been abolished, but it was amended when Reza Shah ascended the throne. The constitution provides for a lower and an upper house. The latter was, however, never called into being. The lower house, elected by

popular vote, had regular session, at which the ministers submitted to the representatives the program and the projects of the government. Under Reza Shah, however, this procedure, as well as the ensuing comments of the house, were purely formalities. Since the government was but the instrument of the shah's will, responsible to the house only in the words of the constitution, and since the house was not permitted either initiative or criticism, its function was confined to the business of ratifying government projects and decisions, and the transactions of the house were confined to eulogizing and asking questions.

With the executive and legislative branches of government in his hand, the shah began to pull down the structure of traditional society. The solidity of the social edifice had, of course, suffered greatly from the vicissitudes of the preceding decades, but within its still existing framework life had not ceased to exist and renovation might not have been impossible. Reza Shah demolished it. Titles of nobility were abolished and no new ones were created. Gradually the members of great families were removed from their governmental positions and replaced by men with modern education and professional training. The Shia clergy were deprived of their possessions, and thereby they lost their independence. The merchant class was practically turned into a class of government employees, because the state controlled production and prices through its monopolistic societies, became itself a capitalistic producer through the new industrial plants owned by the state or the shah, and assumed the task of regulating imports and exports.

All these changes will be discussed later. Here we have to look at them from a general and political angle. Quite apart from his economic and social ideas, which made these reforms and changes necessary, the shah had a definite motive for overthrowing the social system and depriving the three major classes of their independence and influence. As long as they continued to exist, they were potential centers of opposition or revolt, and with their deep-rooted self-assertion they might have become serious obstacles to his radical modernization program. Therefore it was necessary to shatter their privileged social position and to wipe out their eco-

nomic independence. They all had to bow to the omnipotence of the state if they wanted to live at all. With their dispossession the central power indeed became totalitarian.

It was incompatible with Reza Shah's idea of an independent nation that Iran's sovereignty continued to be limited in the international field. Parallel to his work of pacification and unification were his efforts to restore to the country its complete independence. Not that there were any longer foreign troops on Iranian soil—the last, the Bolsheviks, had left Iran—nor were there any longer spheres of influence, since the Russo-British treaty of 1907 collapsed automatically with the fall of the czarist regime. Iran was still bound by the system of capitulations, according to which the subjects of foreign powers were immune from the jurisdiction of the country of their residence and enjoyed the extraterritorial privilege of being judged by their own consular authorities. In 1927 the Iranian government declared that the capitulations would be abolished within a year's time, and with the consent of all the nations concerned, by 1928 the system of capitulations ceased to exist in Iran. About the same time the country regained its complete autonomy in matters of customs and tariffs.

With undisputed authority from within and without the shah had created the framework and instruments of modernization. He now proceeded to tackle specific problems. Three facts, he saw, obstructed the way, Shia religion in its traditional form, illiteracy, and the status of women.

The shah's attitude toward religion did not differ from that of the other recent dictators and reformers insofar as it was characterized by indifference and opportunism. It is, however, noteworthy that he never showed any sign of contempt or of hostility to religious beliefs as such. On the other hand, he considered the Shia creed as it survived in Iran incompatible with the progress of the country. If he did not reduce religion to a rationalistic monotheism, as did Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, the reason was as simple as it was serious. Unlike Sunni Islam, the core of the Shia is irrational and mystical. Comparable in this respect with Catholicism, Shia also resembles Catholicism, to some extent at least, in

that a prominent part is occupied by ceremony and ritual. The natural union between religious mysticism and ritual—natural because everything irrational asks for expression in sign, symbol, and ceremony—throws down quite different roots into the souls of men than a faith consisting of a rationalistic conviction practiced only in the inner forum. The shah was compelled to recognize this fact. While he could not think of eradicating the faith itself, he began systematically to attack its forms of expression. The der-vishes had to disappear from the streets and the country roads. For centuries they had been, with their impressive paraphernalia, an indispensable component of Persian life. Clad in white with unshaved hair and beard, wearing a tall cap embroidered with religious inscriptions, carrying a bowl for alms, usually made of a large Indian nutshell, often beautifully carved, and an axe, the symbol of power, and having an antelope horn slung over one shoulder, which was sometimes covered with a panther skin, they were to be seen everywhere begging for their livelihood. In ancient times they were without doubt sincerely devoted to an ascetic life of pity and belonged to the great spiritual orders and fraternities so common in Islamic countries, but most of them had deteriorated into a real nuisance and only with the lower classes of the people did they continue to enjoy the character of saintliness. Now their hour, too, had come. Pilgrimage to Nedjef and Kerbela, in Iraq, the places held in deepest veneration throughout the Shia world, was discouraged. Pressure was exerted on the mollahs to change to European dress. Above all the passion plays, the *taz-zieh*s, were abolished. On the tenth day of the month of Moharram, considered the anniversary of Hussein's death, groups of fanatics used to march through the streets brandishing iron chains, knives, and swords and with the endlessly repeated cry "Ya Ali, Ya Hassan, Ya Hussein" inflicting upon themselves sometimes rather serious wounds, imitating the sufferings of the holy martyrs and hoping to share in their blessings in the life beyond. There had always been some among the higher clergy who looked upon these performances with disfavor as not in harmony with the dignity of their faith. However, as the people fervently clung

to such demonstrations they had not been discontinued; besides, they were certainly efficient means to keep the flame of faith burning. At first the shah prohibited the flagellatism, as most repulsive to modern feelings and most likely to incite to mass fanaticism, with all its dangerous consequences.

Then the *tazziehs* were forbidden altogether, and the police everywhere in the country were instructed to see that the order was scrupulously obeyed. Public meetings were still permitted: for instance, in the covered squares of the bazaar where the walls were lined with black cloth, the people, men and women separated, sat on carpets spread over the floor and listened to the tragedy of the House of Ali, which a priest recited from a cathedra with enough rhetorical pathos to touch the hearts of his auditors, particularly of the female contingent. A year later even these innocent gatherings were forbidden. Nothing was left except the old custom of the *rosekhaneh*: by a black flag hung from his house anyone can announce that a priest is going to recite the Passion of Ali and his House and that all are invited who may wish to attend. By such measures the rich and picturesque ritual of the Shia creed, with all the expressions that appeal so deeply to the emotional side of the people, disappeared within a few years.

More important to the shah than the loss of ground thus suffered by religion itself was the blow he had administered to the influence of the *mollahs*, whose impotence now became apparent to the humblest observer. Another motive implied in the shah's action was political. He wanted to do away once and for all with the old barrier by which the Shia religion had separated Iran from the rest of the Islamic world. While not attacking the faith itself, he demonstrated sufficiently to the other Islamic nations as to his own people that the Shia creed had become a matter of mere personal conviction and was no longer to be permitted to interfere with public and international affairs. This policy was, so to speak, officially consecrated by the marriage of the crown prince with the sister of the king of Egypt, of Sunni faith. This marriage, unimaginable fifteen years earlier, could hardly be reconciled with the first article of the constitutional law as proclaimed by the shah himself, according

to which "the shah of Iran must profess and propagate this (the Shia) faith." However, not a word of criticism was to be heard.

Finally, to complete the analysis of the shah's motives for his religious policy we must talk of an incentive of minor importance, but very characteristic of his personality. The shah's exaggerated susceptibility to any kind of criticism concerning his own person or his country and to even the slightest sign of derision are well known. Jokes or witticisms in French papers, for instance, certainly not very elegant, but innocent enough, filled him with rage and anything short of wholehearted recognition and praise by foreign countries was likely to hurt his feelings. He was constantly on guard to see that his acts or the conditions in his country were not the objects of critical or derisive remarks. His foreign legations had to submit to him facts that seemed injurious to what he considered his and the country's honor. Americans may remember the incident which led to the rupture of diplomatic relations; France had to face the same situation twice, and other countries did no better. Understandable and legitimate as it was that he expected appreciation for his momentous work—which nobody of sound judgment thought of refusing—it is, nevertheless, astonishing that a man of his qualities, his self-confidence, and his will power did not show himself superior or at least indifferent to such incidents. The best explanation of his reactions is that he considered the foreign governments vilifying and defamatory. Unable to understand that a government might not possess the authority and the power to suppress such utterances and punish the criminals, he held the governments personally responsible for such acts. It is well known that it was strictly forbidden to take pictures of old parts of towns, historic buildings and works of art excepted, and of camels because he feared that such pictures sent abroad might give the impression that Teheran, particularly, was not the modern city he wanted it to be and was making it—thus completely ignoring the Westerner's viewpoint and the merits of his own achievements. There can be little doubt but that he considered all religious manifestations so many ignominious factors likely to make the foreigner scoff at the backwardness of his country.

These drastic measures could not have been carried out if they had not been preceded by others which had radically undermined the position of the clergy. The first and the most trenchant was the confiscation by the government of the ecclesiastical possessions, called *waqf* in Islamic countries and corresponding to our term "mortmain." Throughout the Islamic world it has always been considered an honorable duty to set up and to support pious foundations for charitable purposes and for the public welfare. So a man might give money for the construction of a public bath or a fountain and another bequeath shops, houses, or landed property for the building or maintaining of a mosque or a theological school. All such endowments were administered by the clergy, and most of them were established for an unlimited time. They enjoyed immunity from taxation, and the state had no hold upon them. The *waqf* possessions accumulated steadily and represented enormous values. In Iran, Nadir Shah (1736-1760) was the last to secularize the ecclesiastical property. Yet after his death his measures were reversed, and it must be assumed that the *waqf* possessions were reinstated. In any case, they had ample time to accrue in the more than 160 years preceding Reza Shah's sequestration. The great sanctuaries, such as Meshed and Qum, disposed of huge incomes from landed property and real estate in the towns. Now with one stroke of the pen the state appropriated their wealth for its own aims. Not all, but most, of this affluence was used to pay for the vast education scheme. In Meshed the revenues connected so far with the sanctuary of Imam Reza served now to build and to maintain a modern hospital, to improve the water supply of the city, to finance industrial enterprises, and for similar purposes in the public interest.

This secularization of the *waqf* possessions had far-reaching results for the clergy. It meant not only decisive loss of power and of a strong means of influencing the masses, but also deprived them of their independence and made them government officials and state functionaries. For thereafter they had to look to the state for their livelihood, whereas previously the government, in spite of many attempts, had never succeeded in interfering seriously with

the financial status and the self-administration of the ecclesiastical body. But the effect of this measure reached even farther. So far the training of the mollahs for the various branches of their activities had been their own right and monopoly, and the government had no influence whatever in the matter. Now the state assumed the education of the clergy as its own task and prerogative. Within the framework of the new university in Teheran, a theological school was created where the plan of studies, as well as the methods of teaching, were reformed on modern lines. Along with the right to learn in their traditional way, they also lost the right of teaching. It was in the tradition of Islam to spread the elements of education everywhere. Even in the small villages a mollah or an old man acting as a schoolmaster could be found who inculcated into the minds of the youngsters the three R's and a mechanical reading of the Koran, which remained incomprehensible to the reader, since the pupils did not understand Arabic. Since the extension of modern elementary schools, these Koranic schools, as they were called, are rapidly disappearing. The medressehs (colleges) still held their place in higher education though, before Reza Shah's reign the colleges established and directed by Europeans and Americans and some modernized Persian institutions in Teheran had infringed on their monopoly. Now their hour, too, had come.

Not less fatal to the position of the clergy than the sequestration of their possessions was the displacement by secular law of the religious law, the *shari'a*. Reza Shah only accelerated and brought to an abrupt close an evolution which, about the middle of the preceding century, began in practically all Moslem countries. In the early days of Islam the relation of canon law to secular law had been totally different from what it was in Europe. In the West, Christianity, established as the religion of the Roman Empire, found itself surrounded by an elaborate code of secular law, covering the whole field of human existence, individual and collective. The unfolding canon law had to win and secure its place in close, and by no means always friendly, contact with the secular power. Moreover, the founder of the Christian faith himself had clearly recognized the existence and the legitimacy of two separate spheres

of jurisdiction, without, however, defining their frontiers, in his words: "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God, the things which are God's."

It is not so in Islam. The Koran is not only the revelation of God's essence and will and a moral guide to the way of salvation but also a code of law and a guide to all social and political, even what we would call international, situations. As problems came up, the Prophet revealed the principles according to which the community should deal with them, transforming by this procedure the tribal traditions or replacing them by new institutions. Since in all these enunciations the Prophet acted as the messenger of God, the bulk of these regulations—whatever was their object—had to be considered divine law. This absorption of secular law by religious law was possible under simple living conditions. But even when the Arabs had to accommodate themselves to the higher standards of the conquered peoples, the Koran and the traditional sayings of the Prophet, his companions, and other outstanding personalities remained the source from which any law or judicial decisions had to be derived through the interpretation by authoritative theological scholars. This whole body of law constitutes the shari'a, which by origin and evolution is religious law. So the relation of secular law to religious law was exactly the reverse of their relationship in the West. In Rome religion was the newcomer and had to build its house in the face of the mighty and perfectly organized Roman secular law. In the realm of Islam we find the religious law, with all the halo of its sacred origin, and it is from this omnipotent authority that secular law will have to wrest its power. The encroachment by secular law on the territory of the shari'a started very soon in the judicial evolution of Islam and came from two different directions.

In the new territories the prevailing ways and customs had to be reckoned with. So there developed a customary law which was in the first place commercial law. On the other hand, the sovereign was inevitably and with good reason liable to the temptation to arrogate to himself part of the jurisdiction, particularly the criminal law. These two points of infringement naturally tended to

enlarge and, by the end of the last century in almost all the Moslem countries, the competence of the religious law and jurisdiction had been limited to inheritance, marriage, and pious foundations.

The second obstacle on the path to modernization was illiteracy. However, illiteracy is not an isolated fact. It must be considered in relation to a country's educational standard and system, and only in looking at it in this way will it be possible to fight it effectively. This was the shah's intuition. Not content to introduce partial and haphazard improvements, as had been the policy of his predecessors, he resolutely proceeded to a radical reform of the educational system. Resistance was centered in the mollahs, who at the time of the shah's ascension to the throne still dominated the primary and the higher education. Their dispossession opened the door to reorganization in roots and branches.

In view of what has been said about the Koranic schools, which were in the hands of the mollahs, such a statement may seem contradictory. However worthy of appreciation this time-honored institution was, it had outgrown its utility. A child, equipped with not more than a scanty knowledge of the three R's could hardly be called literate according to modern standards, and in most cases the little knowledge that was acquired mechanically at the Koranic schools was rapidly forgotten. It must be added that this primary instruction was not compulsory, and later, when adult education was introduced, the great extent of illiteracy became apparent. However, this is not all. Speaking of illiteracy in Iran is, as in any Islamic country before its modernization, to speak of the position of women. With the exception of the women in high-society circles, Persian women could not read or write. While many men held the view that education of women is unnecessary and a threat to the peace of the home, any change in the position of women, particularly one with such far-reaching consequences, was opposed by the clergy as a violation of the canonic law. The problem of the Persian woman was one of the shah's greatest preoccupations. He realized clearly that without a radical change in her situation any progress would be condemned to remain incomplete. That progress in every

field had to be based on education was one of his fundamental convictions.

To start the process of national education with elementary education is impossible. One cannot teach the elements of education in a creative way to the advantage of the child without knowing more than the elements and without adopting certain pedagogic techniques. In other words, the training of primary teachers requires institutions of a higher standard—that is, secondary education. For secondary education the same holds good. The formation of teachers in secondary education must be entrusted to institutions of university grade. As history shows that education was at first a social privilege, before it came down to the people as a whole, so education in its simpler, more popular aspects must be rooted in the highest grade; from above it must continually draw new life. In recognition of this fact the shah sent more than one hundred students every year to Western universities and appealed to foreign professors to help him achieve his goal in his own country. Meanwhile, the numerous colleges and schools established and directed in Iran by some foreign nations were of inestimable value.

Modern education came to Iran from two sources, from religious institutions and from military units. In Iran's best periods it had always manifested broad-minded tolerance toward Christian missionaries. The testimony of one of the Jesuit fathers during the reign of Shah Abbas I is worth quoting:

The mysteries of our Holy Religion were frequently proclaimed and their truth received with all the respect that could possibly be desired, in the most illustrious and the most learned assemblies of the Kingdom. The Muhammadans, of the sect predominant here, have the merit, as I have said before, of being willing to discuss their religion and to listen equally to the teaching of others.*

In this respect the Persian sovereign was in harmony with the Indian princes and the Chinese and Japanese emperors, who all gave proof of a good will and a lack of prejudice not often to be found

* "History of the Mission of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus . . ." in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, London, 1925, Vol. III, Part IV.

at European courts in the past. If their interest was limited to intellectual curiosity and to a desire for information and if they discouraged any attempts to have their subjects converted to the Christian faith, such restrictions are hardly a discredit to them.

On the other hand, the French and British military missions at the beginning of the nineteenth century not only aroused an interest in European culture in Iran but also were necessarily connected with some initiation into foreign languages and ideas. As a result some students were sent to England between 1820 and 1830, and in 1829 a Persian delegation went to Austria to collect information about Western methods of strategy and warfare. These efforts crystallized into the foundation of the Dar al funun College in Teheran in 1852. The college whose idea was inspired by the great French military schools, such as Saint Cyr, was created as a training school for future officers. The main subjects taught were infantry, artillery, and cavalry tactics, military engineering, higher mathematics, and foreign languages (English, French and Russian); instruction was given also in medicine, surgery, and pharmacy. Liberal arts and music were later introduced. The college was thrown open to the sons of the leading families, who received there a general education, and so it became for many years the most influential educational institution in the country.

It is not our intention to follow in detail the evolution of modern education in Iran, which until the beginning of this century was practically in the hands of foreigners. A few dates will serve to punctuate the march of time. The first French school opened in 1839 in Tabriz with ten pupils. It was founded by the Lazarite mission, who, with *les Filles de la Charité*, finally established 76 schools throughout the country. The American Presbyterian mission founded a school for boys in Teheran in 1872 and another, for girls, in 1896. The British Church Missionary Society founded in 1904 the Stuart Memorial College in Isfahan. Of nonmissionary foreign schools, those of the *Alliance Française* and of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* are the most important. The Germans opened a technical college in Teheran. The Russians founded a commercial school in 1911 and other schools in Tabriz and other towns in

the north. Among the Persians themselves the necessity of taking the initiative became recognized. The first significant step was taken by Dr. Loghmanie, who founded the Loghmanie School in Tabriz in 1899. The government decided in 1901 to reorganize public instruction according to the French model. This effort was not limited to the capital. In Resht, for instance, elementary and secondary schools were founded where Persian and Arabic were taught together with French and Russian.

Yet despite the improvement accomplished, the pace was slow and the results were sporadic. It could hardly be otherwise. The men who tried to inaugurate the new era came from the upper rank of society, where the conservative power of tradition and the deep-rooted appreciation of Persian civilization were an inalienable heritage. With all their insight into the inevitability of modernization and the sincerity of their effort, their inner consent to the change could not be wholehearted. Moreover, they had to reckon with the resistance of the mollahs and the jealousy of the foreign powers, who watched every step of the Iranian government. Paradoxically, when the government had decided to create a school of political science, the French professor Demorgny found the students very inadequately prepared because the French had established elementary schools and some courses of higher standard, but had not yet organized secondary education.

Reza Shah corrected all these deficiencies by embodying all the scattered beginnings and attempts in one great educational system. Thanks to his initiative Iran's present educational system has a structure and methods which are not very different from those of the Western countries. Elementary education, which may be preceded by the kindergarten, is now compulsory and free. Secondary schools for boys and girls divide after the first three years into the branches of liberal art and science, preparing in a general way for the corresponding university faculties. The University of Teheran was founded in 1935. With its impressive buildings at the outskirts of the city, situated on the plain at the foot of the Elburz chain, the pyramid of Mt. Demavend visible in the distant background, it may well claim a site which can be matched by few Western or

Eastern campuses. The university results from the unification of the existing institutions of higher learning—the teachers' college, which became the faculty of liberal arts and sciences, the medical school, the school of law and political science, and the technical school, which now constitute the corresponding faculties, supplemented by a theological faculty, which is connected with the beautiful Sepah Salar mosque. Other institutions for higher professional training are organized and sponsored by various ministries. The Ministry of War has its military college, the Ministry of Agriculture the agricultural school and experimental station, as well as a veterinary school in Karaj, near Teheran, and the Ministry of Industry its technical schools. The government takes great interest in the promotion of arts and crafts. In several schools the old crafts, some of which are real arts, are taught—the painting of miniatures, the designing and weaving of carpets, the fabrication of brocades, silver and inlay work, and others.

One of Reza Shah's first important measures was to provide means to send annually more than one hundred students to Western universities—preferably to French-speaking countries (France, Belgium, and Switzerland), the rest to England, America, and Germany. From this stock most of the higher officers of the administration and the professors of the university were recruited. After the development of modern educational institutions, naturally the number of students sent abroad diminished. In 1941 all schools erected by foreigners were taken over by the government, a sign that the Iranian educational system was considered sufficiently advanced to rely on its own resources.

It has often been maintained that in any country the position held by women is the symptom and measure of the standard of civilization. If this were true the Arab of the desert, considering the freedom and equality enjoyed by their women, would be superior to the Chinese and Indian civilizations, to Iran and the other Islamic countries. However, the assumption may hold good for Western civilization. If, then, the shah wanted to give to Iran a Western civilization, he had to transform the inferiority, which was the woman's fate in all Moslem countries, into a status of legal

and social equality. So it is certainly true that the shah crowned his reform work with the emancipation of women in 1935. Today Iran and Turkey are the only Islamic countries where the veil is completely discarded by the women of all classes. It is, of course, not the discarding of the veil as an article of dress which is of such decisive importance, but the veil as a symbol. The veil signifies the seclusion of the woman, her exclusion from the world of man, that is, from society, its transactions, its duties, its rights, and its pleasures.

The Persian woman, like her sisters in other Moslem countries, had lived in the *anderun* (the Persian equivalent of "harem") with the other legitimate wives or concubines, children, and servants. Here her life was passed with some household duties, in wealthier houses entirely performed by the staff of servants, and the care of the children—the latter limited, because in good society a son, when he was old enough to leave the *anderun*, would be committed to one or several tutors for primary instruction, reading of the Koran, and introduction to poetry. The only men she would see were her husband and her nearest relatives. Distractions were mainly frequent visits received from and paid to other women and the rivalry and intrigues that were inevitable under these conditions, and the public bath, which was on certain days reserved for women, the greatest center of amusement, except for ladies of rank, who had their baths in their homes. To the public bath each woman went, accompanied by a servant carrying the bathing accessories, food supply, and musical instruments, for she used to spend at least half a day, if not the whole day, in the bath, going through all the complicated procedures of toilet, chatting, eating, and enjoying music. For women of high society the knowledge of reading and writing, a thorough understanding of Persian literature and the art of writing poems were customary, if not the rule; knowledge of a foreign language, preferably French, had become common. It would, however, be erroneous to assume that all women were condemned to mere passivity and restricted to the duties of wife and mother. This depended upon her personal qualities, her energy and skill in exerting influence and power over or through her hus-

band. Just as the favorite wife or wives of the king might constitute a sort of accessory government by influencing the affairs of the state, a woman might be dominant in any home. The mother, particularly, used to enjoy the unbounded love and veneration of her son as long as she lived, and she was consulted in all matters of importance.

Until a few decades ago the outdoor costume was such as to make even the most graceful woman an unrecognizable monster. Her legs and feet were thrust into a sort of ample black trousers, resembling large bags, wide enough to contain her skirts. The whole body was then enveloped in a large veil, and her face was covered with a white linen band having perforations for the eyes. On her feet were slippers, and the quality and costliness of the material used for trousers, veil, and slippers marked the difference between the wealthy and the poor, otherwise the shape of the walking barrel was the same.

This grotesque disguise, which indicated better than anything else woman's seclusion from the world, had given place gradually to an elegant and coquettish attire, at least among the better classes. This consisted of a long black veil, if possible of silk, that covered the whole figure and was held together at the chin by the invisible left hand. The forehead was covered by a sort of nicely plaited visor made of horsehair, which overshadowed the eyes. The whole arrangement gave to the face a very becoming oval shape, and the manipulation of the veil permitted every desired coquetry, converting the veil into a garment which could be used for purposes exactly opposite to those for which it was intended. Even in this mitigated form the veil suggested the abnormal position of the Persian woman. The indoor costume of Persian women, which, by the way, underwent a great change about the middle of the last century, is too well known from miniatures and pictures to require description.

The veil, as the symbol of the seclusion, was also the symbol of polygamy. We need not review the rather worn out discussion of the pros and cons of polygamy. It will suffice to state that the most serious drawbacks connected usually with polygamy are not so

much outcomes of polygamy itself as the results of the seclusion by which polygamy is nearly always accompanied. It is this isolation which accounts for most of the intellectual, moral, and social injuries and handicaps. As far as Iran is concerned, there was long before Reza Shah a marked tendency to monogamy, for various reasons: Western influence, a more personal attitude toward women, and last, but not least the economic factor, expenditures connected with polygamy having increased with the general cost of living. Reza Shah himself did not go so far as to prohibit polygamy by law—an act which even he might have considered too radically opposed to Mohammed's regulation allowing four legitimate wives to the faithful. But polygamy was discouraged during his regime and became socially ostracized, so that at least in the towns and among the better classes it must be considered extinct.

THE CULTURAL SITUATION

IN DESCRIBING the main obstacles encountered by the shah on his way to modernization, we reached, in many cases crossed, the borderlines of modern Iran. Our task is now to complete the picture—to discuss the problems contained in the present situation and to examine the future outlook. Iran has definitely entered the modern world. Whatever happens, the way back into the past is barred. With the modern world Iran will henceforth share its problems. The process of modernization is far from being terminated. The new elements cannot be expected to have been assimilated in such a short time, nor can the way in which they will be absorbed and the result thereof be foreseen. It is equally unpredictable which of the traditional values will survive and in what form. This, in many ways, enigmatic situation complicates the problems which, even in themselves, are difficult enough.

The future of religion in Iran is just as uncertain as it is in most modern countries. The Shia religion has hardly any chance of renaissance. A mystic creed appealing to imagination no less than to emotion, the Shia cannot grow in the adverse atmosphere of modern life. As a strictly national creed of a small nation, it has not the prerequisites to survive in a world where at least ideas show an increasing tendency to universality. Under these conditions the Shia creed will for a time continue to be dear to the masses of the people, who in it will find shelter from the hardships of life, as they have done for centuries. Most of the educated classes have outgrown the traditional faith, and as modern education widens its sphere of influence, the result cannot be doubted. Religious instruction was not compulsory under the reign of Reza Shah. It is not altogether impossible, but very unlikely, that the wheel will be turned back, although the principles of the amendment, which was added to the constitutional law of 1907 upon his ascension to the throne in 1925 are orthodox in form and spirit. In paragraph 2 it is

stated that a body of at least five doctors of religion shall be chosen by parliament out of the twenty representatives of theologians and doctors of religion and that this body shall "discuss and deliberate the laws proposed by the assembly, and set aside any that contravene the holy principles of Islam, so that they shall not become law; the decisions of this body of doctors on this point shall be final and binding." *

But this institution soon fell into oblivion. The shah, though he never made any pronouncement on the matter, would probably have preferred to reduce Islam to a moral code, with the idea of God as guardian. Apparently it was his policy to divert the energies invested in religion to the nation and the dynasty. He was, of course, too wise and rationalistic to claim for himself any quasi-divine position, but it was his constant endeavor to make the people consider him and his dynasty as the great symbols of the nation and to implant veneration and love of the dynasty in the hearts of the people. Far from talking of a "deified nation" as Mussolini did, he did assign to the nation a place in the scale of values that came very near to such a conception. To create in the people a boundless nationalistic feeling was his purpose, and he was just as eager to make the people proud of the progress achieved under his leadership as he was to encourage the study of Iran's great past for political aims.

In the last years of his reign an Office for the Direction of Public Opinion was set up, clearly in imitation of the fascist ministries of propaganda. As in fascist countries, a nationwide campaign was started to hammer the national idea and ideals into the brains of the people, young and old. A torrential rain of lectures, newspaper articles, and pamphlets overflowed the country, and it would have been difficult to decide whether writers and lecturers or readers and listeners were more bored by this monotonous repetition of the same subjects: the duties of the citizens, the new tasks of the women, the progress achieved, social morale, principles of hygiene, and so forth. At the same time the shah, not content with the wide extension of physical training, ordered the military training by

* Quoted by L. P. Elwell-Sutton, in *Modern Iran*, London, 1941, p. 203.

army officers of the university students—this, too, was probably, copied from the totalitarian states. Whatever are or will be the results of these considerable efforts, it is too soon to express an opinion as to whether the national feeling will be able to occupy in the hearts and minds of the people the place religion used to hold in the past.

Some observers have credited the shah with having secretly entertained the idea of reviving eventually the Zoroastrian creed as the official religion. While such an assumption does not lack consistency, it carries the shah's political and national ideology into a field where he was not sufficiently interested to risk such a momentous change. It is true that in all his public utterances he avoided speaking of the Islamic period in Persian history; he did not even mention the time of Shah Abbas the Great. The peaks of Persian national history to which he never tired of directing the attention of the people were the Achaemenian and the Sassanian periods. He chose for his dynasty the name Pahlavi, the name given to the Persian spoken during the Sassanian times. Achaemenian style influenced the new architecture, Achaemenian ornaments and the sundisk symbol of Ahuramazda adorned it. It would certainly be a grandiose pageant to see the old venerable religion restored to its glory and the handful of Parsis, in every respect the true relics and representatives of ancient Iran, fully rehabilitated and reinstalled in their hereditary places. However, quite apart from the lack of any direct indication that the shah ever thought of pushing his national ideology to this extreme, the general objections expressed above are valid in this respect too. Religions of a strictly national character are too deeply in contradiction with the leveling and universal trends of our time to have a chance of being revived. As far as Bahatism is concerned, the Persians as a whole do not show great sympathy with it, and it is very unlikely that it will ever be strong enough to compete seriously with the Shia creed even if the latter were to yield to Bahatism some new followers.

The missions in Iran represent the divisions in the Christian world. There are the Roman Catholics, the Anglicans, the American Presbyterians, the Lutherans—to name only the most im-

portant. Official statistics not being at hand, it is impossible to form a clear opinion regarding the success of their activities—even if we should consider the quantity of converts an adequate measure of the apostolic work. It may safely be assumed, however, that the number of conversions cannot be very impressive when compared with the personal sacrifices made, the effort bestowed on the cause, and the money spent. Missionary activities meet with particularly great difficulties in Islamic countries. Not long ago the convert to Christianity in Iran risked his life, in any case he could be sure that his family would break with him and that he would incur social ostracism. Converts have been made so far mostly among the common folk, and the results obtained among Parsis and Jews show, perhaps, an even higher percentage than among the Persians of Shiite faith.

Missionary activities in Iran are intimately connected with educational and medical work. The numerous schools and colleges run by the various missions brought them a certain number of converts, and the influence of the beneficent work of the missionary hospitals, the welfare centers, and the other medical institutions were probably of still greater importance in obtaining the desired results. The closing of the foreign primary schools and the taking over by the government of the foreign colleges were particularly heavy blows to the missions, even though the hospitals are permitted to function. However, the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions in the U.S.A. reports that there is in Iran “an increasing freedom to do evangelistic work.”

When all is said, we reach the conclusion that the religious problem in Iran viewed as a whole boils down to the same essentials as everywhere in the modern world—the impact of the change in material life, social disintegration, and indifference or skepticism putting up a stubborn opposition or an active fight against the traditional faiths. In Iran, no less than anywhere else, the outcome of the struggle cannot be predicted.

As a result of the change in the evaluation of religion and of the shah's policy, the Shia creed is forthwith no longer to be identified with the nation. This fact influences the attitude toward the

minorities, which, strangely enough, remains basically the same (except with relation to the Parsis), while the accompanying emotions are shifting from the religious to the national sphere. Until the time of Reza Shah the Parsis, the Armenians, and the Jews had been discriminated against and even persecuted because of their religion. Now that legislation has lifted the ban against these groups, by making them members of the nation with equal rights, public feeling and administrative practice use the national criterion to maintain the moral and social discrimination to a certain degree. Obviously this cannot apply to the Parsis, who, from the viewpoint of nationality could claim the first right to be called Persians. The Armenians, however, who previously occupied quite a few posts in the administration, and not only positions of minor importance, are suffering most severely because of this change. It is true that there is another substantial reason for their loss of influence and position. The new education now provides for the government a sufficient number of trained Persians, whereas earlier the Armenians had made themselves indispensable for such posts by their superior knowledge and experience. Yet it is precisely this clear distinction between Persians and Armenians which proves that since the breakdown or the lowering of religious discriminations the barrier of nationality has been raised.

As for the Jews, legal equality has not freed them from social ostracism, which, in fact, remains unchanged. They, too, are today considered foreigners, administrative posts are barred to them, and despite their recognized qualifications as teachers, they have great difficulty in finding employment in government schools. In some ways they may be said to be even worse off than before. For, as long as the discrimination was based on religion alone, conversion to Islam opened the way to social equality and to the opportunity for a public career, and, indeed, a considerable number availed themselves of this. Now that nationality is the criterion, conversion to Islam does not carry the same guarantee of success as it did before. In adopting the nationality principle with regard to minorities the Persians are falling in line with one of the less praiseworthy achievements of Western political ideology.

Education in Iran shares and will continue to share in the near future the tremendous problems it faces in Western countries. Besides, there are problems common to all oriental nations which have entered the path of modernization, and in addition there are some specifically Persian problems. In many oriental countries the educational transformation has been prepared for by a long and uninterrupted contact with the West. This is true for almost all the countries of the Mediterranean region. There the Roman, Byzantine, and Hellenistic influences were replaced since the Crusades by the paramount cultural impact of France, and to a much lesser degree of Italy. During the nineteenth century the thus-prepared soil of the former Ottoman Empire, of Turkey proper, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria, showed an unmistakable receptivity to Western ways and ideas, represented by an ever-increasing number of Western educational institutions.

In other oriental countries modern education was from the beginning introduced after careful consideration and according to a thoroughgoing plan. This was the case in India after the British had adopted in 1835 the principles laid down in Macaulay's report, in Algeria after the French occupation, and in Japan when enlightened statesmen recognized, in the 60's of the last century, the need for educational transformation. Quite another fate fell to Iran. After the end of the Parthian Empire, Iran passed out of the Western sphere of influence. Even in the Islamic period the country remained unchanged by the continuous military and political encounters and by the manifold commercial relations which brought Europe so near to the people of the Near East. It was not only the greater distance but also the character of the geographical barrier, the high mountain ranges, which accounts for the isolation of Iran during this period. As it is, Iran's contact with the West until the beginning of the last century was limited to individuals who came to the country as ambassadors, missionaries, merchants, or adventurers. No regular *rapprochement* on a broad basis had ever been established before that time. When it came at last, it was immediately impaired and overshadowed by high political issues—the Franco-British and soon afterward the Russo-British antagonisms.

There was no general acquaintance with the West, no gradual preparation for modernization to make it easier and almost consistent, nor was there any possibility of a radical transformation, as in Japan, where there was no danger of immediate assault.

This is not all. The West that Iran faces in its period of modernization is not the West the other oriental countries had known. This rather paradoxical statement conceals a very plain truth. Until the end of the eighteenth century the West appeared to the countries of the Orient as a civilization different from their own, but homogeneous, stable, and, so to speak, on the same plane with theirs. Differing seriously only in religion, having similar political, social, and economic structures, Western civilization presented itself to the East as a congenial philosophical and literary civilization. This impression persisted in general until the second half of the nineteenth century, despite the technical evolution. Indeed, up to that moment the last rays of setting Humanism still enveloped the civilization of the European continent with the halo of its old glory before the *fin de siècle* atmosphere and the dismembering forces of supernationalism foreboded the end of Europe as a great cultural unit.

In Iran insight into the necessity for educational reform and the first hesitating measures to prepare for it date no farther back than the turn of the century. At that time the face of the West had changed. Now science and material progress ruled the West, and the adoption by Iran of Western civilization was purely a matter of self-preservation. No inner and emotional affinity and sympathy was possible. The moral and intellectual aspects of the modernization of education under these conditions were somewhat easier because Iran had chosen France as its guide and model, a country where the philosophical and literary aspect of a humanistic culture had best been preserved.

On the other hand, the choice of France had its disadvantages, for it became evident at the time of Reza Shah's reform that American, British, and German educational methods answered the problems of the day better than did the French. It is remarkable that the Persian government knew how to make use of the

was available. To turn down all the demands so enthusiastically expressed would have met with little comprehension and would have created disappointment. As usually happens, the existing means had to be stretched as far as possible, to the disadvantage of the quality of the instruction and the circumstances under which it was given. Above all, financial means were not large enough to secure a decent living for the teachers. Conditions improved steadily, but now that primary education had been made compulsory, the problem will certainly continue to be troublesome.

As for the secondary schools, their number is comparatively high. This fact in itself proves the widespread desire for knowledge. Secondary education must, however, be considered in connection with university education, since most of the high school students want to continue their education at the University of Teheran. There is in Iran as yet no sign of the danger of an intellectual proletariat, so critical in many countries, nor is there any reason to expect such a danger in the near future. For years to come physicians, jurists, teachers, and engineers will be needed. There is another strong argument in favor of discouraging to some extent the affluence of the high schools and the universities. Iran is an agricultural country and will remain so even when its industrial output reaches a much larger volume than it shows today. The raising of the agricultural education standard of the peasant, nation-wide instruction for this purpose, is just as necessary as the improvement of his general living standard and, in fact, is one means of achieving it. Rural centers for such education, with shifting personnel so as to cover large areas, should be created in great numbers.

The same scheme should be adopted for the development and modernization of the arts and crafts for which Iran has been famous for centuries; the industries themselves would profit thereby. It should not be inferred that not much has been done along these lines, but the point is that the work should be systematically enlarged and that youngsters who have finished those courses should not be encouraged to continue their education in the high schools. They will be more willing to remain at their stations if they see that

advancement is possible in their hereditary callings and that they can obtain therefrom a decent living. After all, one of the greatest treasures and resources a nation possesses is the stock of its rural population and its craftsmen living securely and decently, well instructed in their specialty and bound to the nation by a sound but unpretentious general education. The Persian peasant, so long neglected and exploited, is especially entitled to a policy which grants him this benefit, and he will repay to the nation twice or three times as much as has been conferred upon him.

The task of the new university is, and will be for years to come, to prepare for the various professions. Independent and original scholarly work and research will be rare exceptions. This is, of course, a fact to be regretted, not so much, perhaps, in itself—many of our smaller Western universities are in the same position—but because of its effect on the general level of the university and on its qualifications for providing the students with professional training of ever-improving standards. The absence of independent and original scholarly activity may be counteracted by the maintenance of close and continuous contact with the scientific and intellectual movement going on in the rest of the world. In this respect its geographical position is a serious handicap for the young university. Thorough study of foreign scientific books and reviews could not compensate for the intellectual isolation in which the university finds itself. There is no natural way of following the evolution of scientific and intellectual problems in the Western world, no exchange of ideas, no stimulus from without—everything being left to the initiative and responsibility of the individual. Such a condition would be detrimental even to an older and better established institution. As it is, the University of Teheran must continually draw on its own reserves, which may mean stagnation and perhaps in some cases even retrogression. If a professor is not in a position to evolve himself, what he will communicate to his students will be less than what he possesses, because it does not stem from creative knowledge and abundance, but is only the transmission of a limited and devitalized material.

Another difficulty is the recruiting of a teaching staff. Most of

the faculty members are men who had formerly been sent to foreign countries to obtain their degrees. They had been carefully selected, and there can be little doubt that they did their best to show themselves worthy of the privilege and their responsibility to their country. But we all know that the conferring of a doctor's degree, whose value differs in the various countries and institutions, does not necessarily confer the qualification of a scholar or even of a teacher. The situation would be less alarming if these future university teachers were offered the opportunity to continue and to deepen their studies. But in many fields proper guidance is lacking, and research and library facilities are hardly sufficient. The urgent demand for teachers has made such arrangements impossible. They have begun to teach as soon as they received a degree and have become so overburdened with this work that serious study for their own improvement has been out of the question. On the other hand, some distinguished men of the older generation, who had served their country in various positions in foreign countries or at home, were appointed on the academic teaching staff. All these men fulfilled their duties with rare devotion to the cause and with full comprehension of their difficult task, but it is evident that the objections and doubts just mentioned must apply to them no less than to their academic colleagues.

This is not meant as a criticism. The difficulties were inevitable, the outcome of a given situation and the necessity to move rapidly and as efficiently as possible. What is noticeable and surprising is that so much has been achieved, not the fact that there are deficiencies. To suggest ways in which to remove these obstacles to progress is therefore the purpose of these remarks. Contact with Western institutions should be established on a broad and permanent basis. The wise policy of Reza Shah must be resumed and enlarged. While it may no longer be necessary to send young men abroad to study, or at least not in such large numbers, it will be indispensable to offer to graduates of the Teheran University the opportunity of completing their studies abroad. These young graduates should be thoroughly trained in their respective fields so that later they could occupy a chair at the university. However, it would

seem that for years to come it will be necessary to appeal to a certain number of foreign professors to work at the university, as has been the custom in the past. Such a close collaboration between Persians and foreigners will be all the more necessary since the educational system and methods will have to be readjusted to the trend of the time and orientated more to the Anglo-Saxon model. America will be called to play an important part in this development, and it is hoped that this country will offer the desirable facilities for welcoming Persians to its institutions and will make American professors available for service in Iran.

Not all oriental countries have made the best possible use of the services of western experts, administrators and professors to whom they have appealed. What is meant has been admirably expressed more than forty years ago by Professor Baelz,* who introduced modern medicine to Japan. In a speech he delivered at his twenty-five year jubilee before leaving Japan he pointed out that "erroneous conceptions about the origin and nature of Western science are widely prevalent. It is regarded as a machine which can turn out so much work every year, and therefore as a machine which can without further ado be transported from the West to any other part of the world there to continue its labour." He insisted that science is an organism which in order to thrive needs a particular climate and atmosphere. And then he gave this warning: "From all the lands of the West there have come to you teachers. . . . Often enough their mission has been misunderstood. They have been looked upon merely as purveyors of scientific fruit, whereas they really were, or wanted to be, the gardeners of science. Often you have expected them to hand over to you the finished 'product' of contemporary science, whereas their business was to sow the seeds out of which the tree of science could continue." He finished by asking for the remaining foreign teachers more freedom and more opportunity for independent work. His last words deserve to be quoted in full: "Let me urge you to keep in close touch with them in other fields besides that of their strictly educational work.

* Ervin Baelz, *Awakening of Japan: The Diary of a German Doctor*, tr. from the German, New York, Viking Press, 1932, p. 149.

You will never regret doing so. In that way you will learn more of the spirit of science. . . . You will gain glimpses into the workshop of the mind, that workshop from which issues what is talked about in the lecture theaters. The spirit of science is chary of her favours, makes large claims, demands from those who woo her all or nearly all their time throughout life."

These are wise words. Many of them could with equal justice be addressed to the West itself. For as we proceed on the path of science we, too, are likely to forget about the origin and nature of science and to look upon it as Baelz has described. It is, however, particularly significant that Baelz emphasizes the value and the function of the human contact between professor and student, quite apart from and beyond the professorial relationship. This advice has certainly not been followed by Iran in the past. The shah discouraged in principle any contact between his subjects (particularly his functionaries) and foreigners. While the motives which inspired this attitude are not difficult to guess, the harm done or the gain lost by this policy is especially regrettable in the field of education. All those who want Iran to join the West constructively must wish that a broader-minded spirit will emerge in the future.

In 1944 a Persian mission headed by A. Hekmat, former minister of education, visited India with the purpose of strengthening the cultural relations with India, particularly with Indian universities. The Nizam of Hyderabad, the first of the Indian princes, seems to be an enthusiastic supporter of the idea, while among the universities that of Allahabad takes a special interest. The exchange of scholars is planned such as exists between India and China. Here is an evolution everybody who believes in the revival of Asiatic civilizations will heartily welcome. The contacts between the higher institutions of learning of the various Asiatic countries ought to be organized on a large scale. Communicating to one another experiences and projects, stimulating common interests and research programs, exchanging professors and students are sound and solid bases for mutual comprehension and appreciation.

The new Asia could not find a more fertile ground to grow in than this kind of collaboration. The University of Teheran could become the natural place of interchange between the universities of the Near East (Cairo and Alexandria, Beirut and Jerusalem, Ankara and Constantinople) on one hand and those of India and China on the other.

The emancipation of women is in more than one respect the landmark of Iran's social transformation. It signifies the end of the patriarchal family and the introduction of a new and promising element into the cultural and economic life, until recently exclusively reserved to men. As for the family, the man has ceased to be the sovereign overlord that he was in former times. While a man is not prohibited by legislation from marrying the four wives conceded to him in the Koran, he is now under the obligation to obtain the consent of his first wife before he can conclude a second marriage. He must also inform the prospective wife of the existence of others. If he contravenes this law, he incurs imprisonment. In fact, it has become more and more the rule for the future wife to protect herself against a second wife by a pertinent clause in the marriage contract. Just as effective as legislation, if not more so, is the social discrimination against polygamy, which had set in among the better classes before the reign of Reza Shah.

The same is true of a specifically Shiite institution, the temporary marriage, called *mut'a*. According to this custom a man may marry a woman for any length of time. The marriage contract containing the intended duration of the marriage and the indemnity to be paid to the woman must be concluded before a mollah. The *mut'a* was, of course, in many cases (for instance in the places of pilgrimage, where it provided the pilgrim with a wife for the time of his stay) nothing but a concealed form of prostitution with the very remarkable and humane difference that the woman's interests were protected. In other cases, particularly when the marriage was concluded for 99 years, it meant a lifetime union and equaled in this respect a legal marriage, though the position of a *sigh* was not the same as that of a legitimate wife. This institu-

tion, too, is falling rapidly into desuetude, at least among the better classes, and the necessity for official registration worked toward the same result.

At the same time, legislation has granted to a wife the right of divorce and of inheritance, and, though in neither respect does she enjoy quite the same facilities as the man, she cannot be said in principle to be any longer the man's inferior. Furthermore there is legislation against child marriage. The damage caused by marriage when the girl had not reached physical maturity—damage to the mother and to the child—is now prevented by law, which forbids the marrying of men under eighteen and of girls under sixteen. Here, too, other factors combine with the law to work for the better, for as long as the girls might be married while still in their childhood there was no incentive to give them any serious education. Now that education has become compulsory and the opportunities connected with it are practically the same for girls as for boys, the marriage age for girls is postponed by the nature of things.

The eagerness and adaptive skill with which the women of Iran, adults and girls, availed themselves of their new life and opportunities cannot be sufficiently emphasized. Girl Scouts walk through the streets without any sign of timidity, women find their way to the government offices as secretaries as if seclusion and the veil had never existed, and girl students take their places in the university beside the men with unaffected self-assertion. The time is not far off when there will be women doctors, some of them trained in Western countries, and women lawyers in Iran. These achievements accomplished in a comparatively short time and against a still powerful tradition can only be fully appreciated if we remember how much time and effort were needed to obtain equality for women in the West, where they had enjoyed social and moral freedom before their professional and political emancipation and had shared to a large extent the world of men.

In praising the progress achieved, one must, however, resist the temptation unduly to condemn the past. We in the West, who are facing the disintegration of home and family as a result of the social and economic trends, cannot be blind to the values treasured in the

patriarchal family of the East. The respect and reverence for both parents, particularly the loving reverence for the mother—virtues whose moral influence extends far beyond their immediate objective—will be undermined in Iran, as it is elsewhere, by modern education. Kindness to servants and formerly to slaves is another mark of the patriarchal family which was valuable in forming humane attitudes. The polygamic family has the socially important advantage that celibacy is almost unknown among both sexes; furthermore, adultery is infinitely less frequent than in the West and prostitution less widespread. In the West there have arisen new and serious problems that are all too well known. We are accustomed to look at our monogamic family, with its limited number of children, as the birthplace of the free individual. This is particularly true in the sense that the individual is, indeed, set free, that he becomes isolated and homeless, a monad so to speak which instinctively seeks shelter in professional, political, religious and other groups where he exists in parts, divided up in compartments instead of forming a whole. The assertion that our family is more efficient for developing personality is hardly borne out by facts, except, of course, with regard to women.

This disintegrating trend from below is matched by the other coming from above, from the centralistic policy of the late shah. In this respect more absolutistic than his predecessors, he could not conceive of any other way of creating an Iranian nation than by shattering all natural and traditional units and groups, convinced that they had to be sacrificed on the altar of the state. His deliberate policy of pulverizing the social body resulted from one and only one holy duty—to strengthen the nation—and for the nation he claimed the entire human individual, thus following the totalitarian ideal. Upon state and nation, represented by him and his dynasty, constant attention had to be focused. Not content with the dissolution of traditional groups, he tolerated only those created by the state—mostly economic organizations—and he had all meetings, social gatherings, and clubs closely watched by the police.

The social disintegration, while it removed the danger of any political opposition, constituted the indispensable condition for the

shah's economic policy, which reserved to the government the initiative, the organization, the administration, and the control of the national economy. Through monopolistic agricultural societies the state determines to a large extent the cultivation of crops, fixes the prices, and acts as buyer of the products. The state owns most of the industrial plants, provides the bazaar with the manufactured products at fixed prices, and regulates imports and exports; in so doing it dominates the market. The Persian merchant, once the economic backbone of Iran and a great human type, known in Asia and in Europe, has become a depository—a kind of indirect employee of the state. Deprived of his century-old independence and dignity, his fate is like that of the nobility and the clergy. Time-honored and autonomous groups grown in the native soil have given place to agglomerations of individuals organized by the will of the state and for its own purposes. Nothing could be less congenial to the Iranian mind, as it emerges from the past, than a life based on conditions depriving man of all not strictly utilitarian links. It is therefore difficult to believe that the Iranians, if left to themselves, will acquiesce in this state of things unless they are forced to do so by another despot of Reza Shah's strength—which is not likely—or by pressure from without—which, it must be hoped, will not develop.

Whatever will be the result of this revolution in Iran, it is clear that this period of uncertainty and transition cannot be favorable to great cultural achievements. That the old institutions disappear does not mean that the battle between the old and the new is decided exclusively in favor of the new. While it is certain that modern civilization is well on the way to being assimilated, it is too soon to predict how much and in what way this assimilation will be determined by the civilization of the past. It would be just as regrettable as it is unlikely for the Persian mind simply to abdicate before the Western forces instead of contributing its share in transforming creatively what it receives. Until a responsive and creative activity sets in on a large scale it would be unwise and unjust to expect an original cultural movement to evolve. This may not occur in the Iran of our day. Beginnings and preparations,

symptoms of the creations to come, and, above all, indications of the will to create are what we may hope to find. Indeed, such signs are not lacking.

It has been pointed out that with regard to cultural values the nineteenth century in Iran cannot simply be dismissed as a period of decadence and sterility. Remarkable efforts were made to merge constructively the old and the new, and creditable results were achieved. It is, perhaps, not too much to say that had fate granted to Iran a long period of undisturbed and peaceful evolution it would have led in the course of time to most interesting achievements. However, in history the transference from one civilization to another has hardly ever been made under favorable conditions. It is in the nature of things that the grafting process is caused by force, ranging from brutal military and political force to moral and intellectual constraint, working to the detriment of gradual and sound development. This is what happened in Iran. Neither the turmoil which characterized the last decades of the Kajar regime nor the dictatorship of Reza Shah offered the right conditions for slow ripening. During the former period the uninterrupted interference with Persian affairs by foreign powers created an anarchical situation in which more was destroyed than constructed. On the other hand, Reza Shah enforced the modernization of his country at a pace which though unavoidable could not be in harmony with the laws of evolution and assimilation. This must be remembered if we are going to review the intellectual and artistic situation of present-day Iran. It is fitting to begin with the arts, particularly literature.

Poetry, which was, at least in Islamic times, the classical expression of the Iranian mind, seems to have entered a new epoch. The younger poets are decidedly breaking with tradition, convinced that the example of the great poets of the past has outgrown its creative influence and has become more of an obstacle than an inspiration to poetical expression. Many younger poets are trying to find new forms and new topics. In prose the short story prevails. This form is particularly appropriate for introducing the new problems resulting from the clash between the past and the present. In

so doing they may well make the short story prepare the way for the novel, a form of literature which does not exist in Iran. For, of the two great subjects of the novel, the first (love between man and woman) could not, in view of the woman's status, become the object of literary description and analysis—except in lyrics—while the second (the social problem) did not present itself at all. It would not be surprising if some women writers would appear on the scene, as they have done in Turkey and India, to contribute their part to the literary effort. It will be long before we may expect to see Iranian plays and dramas. So far the passion play has been almost the only dramatic production, and, with its strictly prescribed action and characters, it cannot be considered in any way preparatory for a modern dramatic art. Until recently French literary works were practically the only ones to be translated, and even their number is not impressive nor was their choice guided by anything other than personal taste. Now that the pendulum is swinging toward the English speaking nations, the translation of English literature will rapidly compete with the French. A significant start has been made with the translation by A. Hekmat, the former minister of education, of several Shakespearean plays. A translation of Sir Percy Sykes's *History of Persia* is in preparation. M. Minovi translated "The Hound of Heaven." A *History of English Literature*, by L. Suratgar, is very timely. These works do not, of course, pretend to cover what has been done or is going to be done to bring the world of the English speaking people nearer to the people of Iran.

The philological work of the Iranian Academy is also worth mentioning. Following the example given by Turkey, the shah charged the academy with the task of eliminating from the Persian language all words of foreign, that is, particularly of Arabian origin. So a great process of purification is going on, which it must be hoped will not impoverish the Persian language. Since about 50 percent of the Persian language consists of Arabic words, their replacement by genuine Persian ones is not easy; indeed it is a very responsible task. The scholars entrusted with the work are reintroducing terms which have fallen into desuetude, particularly those

used by the classic authors, changing, if necessary, their meaning so as to adapt them to the new use.

With regard to painting, nothing has been produced within the last decades which could claim originality. What is done in the Academy of Fine Arts does not exceed the average academic style in painting or in sculpture. While the latter activity is new to Iran, the art of relief, one of the classic arts of Iran, was revived under Fath Ali Shah; it is now apparently neglected.

Music has at all times played a great part in Iranian life. The importance of music in the Sassanian period has been emphasized by Professor Christensen.* Miniature and literature demonstrate amply that in the Islamic era music was appreciated not only as an admirable pastime, accompanying almost all kinds of enjoyment, but an exquisite artistic performance resorted to for inspiration and consolation. The Academy of Music intends to introduce and to cultivate Western music and to transpose Iranian music into polyphony with the idea of evolving something that will do more than merely imitate the West. The interest in the folksongs, so richly developed, for instance, in the Caspian provinces, in Fars, and in Kurdistan, has been happily revived.

Architecture has had and now has a wide field in Iran. Reza Shah's plans to practically rebuild his capital and his industrialization program placed every kind of task before the architect. It is, however, natural that Western models had to be copied. Iranian influence is to be seen only in some public buildings, such as the National Bank in Teheran, where the columns of Persepolis are imitated and wide use is made of Achaemenian motives for decoration. For the construction of the entrance to the Archaeological Museum and for that to the medical building at the new university the architect has resorted to ancient models.

As to intellectual life in the proper sense of the word, the production of books to stimulate it is on the way. For example, the late prime minister, Mohammed Ali Foroughi, one of the great statesmen and scholars of Iran, published in three volumes *Trends in Eu-*

* Arthur Christensen, "La Vie musicale dans la civilization des Sassanides," *Bulletin de l'Association française des Amis de l'Orient*, No. 20, 1936, p. 24.

ropean Philosophy, beginning with Descartes and bringing the subject up to date. Rashid, a mollah of the young generation, comprised his series of broadcasts on religious subjects in a book which gives proof of a broad-minded and universal approach. F. Reza's book on the new physics and the philosophy of nature, condensed from the work of Jeans and Eddington, enjoyed wide circulation, demonstrating the public's desire for modern knowledge. This interest is supported by numerous magazines and reviews. There is a popular science magazine, *The New Road*, mostly composed of translations from the *Reader's Digest*; there are also a review edited by former students of the teachers' college, cultivating literature and science, a technical review, and reviews published by the ministries of education, agriculture, and others. The best magazines of a general character are printed in London and India and supported by the British and Indian governments, such as *Ruz-gar i No*, printed in London, and *Tadj Mahal*, *Jahan-e-Azad*, and *Shapur*, printed in Delhi. The surprising number of newspapers which sprang up after the abdication of the old shah made it clear that long-suppressed intellectual energies had been released. This is noteworthy because the editors who did most of the writing themselves furnished the proof that the old Iranian spirit of criticism, independence of judgment, wit, and repartee is not dead. Teheran possesses three museums: the Royal Museum in the garden of the Gulistan palace, containing the crown jewels and art treasures of the Kajar period, the archaeological museum, and the ethnographical museum.

Intellectual and material backgrounds are changing simultaneously. Reza Shah started a big town planning and housing program, which has transformed the aspect of Teheran and is being extended to other towns. When Reza Shah became the ruler of Iran there were only one street which deserved the name in our Western sense of the term and one large square in the center of the city. Today Teheran is intersected by broad avenues and thoroughfares converging in several well-planned places and squares. On these arteries modern buildings are springing up, and north of the old

circumference of the town the new residential quarters, constructed in European style, are spreading over the desert ground.

So there is not much left of the oriental town. Even more than the mediaeval towns of Europe, the oriental town is a labyrinth of narrow and crooked streets and blind alleys, where no market place (represented in the Orient by the bazaar), as in the European towns, provides a sort of public meeting place. There was, indeed, no need for anything more, since carriages were unknown in Iran until late in the nineteenth century and all traffic and traveling was on foot or on pack and riding animals. The transformation, despite its inevitability and its hygienic value, is not without the disadvantages all too well known in the West.

Previously each family, with the exception of the poorest, occupied a house of its own, and this may still be the rule for the majority. The Persian house always has a courtyard and at least a few shrubs and flowers planted around a water tank. The wealthy have gardens that fill the largest part of the compound. The Persian house, made of mud bricks covered with plaster and surrounded by a veranda designed to keep out the sun in summer, is well separated from the world by walls that are interrupted only by a heavy door braced with huge iron nails. Now this noble privacy of the home, based on another concept of life and connected with the patriarchal idea no less than with the seclusion of women, is breaking down. Rising ground rents will cause the introduction of the apartment house, and the one-family house will be available for a wealthy minority only—the large garden for the happy few.

The European manner of dressing was made compulsory for men in 1928, after most of the better classes had adopted it, and the right of dressing in the traditional costume was reserved for the mollahs; even for them it was discouraged later. Women followed naturally in 1936, when the veil was discarded. These measures had far-reaching economic consequences. The European dress, particularly for women, is far more expensive than the traditional costume and presents for many households a serious problem. The rich,

even extravagant old Persian cuisine, with its surprising variety of luscious dishes, is disappearing rapidly for economic reasons, want of servants, and the impact of Western ways—all this is a sad contribution to the increasing monotony of life on the globe.

The population of Iran has become stable. Since the Arab conquest until the nineteenth century movements of parts of the population occurred frequently. Groups of tribesmen settled outside their tribal country. More important from the demographic point of view are the involuntary movements of population. The kings of Iran resorted at all times to the practice of transplanting groups of the people for various reasons. Shah Abbas I transferred Kurdish tribesmen to Khorasan for the defense of the frontier. Shah Abbas II transplanted parts of the Kajar tribes. The transportation of groups of Armenians to Isfahan by Abbas I was carried out because of an economic motive; he wanted them to contribute to the prosperity of his newly chosen capital by improving the crafts and increasing the trade. Another incentive caused Aga Mohammed Khan, the founder of the Kajar dynasty, to move parts of the Lakh tribes from the province of Fars to the north. Since the Lakh tribes had given birth to the Zand dynasty, which he had overthrown, his idea was to weaken the tribes by splitting them so as to render a future revolt impossible.

In the nineteenth century transplantations on a large scale came to an end. Reza Shah became the pacificator of the country. The only transfer of tribal population under his regime was the settling of some particularly rebellious groups of tribesmen, Lurs and Qashqais, outside their territories. Another and more peaceful measure was the bringing of people into the plain of Khuzistan to cultivate the newly irrigated land. The compulsory military service introduced by Reza Shah might be considered a temporary shifting of population. The shah liked to move men from distant regions to town garrisons and town people to remote parts of the country in order to teach men to know their country and each other. The main factor accounting for horizontal migration in modern countries, industrialization, has not played so far an important part in Persia. The industries are able to recruit their labor

from local sources. Even in Isfahan the villages immediately surroundings the city are amply sufficient to supply the necessary labor.

As late as 1939 the ministry of interior took the initiative in preparing a general census of the population. The results have only partly been released. For the total population of Persia we must therefore still return to the official estimation of 1935, which puts it at 15,055,000. The census of 1940 gave Iran 7 towns having more than 100,000 inhabitants, namely: Teheran, 540,000; Tabriz, 213,000; Isfahan, 204,000; Meshed, 176,000; Shiraz, 129,000; Resht, 121,000; and Hamadan, 104,000. There are six towns with fifty thousand to one hundred thousand inhabitants. We may safely say that not more than 20 percent of the population live in places deserving the name "town." The census shows that except in some of the large towns there has been no (or at most only a slight) increase over the estimated population of 1934-35, and there is no reason to believe that there has been any considerable increase in the population within the last decades, perhaps not even within the last hundred years. The birth rate has always been high, but so have infant mortality and deaths caused by infectious diseases. If there is such a thing as natural selection, Iran is certainly one of the regions on the globe where it should work with full force. The pertinent question is, of course, what effect will modernization have. Generally speaking, modernization must work both ways. The standard of living of the majority of the population can hardly be said to have improved within the last ten or fifteen years, since the steadily rising living costs and taxes have not been compensated by an adequate rise in wages and income. Probably this did not influence the propagation rate of the masses, for even a higher living standard could hardly encourage an increase in the already high birth rate. But among the middle and upper classes the increasing expenses connected with the change to the Western way of living could not but discourage the procreation of children. With the disappearance of polygamy, the large family, too, tends to become the exception. Since woman is now recognized as an individual, entitled to education and independence, she will refuse to be a

machine for the production of progeny as she has been for centuries. To what extent the change to monogamy has influenced and will influence the birth rate will remain an unanswered question, since the effect of the change cannot be isolated from that of the other factors comprised in "modernization."

If, therefore, modernization cannot be expected to increase the population directly, it will indirectly produce that result by lowering infant mortality and the death rate. Modern medicine and hygiene have gained a firm footing in Iran, and as time goes on they will succeed in eliminating some of the main causes which obstruct the growth of the population. Modern medicine, like modern schools, was brought to Iran by British and American church missions, which established the first hospitals in the thirties of the last century. The medical service of the British Telegraph Service (first line established in 1864) did much to improve conditions, just as did later the hospitals of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in its district. The superiority of Western medical science was openly recognized, since Mohammed Shah in 1842 availed himself of the services of a French doctor, Dr. Labat, as physician in ordinary. At the court of Nasr ed Din Shah were successively the French doctors Cloquet, Tholozan, Feuvrier, and Schneider and the Austrian doctor Pollak in attendance. Persian hospitals were established in the seventies of the last century, even before Persians were sent to Western countries for their medical education. In the era of Reza Shah hospitals were created in all towns of any importance. The larger towns are amply provided with physicians—Teheran even too well to be always to the advantage of the standard of the profession. The small town and particularly the village suffer from lack of medical care. This is all the more regrettable, since in Persia the rural population is unusually large in comparison with that of the towns. It is difficult to see how this situation could be improved, for the town offers so many natural and professional advantages and attractions to the young doctor. It may, however, not be out of place to call attention to the system adopted by the government of Iraq, which faces the same problem. In Iraq the young doctor is obliged to practice for a certain time

in the country or among the tribes before being authorized to choose the place of his future activity. He receives a good salary during this period.

Under the supervision of the faculty of medicine in Teheran, nurses are trained and children's welfare centers and maternity clinics are being spread throughout the country. There, as in the hospitals and dispensaries, treatment is free for the needy. At the Pasteur Institute in Teheran, founded in 1923 under French direction, vaccines and serums are prepared for the fighting of smallpox, typhoid, and other diseases. The struggle against malaria, particularly in the Caspian provinces, has obtained remarkable results. Less satisfactory seem to be the results of the treatment of the venereal diseases, a real scourge in Iran, especially in the larger towns. It is feared that as a consequence of compulsory military service the infection is spreading to the villages too, in spite of the treatment. For it has been stated that infected soldiers, having not reported to the physician or having left the service not entirely cured, are spreading the infection in regions that until now have been untouched. Probably this applies chiefly to tribal country. The damage done cannot be overestimated; it is all the worse because the tribal country suffers from the lack of medical care.

As to the tribes, nothing is known about the effect the enforced settlement may have had on their physical and moral state. Here is a problem of importance which deserves close attention. The tribes suffered heavy losses in lives, property, and immaterial values when Reza Shah began the campaign which ended with their disarmament and settlement. Of all this not much is known. For the census of the population, as well as for all demographic problems the ignorance which so far prevails concerning all tribal questions outside the military circles, is a serious handicap.

In every field of medicine a good start has been made, and compared with the conditions that existed some twenty or thirty years ago the progress is enormous, but so is the task which lies ahead with regard to the improvement of medical equipment as well as of the standard of the doctors themselves. For the medical profession, because of the tremendous accumulation of discoveries

and experiences, permanent contact with the West is more indispensable than in any other field of knowledge. The judgment of Doctor H. A. Lichtwardt who has had long experience in pioneer medical work in Iran, is in this respect more encouraging than critical. He says: "The Government Medical School in Teheran is improving constantly, and although it would still be rated as a Class 'C' school by our [American] standards, it is turning out some very fine men." * Nobody with sound judgment can fail to recognize the specific obstacles which public health authorities in Iran have to overcome. Dependence upon foreign countries for practically all equipment and drugs, the great distances separating the various settlements from one another, the prejudice and superstition which, though steadily diminishing, are still hampering the work are some of the difficulties. As far as the struggle against prejudice is concerned, the shah was the first pioneer. When it had been decided to create the new university, the shah ordered the dissection hall to be built first and put into use, delivering by this act a crushing blow to the clergy, since the Islamic law forbids the dissection of the human body. Anyone who is tempted to wonder at or to scoff at this prejudice must be reminded of the difficulties dissection had to face in Europe in the eighteenth century and should be advised to read the play *Anatomists*, by James Bridie. In Iran the will of one man broke the bias that seemed unsurmountable, and he was followed unhesitatingly by the majority of the educated people.

One of the constant preoccupations of the Public Health Department, a branch of the Ministry of the Interior, is to enlighten the people concerning the necessity for hygiene and ways to conform with its elementary requirements. The work of the centers and dispensaries is supported by medical school inspections, lectures, and newspaper articles. It must, however, be emphasized that hygiene is based not only on knowledge and good will. One of its first conditions is a certain standard of living, which is so far beyond the reach of the vast majority of the population. Hygiene is costlier than indifference; it requires time, money, and attention.

* "Western Medicine in Iran," *The Moslem World*, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, p. 236.

This is particularly true in Iran where sanitation leaves much to be desired and even money and time cannot buy what the Westerner considers the elements of public hygiene. The water supply is the great problem in a country where water is almost everywhere scarce. Since pipes are unknown, water from the mountains or wells is conducted through channels that are open or only partly covered and therefore liable to any use or misuse. There are old and ingenious methods of purifying the water collected in the tanks of the houses, but these processes are long, and whether or not they are effective, the water in most cases and for most purposes is used without treatment. Sewerage is unknown even in the capital. The reasons why nothing has been done to secure clean water supply and a sewerage system are technical difficulties and the costs involved. Finding in the mountains sufficient water to supply Teheran, collecting it, and preserving it are serious problems to say nothing of conducting and distributing it to all parts of the town. On the other hand, it may be argued that money could not be spent for a better purpose. For it is obvious that as long as these unsatisfactory sanitary conditions prevail prevention of diseases resulting from filth, such as typhoid and eye and skin diseases, is impossible, and their treatment is difficult even with the best medical care. However, if our impatience or intolerance stems from the desire to see deficiencies removed, it is legitimate; if it is merely the outgrowth of unqualified criticism, it is highly unjustified, since it overlooks the progress achieved in less than twenty years.

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

NOBODY who travels on the Persian plateau, across the endless stretches of barren land, can fail to wonder how the country feeds its fifteen million inhabitants. The villages at the foot of the hills, those nestled in the rifts of the mountains, their flat-roofed mud huts almost invisible from a little distance, and even the majority of the settlements in the plain cannot solve the problem. A few trees surrounded like the scanty vegetable gardens by a protecting enclosure, a bit of tilled soil, a few sheep and goats, whose sustenance, too, seems a riddle, and some chickens compose the usual picture of the Persian village; in some parts of the country, as in the arid area around Kerman and in the zones approaching the formidable deserts, even this would appear paradise. We must turn to the poorest parts of Southern Italy and the Balkans to find similar living conditions among Western peasantry.

However, Iran is an agricultural country, and despite the beginnings of industrialization it will remain so. That the country can nourish its population and that in good years there is even a small surplus of agricultural products for export is due partly to its fertile regions, but even more to the extreme frugality of its working class. A lump of cheese, the pieces of which are eaten wrapped in flat bread, some onions, cucumbers, or grapes, and perhaps a hard-boiled egg and kurd comprise the regular diet of the working class. A bread prepared from acorns is known, particularly among the tribesmen of some mountainous regions. Meat and even rice are rare treats among the poor.

The small landowner is in the minority in Iran. About two-thirds of the land is occupied by large estates, the crown land included. There the share of the tenant farmer is determined by old traditional custom, whereby land, water, cow, seed, and peasant participate on equal terms in the produce of the land. While the

peasant would benefit for his toil only by one-fifth of the produce, four-fifths would go to the owner to pay for the rent of the land and the few heads of cattle, for the upkeep of the irrigation channels and the purveying of the seed. However, this system is far from being rigorously applied. In most cases the cow is the property of the peasant, and the seed, too, may be free, so that the revenue of the owner is limited to two-fifths. Usually an agreement is worked out between the owner and the village headman, depending largely upon the fertility of the land and the costs of irrigation. The old and complex methods of taxation were replaced in 1944 by a simple land revenue tax. The government has started to register all the land. So far about two-fifths are registered.

Of the main agricultural products for food consumption wheat, barley, and Indian corn are the most widely grown grains, rice comes chiefly from Gilan and Mazanderan on the Caspian, and almost all Western vegetables are represented and some others unknown in our countries. Iran is also a land of fruits, probably the homeland of most of the species found in our countries. Some of them could easily be grafted and so improved in quality. But the peaches of Tabriz and Meshed are famous; so are the melons of Isfahan and Kashan, the pears of Natanz, and other fruits. Of the many varieties of grapes, the best are grown in the Shiraz region. Great tea plantations lie near Lahijan, some thirty miles east of Resht. Three kinds of tobacco are grown—for the waterpipe, which is still in favor among the majority of the people, for cigarettes, and for cigars. The production of opium has been discouraged, and so has the smoking of opium. It is just as difficult to form an opinion as to whether the use of the drug has decreased as it is to get exact figures concerning the quantity produced.

Of plants used for industrial purposes cotton is grown extensively throughout the country and raw silk is produced in Gilan, Khorasan, and other regions. Vegetable gums, such as gum tragacanth, asafoetida, henna, indigo, madder (*rubia tinctorum*), used for dye stuffs, and oak bark for tanning are important articles. The virgin forests of Gilan and Mazanderan provide excellent timber of various kinds, such as walnut, ash, oak, maple, elm, and

poplar, and in these provinces a very interesting wood architecture has developed.

The breeding of cattle, horses, donkeys, and camels is developed mostly in tribal country. The Caspian Sea is rich in fishes of all kind; the sturgeon is of particular importance. In the rivers flowing into the Caspian there are salmon, pike-perch, carp, and other varieties. Less interesting, but still important enough as a fish reservoir, is the Persian Gulf.

Iran is a paradise for the hunter. In the mountain ranges the ibex is plentiful, in the plains the antelope, in the jungles of the Caspian regions panthers, bears, wolves, and deer of various kinds; the wild boar is frequent, even the tiger is still to be found. The lion, formerly existing in the South, the heraldic animal of Iran, has been extinct for about fifty years. Birds are abundant—the pheasant, the woodcock, the partridge, and waterfowl such as ducks, geese, and snipes.

Most Persian vegetable and animal products could be considerably increased in quantity and improved in quality to the great benefit of a higher living standard of the masses and to the advantage of Iran's export trade. There are several ways to achieve this highly desirable aim, in fact, one which must be the foremost preoccupation of the government. First, the land under cultivation should be improved and new land should be opened up. Irrigation is here the all-important factor, compared with which fertilization is of but minor concern.

Lack of important rivers (only one, the Karun, is navigable) and scarcity of rainfall, except in the Caspian provinces, have made irrigation a necessity since the oldest times. The ingenious system of qanats, underground tunnels constructed to bring water over long distances to towns, villages, and fields, is still in use. Iran produces enough foodstuffs to nourish her population. However, an increase of production by irrigation would be highly desirable for three reasons: first, to raise the standard of living; second, to enlarge the production of the industries based on agriculture; and third, to allow for increased exportation of agricultural and industrial products. The former shah gave much attention to the prob-

lem of irrigation. On the other hand, it must be maintained that it would have been to the best interests of the country if part of the huge sums spent for other purposes had been diverted to agriculture and to irrigation.*

As to irrigation methods strict attention should be paid to qanats, the subterranean channels. In many regions where there is no surface water the qanat system is the only means of irrigation. The construction of qanats is a technique still generally practiced, familiar to the peasant, and a part of his traditional surroundings—therefore of moral and psychological importance. The qanats present the inestimable advantages that little water can be lost through evaporation and that water cannot be stolen. Wherever qanats exist, they should be repaired and improved, and new ones should be constructed. The digging of wells is made much easier by modern machinery, while the construction of the qanat itself may be left to native workmen.

Secondly, the use of pumps could be increased considerably. Fuel oil presents no problem in Iran. The road system, which even before the war was steadily improving, is undergoing an unexpected development as a result of the war, and this has facilitated the distribution of oil.

Thirdly, many of the rivers, particularly those of the inner plateau, are oozing away into swamps or salt lakes, or are drying up. So the Zaindeh Rud, which irrigates the plain of Isfahan, ends in the Gaukhana swamp; the Kur River, in the province of Fars, discharges its water into a salt lake, as do the Kara-su, near Qum, and many others. By harnessing some of these rivers much land could be won at comparatively little cost.

Three regions seem to be of primary importance for new settlements as a result of irrigation: Khuzistan, the country between Ahwaz and Behbahan, and the plain of Gorgan in northeastern Persia. The difficulty which impedes the realization of a great irrigation scheme in Khuzistan is not technical, but financial. To this must be added the objection which Lord Curzon raised in his time and which has hardly lost its importance. Lord Curzon feared that

* For achievements and projects in the field of irrigation see Appendix A.

irrigation constructions might endanger or even render impossible the navigation of the Karun River. A similar argument might, perhaps, be raised, though with less emphasis, against the project of linking the Zaindeh Rud with the Karun, namely, that the loss of water suffered by the Karun might be detrimental lower in its course.

The plain of Behbahan and the whole plain between Ahwaz and Behbahan, which was once green land, would be ideal for large settlements if properly irrigated. The plain of Gorgan could certainly nourish a larger population than it now does if the potential of the Atrak and the Gorgan rivers were fully utilized. As to the problem of transferring settlers from other regions to newly irrigated areas, it must be kept in mind that such transplantations have occurred frequently in the history of Persia. However, such transfers used to be confined to tribal populations—at least in peace time. Today the tribes have become sedentary, and it is doubtful if under normal conditions sufficient numbers of settlers could be obtained from them. Also, the problem of acclimatization could not be neglected; not every mountain tribe can stand the climate of Khuzistan. Iran is a sparsely populated country, and nowhere is there a surplus of inhabitants. Under these conditions it will be found difficult to form settlements of considerable size. The only way of populating new cultivable areas would seem to be to transplant inhabitants from impoverished and sterile regions and settle them under government guidance and control.

Another means of increasing agricultural production is the raising of the professional standard of all those who as administrators, as owners, and as agricultural laborers are concerned with the land. Much has been done in this direction. In Karaj near Teheran is the great agricultural and veterinary school. There the officers of the ministry of agriculture are trained for their future duties as heads of the local branches to supervise and to direct the work in the various regions. It must be doubted whether the great landowners are profiting by the opportunities offered to ameliorate the conditions on their estates. In any case the peasant remains practically outside this educational system and is touched only insofar as the

local officer may advise him as to the kind of crops to be cultivated. Since only a trifling minority of free peasants will have the opportunity of attending an agricultural school, it will be necessary to bring the school to the peasants. The extension of compulsory primary education may do much if it is of a strictly vocational character. In rural areas the elementary schools should have a school farm where theoretical and practical knowledge work together and technical methods for improving farming and the village crafts are taught. The experiences of the British with their system of rural education in Palestine and the methods applied there will prove illuminating. In Palestine use has been made of the small traveling cinema, "peripatetic" teachers are employed to live with the tribes, and particular attention is given to the training of the village teacher and the wandering teacher.

There is good reason to hope that for both these tasks, irrigation and education, the necessary means will be available in the future. The great Persian railway system, the Trans-Iranian and its side branches, is almost finished, expenses for the army will be considerably less than they were under Reza Shah, and a large part of the huge sums thus saved could and should be spent for agricultural improvements. A noteworthy start has been made with the foundation of the Agricultural Bank. Considerable credit has been distributed among the farmers. But since regulations limit the granting of credits to registered land and only about two-fifths of the land is registered, much remains to be done.

Eventually the amount of land occupied by the large estates in Iran may suggest an agrarian reform. It must, however, be recognized that conditions are not now ripe for such a measure. If proof were needed, the experiences in Khuzistan have amply demonstrated that the Iranian peasant is not capable of working under new conditions requiring increased personal responsibility and technical understanding and skill. This is certainly no fault of his, for his fine moral and intellectual qualities are appreciated by all observers. The reasons are beyond his control and are partly connected with the difficulties of irrigation. The construction of qanats and their maintenance are so expensive that no peasant could han-

dle the problem without financial help, and the distribution of the water, everywhere, because of contention and rivalry, needs constant supervision and arbitration. Introducing new methods of farming and new agricultural machinery is beyond the peasants' intellectual and financial capacity; moreover, the small area of the average village land does not permit the use of modern machinery on a large scale. Under these circumstances the large estate is still an indispensable form of land cultivation. Agricultural education and the creation of co-operatives on large irrigated lands must work together to change the present status of landed property.

All these improvements will raise not only the material welfare but also the moral, intellectual, and social standards of the peasantry. Better hygienic conditions will diminish the high infant mortality rate, and, as everywhere, a sound and enlightened peasantry will become a natural guarantee of prosperity and stability. Nevertheless, one must keep in mind that the extension of agriculture in Iran has limits, which are determined by the nature of the country; even modern science and techniques will not be able to overcome all the obstacles. It has been estimated that about two-thirds of the land is unfit for cultivation.

The fever of industrialization has seized all countries. The economic motive is far from being the only motive, in many cases it is not even the leading one. There is an almost irresistible trend toward autarchy, with its political implications; furthermore, there is a belief that industrialization constitutes the condition and the proof of progress and that the lack of industry betrays infallibly a country's backwardness. Cases are not rare in which these political and psychological ideas or prejudices have prevailed over sound economic reasoning. Such erroneous thinking has not controlled industrialization in Iran. Although noneconomic motives certainly played their part when the shah took the decisive step to industrialize, the general plan of the industrialization takes good account of the possibilities and the needs of the country.

Beside the economic and the technical problems connected with industrialization in Iran, it is beginning to produce its social effect, the rise of an industrial proletariat. The danger of depopulation

of the countryside resulting from the absorption by industry of rural labor does not yet exist, nor is it likely to occur for some time to come. But the situation of the industrial proletariat itself presents a well-known problem quite different from that of the agricultural proletariat. In Iran the situation of the latter is today, as in the past, far from being satisfactory. However, the patriarchal relationship between the landowner and the tenants is more personal and better qualified to alleviate the hardships of the peasants. It retains by the nature of things a certain human element which is lacking in the relationship between the industrialist and his workers. Besides, seen from a purely matter of fact viewpoint, agricultural labor is difficult to organize for political and economic purposes and therefore does not easily become a factor of social unrest. The industrial proletariat, massed in the towns and occupied with the handling of the delicate industrial machinery, possesses very different means of defending its interests. True, in most of the industries, particularly those owned by the government, care has been taken to provide hygienic conditions and good housing for the workmen. But a number of the private industrialists seem to favor ruthless exploitation of their labor. As an answer to this a labor union has been formed—an organization which in the time of Reza Shah was, of course, impossible—and with a rapidly increasing membership it begins to counteract abuses effectively. So with the rising conflict between capital and labor Iran is going to be drawn deeper and deeper into the conflicts of modern life.

Because of the agricultural character of the country the most important industries are those that process vegetable and animal products. Sugar is produced by numerous beet-sugar factories. Since sugar is one of the commodities extensively consumed, only about one-third of the total can be produced by home factories. Refineries for vegetable oils and perfumes and soap are steadily improving the quality of their products. There are factories for the drying of fruits and tea. The center for the canning of fruit and vegetables is Meshed, but in 1942 work was started on a new canning factory in Mazanderan. The canning of caviar and fish is no longer monopolized by Pahlavi, on the shore of the Caspian Sea, for a new plant

has been opened at Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf. The products of the canning industry should become in peace time very interesting articles of exportation to neighboring countries. In Teheran is the greatest plant for the manufacture of pipe-tobacco, cigarettes, and cigars. It remains to be seen whether the hope of the shah to make Persian cigarettes articles of exportation can be realized. Breweries have been founded by Europeans. The making of good wine—introduced by Armenians—has progressed greatly, together with the increase of distilleries.

Textile plants have sprung up throughout the country, and since they are continuing the work in a field wherein Iran has excelled in the past, they have every chance of producing articles of ever-increasing good quality and taste. The largest cotton mill is at Shahi, in Mazanderan, the private property of Reza Shāh. Other important mills are in Tabriz, Yezd, Isfahan, Shiraz, Kerman, and other towns. Silk fabrics and jute mills are to be found in Mazanderan and Gilan. The factory in Chaluz produces about one million yards of silk per year. Wool is used in plants in Tabriz, Isfahan, and Yezd, but Khorasan is the leading region for the manufacture of woolen goods. In the fabrication of carpets and rugs the artistic genius of Iran has found admirable and peculiar expression. The Western countries, particularly America, are the chief market to-day. Design, color, and size have been adapted to foreign taste, and this influence, impairing tradition and discouraging creative invention, has not been for the good of the art.

There is not much to be said concerning the mining industry. The mineral deposits are not yet sufficiently prospected to permit an exact idea of the country's mineral wealth. Deposits of many ores—gold, silver, copper, nickel, iron, zinc, antimony, chrome, and others—exist in various regions. Mining for copper is going on in Anarak; as a result of the rising price of copper the copper refining factory increased its output considerably during the last years; copper is also mined in Sabzavar and Zanjan. Manganese is mined in Robatkarim, near Teheran, sulfur at Semnan, ironoxyde at Hormuz, nickel at Anarak, and coal at Shamshak, Galanderud, near Isfahan, and elsewhere.

pating by its dimensions future production. Cement factories have sprung up in many places. In Teheran a plant for the manufacture of glass of all kinds was completed before the war. In connection with the needs of the army, munition plants were built and a plant for the repair and assembling of airplanes was installed under British management. It stands to reason that in Iran, as everywhere, manufactured goods are going to displace the products of hand craftsmanship. The loss of the aesthetic values of spontaneous creation, the loss of the human values inherent in the independent craftsman, the social loss of such an original and stabilizing institution as the craft guild is in Iran, as in our civilization, the price that has to be paid for industrialization. There is no need to describe in detail the working of this all-too-well-known process.

It may not be out of place to illustrate how simple and ingenious techniques are being displaced by modern machinery—all the more so since our example concerns a commodity as indispensable and popular in Iran as in this country, the ice. Iran is the home of the sherbet (fruit-syrup with water) and of water ice and ice cream which are prepared with various kinds of fruits; there are also ices with pounded fruits. The traditional way of producing the ice for freezing such commodities is this: near a spring or a river an excavation is made several feet deep, but having a much larger diameter, and a high wall is constructed around it of sun-dried bricks for protection against the sun's rays. When the nights are beginning to be cold, it is filled with a few inches of water. A deep well is dug nearby, well covered and protected against the sun. Every morning when the water is frozen, the ice is carried to the well, and the excavation is again filled with fresh water. This process goes on during the cold period. The stored ice can be used throughout the warm season. When mountains are not far away, ice is brought down from the mountains during the night and stored in the same way. So nearly everywhere ice is to be had all the year round. In the large towns the freezing machine is now replacing the old method.

Oil not only occupies an outstanding place in the economy and the budget of the country, it also determines to a large extent the position of Iran in international politics. It is not Iran that ex-

exploits and administers the oil fields, but Great Britain under an Iranian concession.

What Mephistopheles says of blood, that "it is a most peculiar fluid," applies to oil too. In some ways the great oil discovery in Iran at the beginning of this century may be compared in importance and consequences to that of gold in America in the nineteenth century. But oil's revolutionary power is infinitely superior to that of gold. Whereas gold functions chiefly as money, oil, originally a modest article used for primitive illumination, became the mightiest agent of energy in our civilization. Besides this obvious difference in their economic roles and importance, there is another of a sociological character. The discovery of gold and its exploitation were for a long time a one-man job, so it could have gone on for any length of time. The first oil discoveries were, of course, equally due to individual chance and endurance. But unlike the discovery of gold, that of oil does not result in immediate wealth. More than rocker, pick, and pan is needed to get hold of the oil and make it usable. Complex machinery, pipe lines, oil tanks and refineries are indispensable, and even when the oil comes naturally to the surface, this is for industrial purposes only an indication that oil is present in larger quantities and that wells should be drilled. All this means that oil requires from the very beginning collective and organized effort, the collaboration of science, techniques, and capital, highly complex teamwork in the fields, collaboration for shipping the oil and for its distribution. Consequently oil has a more powerful and a more creative impact than has gold upon men and human relations.

The history of oil in the Persian region begins with the fire cult in Zoroastrian times. No doubt oil springs, which for some reason (lightning or self-ignition) were "eternally" burning were objects of worship even before Zarathustra. But it is obvious that Zoroastrianism, with its sun-representing fire cult, looked with particular awe on these fires, which had not been lighted by human hand and went on burning apparently without being nourished. Such natural fires existed in Baku and Damghan. In the center of the region of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, called Masjid-i-Sulaiman, the

mosque or temple of Solomon, was a fire temple whose remains are still to be seen. In Islamic times, if not earlier, the oil of Baku was used for lamp-illumination and was transported to all parts of the country.

The modern history of Iranian oil starts with the concession granted to D'Arcy in 1901 by the shah, a concession which conferred the monopoly to search for and to exploit oil in Iran, with the exception of the northern provinces. After years of effort which could hardly be called successful, the momentous turning point occurred. Sykes has condensed this dramatic period in the following words:

For a long time there was no success, and orders were on the point of being issued to close down the work when a "gusher" of oil was struck and saved the situation. Much credit is due to the early pioneers who not only suffered from a very trying climate without proper houses and food, but had also to endure patiently the truculent insolence of the tribesmen. The Bakhtiari put many difficulties in the way of pioneer operations, and, notwithstanding that they were receiving a handsome subsidy to provide protection for the Europeans, treated all complaints with indifference. The manager was repeatedly threatened by his Bakhtiari guard; and not until a small escort of Indian troupes appeared on the scene, and the Bakhtiari chiefs were subsidized by further payments in cash and shares, was there any security for the British community.*

The oil of Masjid-i-Sulaiman was discovered in 1908, but commercial production could not start until the summer of 1911, when the first pipe line from Masjid-i-Sulaiman to Abadan was completed. Some decades ago a barren high country which the Bakhtiari tribesmen traversed with their flocks on their yearly migrations from the plain to the highland and back again, it is today the site of a modern industrial settlement extending over an area of about two hundred square miles and having a population of more than forty thousand souls.

The oil † is found at a depth varying from one thousand to five

* *A History of Persia*, 3d ed., London, 1930, II, 535.

† See J. W. Williamson, *In a Persian Oilfield*, 2d ed., London, Benn, 1930.

thousand feet below the surface. Once the presence of oil is detected by various scientific methods, the drilling of the wells begins. The oil that comes to the surface is crude oil, containing all sorts of admixtures which can be separated and used for many purposes. Above all, the crude oil contains large quantities of gas. Part of it is used on the spot for industrial and domestic needs. But the greater part is wasted, since there are no plants or towns nearby where it could be carried for consumption. So it is piped away to the hills and burned there. These huge continuously burning fires, like gigantic torches, can be seen from a great distance and are the distinctive marks and symbols of the region. The crude oil is taken to great tanks, and from there it runs through a pipe line over a distance of one hundred and thirty miles to the refineries at Abadan on the Persian Gulf. As the pipe line crosses two ridges seven hundred feet higher than the starting point before it reaches plain and desert, the oil must be driven through the pipe lines. This is achieved by four pumping stations.

Just as Abadan itself is almost a British town, so around the industrial machinery at Masjid-i-Sulaiman another British town has arisen with stone houses, gardens, clubs, and sports of all kinds. An extensive and exemplary public health service has been set up in Fields, as the town in the oil fields is called, in Ahwaz, and in Abadan. Medical service and hospital treatment are free for all down to the lowliest workman. Labor is recruited mostly from the Bakhtiari nomads, and a careful technique of education is necessary to accustom these people to regular work of this new kind. Good housing, better food, and medical care are co-operating to achieve this aim. The policy of the oil company being to increase steadily the number of Persians employed as workmen and craftsmen and in higher positions, as clerks, engineers, and administrators, the company is providing the means necessary for their education and training. The company has its own elementary schools, workshops, and workshop training schools in Fields, Ahwaz, and Abadan, where boys from the towns and from the tribe are prepared with remarkable success. No less than the royalties paid by

the company, these educational and medical facilities are valuable in contributing to the development of Iran.

To Reza Shah as to the Romans and the French roads were required for conquering and civilizing. The subjugation of the tribes depended upon pushing roads into country where nothing but tracks had existed. In order to open up Iran to modern influence he urged the construction of a road system throughout the country. He certainly was, if not the first, at least the greatest road builder in Iran. The Achaemenians constructed the so-called "royal road," about 1,500 miles long. Coming from Anatolia, it led into Mesopotamia, skirted the Tigris River, and then turned east to reach the residence of Susa. Whether this road, famous in antiquity, really was a road in our sense of the term, we do not know, since no trace of it is left. In any case, it could not have equaled the Roman roads, which have resisted time and of which some are still in use. The same uncertainty prevails regarding the roads of the Sassanian kings, who were known as builders of roads and bridges. In later times Shah Abbas I constructed a paved road through the Caspian provinces of Gilan and Mazanderan, still to be seen. But in a general way the kings of the Islamic period were content to improve communications and trade by building caravanserais and post houses where men and animals could find rest and protection and horses could be exchanged. Since wheeled vehicles were unknown, there was, indeed, no need for broad and well-built roads, and the tracks formed by horses, camels, and mules—many of them impassable in bad weather—remained unimproved. For traveling by means other than horseback or camelback there were two forms of accommodation. One was the *takht-e-ravan*, an enclosed litter like a palanquin, with door and windows, the inside made comfortable by carpets and pillows. It was borne by means of poles attached to the sides of two mules, one in front the other in the rear. The other accommodation, for common people, consisted of panniers, open or covered, balancing on both side of a horse or mule, used mostly for women and children. Wheeled vehicles were introduced from Russia as late as the middle of the nineteenth cen-

tury, and even in the seventies the only road outside Teheran was the one leading to the village district of Shemran, the site of the royal summer residences and the foreign legations—a favorite ride of Nasr ed Din Shah, in his carriage drawn by eight horses and preceded by runners in picturesque red costumes.

The first modern road was constructed at the end of the nineteenth century by the Russians under a concession from the Persian government; it ran from Enzeli, now Pahlavi, to Kasvin. Another Russian-made road of 1914 connected Meshed-i-Sar, an important port on the Caspian Sea, in Mazanderan, to Teheran. The first World War left Iran with two main routes fit for motor traffic, one from Teheran via Hamadan and Kermanshah to the border of Iraq, another from Teheran to Isfahan and Shiraz—both legacies from the foreign powers whose armies fought on Persian soil. When Reza Shah ascended the throne there were hardly two thousand miles of road in Iran. In 1938 the length of the road system had reached seventeen thousand miles. As did the first World War, the second World War will result for Iran in a considerable improvement in all her means of communication. A modern road has been constructed from Khorramshahr via Ahwaz to Andimashk; other roads all along the supply lines to Russia have been enlarged and improved.

Iran could have had railways at a much earlier date had it not been for the rivalry between Great Britain and Russia. As it was, the two powers tried to wrest from the Persian government a concession, if not a monopoly, for their projects, and the government, between two fires, thought it the best, certainly the least dangerous, policy to grant concessions to neither of the competitors. The main project proposed by the Russians was a line Tabriz-Teheran-Meshed, to link Tiflis and the Caucasus region with Russian Turkestan, obviously meant as a strategic movement to increase the pressure on Afghanistan and the Indian border and to seal at the same time the Russian influence on the most important part of Iran. The most interesting British plan envisaged a trans-Persian railway in the south which was to come from Iraq, then flank or pass through Bakhtiari country, touch Shiraz, and cross into British

Baluchistan. Such a line would have constituted the main link in the land connection between Egypt and the Near East, on the one hand, and India, on the other, an old British dream to see the Arab countries, Iran, and India united in one solid block under British influence. These grandiose projects did not materialize, and Iran had to content herself with a few embryonic lines, all (with one exception) at the periphery of the country and none of much importance. These lines were: (1) the 85 mile railway from Tabriz to the Russo-Iranian frontier at Julfa, with a side line branching off to Lake Rezayeh, built by a Russian company in 1916; (2) the line, 104 miles in length, from Mirjawah, on the Irano-Indian border, to Zahedan, constructed during the first World War by the Indian government, a continuation of the line coming from Quetta in British Baluchistan, planned as the first stretch of a trans-Persian railway (discontinued in 1931 by order of the shah); (3) a railway $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles long between Resht and Pirebazar; (4) within the territory of the British oil concessions, a railway 35 miles long, built in 1923; (5) a tiny railway constructed in 1892, covering the five miles between Teheran and Shah Abd ul Azim, one of the most visited places of pilgrimage in Iran.

Today there is the Trans-Iranian Railway, connecting the Persian Gulf with the Caspian Sea, and its far-flung branch lines which are now under construction. The Trans-Iranian itself is a most impressive railway because of the enormous technical difficulties engineering skill had to overcome and the variety of the scenery along its route. Started in 1928, it was completed in 1938. The total length of the line is 865 miles. The northern section from Bandarshah, on the Caspian, to Teheran covers a distance of 289 miles. The southern section ends at Bandarshapur, on the Persian Gulf. The port of Bandarshapur lies farther east than Abadan and Khorramshahr, the other two important ports on the Persian Gulf. The port is accessible to all seagoing vessels. From Bandarshapur, the Trans-Iranian passes for about seventy miles through the desert; then it crosses the Karun River on a steel bridge more than 3,000 feet long into Ahwaz, the capital of Khuzistan. In Ahwaz the Trans-Iranian is joined by another line, seventy-five miles long, which the British

constructed in 1942 to connect the Port of Khorramshahr on the Shatt al Arab with the Trans-Iranian. Leaving Ahwaz, the Trans-Iranian runs for one hundred miles through steppe country, passing the small village of Shush, the old Susa, capital of Elam and residence of the Achaemenian kings, one of the most important centers of excavation. At Andimashk, the former Salehabad, the train begins to penetrate into the mountains of Luristan, where the track had to be blasted out of the rock of steep canyons. Here it winds through one hundred and eighty-six tunnels and reaches its highest altitude—7,272 feet. Having arrived at the Iranian plateau, it passes through Araq, the former Sultanabad, and Qum, with its golden domes, one of the holy cities of Iran, into Teheran. From Teheran the railway turns eastward and crosses the Elburz Mountains at an altitude of 6,927 feet. Here, at the Firuzkuh pass is the largest tunnel, two miles in length. The descent to the plains of the Caspian offers the greatest obstacles. "Most of the grade is 2.8 per cent and in one location the track is badly snarled, with six bridges and four tunnels within a radius of less than 900 ft."* As the train descends the slopes, it plunges into the virgin forests of Mazanderan and after leaving the jungle reaches the fertile plains. Bandarshah, the northern terminal of the Trans-Iranian, is situated on the eastern shore of the Caspian in the Turkoman steppe. It is a port recently constructed, having a large jetty almost one mile long for the loading and unloading of steamers.

When the route of the Trans-Iranian first became known, it came as a surprise to many and as a disappointment to Great Britain and Russia. Even more it must have seemed to them that it had been planned in derision, since the interests and the projects of the great powers were to all appearances intentionally ignored. Neither was there any prospect of a railway running from west to east in the north of the country, between the Russian Caucasus and Russian Turkestan, or of a west-east line to the south, connecting Iraq and India, nor was another Russian idea taken up—the project of tracks coming diagonally

* Charles T. Warren, "Problems of the M.R.S. in Iran," *Railway Age*, July 22, 1944, p. 152.

slovakia, Sweden, and Germany. No less than three thousand bridges, most of them constructed of masonry, were necessary. The total cost is estimated at \$125,000,000, and it was decided to finance the railway entirely from the revenues of the tea and sugar monopoly. The railway will have three branch lines. One will connect Tabriz in the northwestern province of Azerbaijan with Meshed in the northeast, passing through Teheran. This branch is finished from Teheran to Mianeh in a westerly direction and from Teheran to Shahrud in an easterly direction. The significance of this line is obvious, since it links in a far-flung curve the northwest with the northeast, both regions as important in the economic life of the country as in its political history. Tabriz, the second largest town, has lost nothing of its importance, despite the fact that industrial centers have sprung up elsewhere, and Meshed, ranking fourth in size after Isfahan, dominates the whole eastern part of Iran. The Tabriz branch, connecting Iran with the Russian net, is therefore a direct contribution to the international railway system. The Meshed branch is of only domestic importance and will hardly be continued to join the Russian Trans-Caspian line. Another line will connect Teheran with the rich mining district of Anarak in central Iran; of this line, which will have a branch to Isfahan, the section from Teheran to Kashan is completed. In view of the fact that the lucrativeness of mining in Iran depends largely on communication facilities, the opening up of Anarak is particularly interesting. As to the Isfahan branch, it is in line with the growing importance of Isfahan as an industrial center, and from an ideological angle it is only consistent that this city, which is more representative of Iran than any other, should not be ignored. Teheran itself, connected with the three next largest towns, now becomes the junction of all major communication lines and thereby a real metropolis.

No doubt in due time the network will be completed by a line linking it with a branch to Khanikin on the Iraq border; if so, Teheran could be reached by train from Baghdad and Mosul and the direct London or Paris Teheran express would become a reality. Sooner or later the connection with India by way of Isfahan-Yezd-

Kerman-Zahedan or Meshed-Zahedan will follow, a line which would be particularly interesting for passenger travel.

When this great system is accomplished Iran may assume once again the role she has played so often, that of a crossroad—not a crossroad for migrations and invasions, of which she knows all too well the implications and vicissitudes, but a peaceful crossroad for the exchange of civilizations and their material goods.

It is another question whether the passenger and freight traffic in Iran is at present sufficient or will be in the future to make this far-flung railway system a paying business. In building the railway the shah certainly did not look at it as a profitable enterprise, nor are the branches now under construction to be considered so. It may well be that the construction and the maintenance of the entire system will weigh considerably on the budget.

The whole system of communication in Iran has been greatly improved in extent and in quality of service as a consequence of the war. When the German offensive in 1941 destroyed a large, if not the major, part of Russian industry, when the eastern Mediterranean and the entrance to the Black Sea were closed by the German occupation of Greece, and when the transports to the northern ports of Russia were constantly threatened by German submarines there was only one route left to supply Russia—the way around the Cape of Good Hope, into the Persian Gulf, and from there northward by land into Russia. These last eight hundred miles from the Persian Gulf to the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, over difficult terrain, desert, and mountains, presented enormous problems in engineering, since neither the ports nor the roads nor the railway were built to handle the shipping of materials of such great weight and in such large quantities. The docks of Khorramshahr had to be enlarged, a railroad of forty miles had to be constructed to bring the Iraq port of Basra nearer to the Trans-Iranian, two hundred miles of road twenty-four feet wide had to be built over the desert from Khorramshahr to Andimashk; the whole track of the Trans-Iranian had to be reconstructed so that it could carry the heavy load of trains and the American diesel locomotives. We need not emphasize the irony in the fact that the Trans-Iranian, laid out so

as to avoid the vicinity of British and Russian territory and interests, was destined to play a vital role in strengthening British and Russian power.

To open the supply route over which the materials, from tanks and planes to foodstuffs and drugs, flowed into Russia by road, railway, and air much preparatory work had to be done. The major part of it fell to the Americans. Contracts were made by the War Department with the firms Foley Brothers and Spencer, White and Prentice for the construction of wharves, docks, roads, and a rail line and with General Motors and Douglas Aircraft for truck and plane assembly plants. In 1943 the Persian Gulf Service Command created by the United States Army took over the work. The PGSC was dissolved in 1945, since the victories of the Allies opened shorter and easier ways to Russia. The Mediterranean being safe again after the liberation of Greece, goods could be shipped from England and America directly to the great Russian ports of the Black Sea, and the risks of navigation between England and the Arctic port of Murmansk had ceased to be serious.

But the Persian supply road will forever be remembered as an outstanding fact in the history of the war—outstanding as a technical achievement and as a decisive factor in winning the war. While the negative effects of the occupation of a free country are self-evident, this war will at least leave Iran with a remarkably improved communications system, including its rolling stock. Still more important is the fact of active co-operation. From the simple workman and craftsman to the technician and engineer Persians have collaborated for the common purpose with a zeal and skill that has received unanimous recognition. All this is in significant contrast to the situation of the country during and after the first World War, when Iran was nothing but a victim of international policy and a battlefield of hostile powers. Except for a few newly constructed roads, the only results of the war were disorganization and ruin. This time Iran has been an ally, not entirely by her own free will it is true, but recognized as such and having all rights and guarantees of the complete restoration of her sovereignty. Thus, Iran is drawn deeply into the intricacies of world affairs. This is,

after all, consistent with the policy of Reza Shah, who wanted his country to join the community of the Western nations. As things are now, this means a struggle for Iran—let us hope it will be a peaceful struggle—to find her place in the community of nations and to maintain it.

In 1927 the concession for a passenger and postal service was granted to the German company Junkers. Several lines within the country were regularly served, until in 1932 the concession was discontinued. Before this war the German Luft-Hansa Company maintained a service from Berlin via Teheran to Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, a two-day journey. Since 1935 the Persian government has operated a regular passenger service, with Persian pilots and planes, between Teheran and Baghdad. Reza Shah was especially anxious to promote military and civil aviation.

Modernization achieved within such a short time is a cruel and an expensive process. It is futile to discuss whether or not the hardships could have been ameliorated. Reza Shah was certainly relentless. His dictatorship differed radically in principle from the despotism of the classic Persian ruler in that whatever he did was intended not so much for his own pleasure and advantage as for the benefit of the nation as he conceived it. But despite this intention, or perhaps because of it, he demanded infinitely more of his subjects than had any of his predecessors, and he did not restore to them the equivalent of their losses and sacrifices. We may be convinced that this is the price the nation must pay for modernization and progress, but the fact that is of interest at present is that the people as such cannot be said to have benefited by the transformation. The organized omnipotence of the state which replaced the arbitrary individual despotism of the past, the wrecking of the structure of society, and the dispossession of the leading classes, the uprooting of tradition in every field made the individual homeless and created a social vacuum which modern education and the introduction of Western material civilization could not compensate even if both education and material improvement were not incomplete as they inevitably are in the first stage of evolution.

For the tremendous cost of modernization (the army, the rail-

way, the industrialization—to mention only the three main elements) the shah wanted to rely exclusively on the country's own resources. It is understandable that he shrank from the idea of foreign loans, but his method meant draining the country of its wealth. Iran is not a rich country, and taxation or domestic loans would never have amounted to more than part of the necessary funds. Under these circumstances the only way of financing the projects was to appropriate the main sources of income to the government, to create state monopolies. The system of state monopolies reached from the foreign trade monopoly introduced in 1931 to the commodities of daily life, such as rice, tea, sugar, salt, tobacco, and matches. Quite apart from its social and moral consequences, this system weighed heavily on the purses of the people. It was only one of the results of this policy of combining monopolies and industrialization that the prices of many articles now produced by domestic industries became considerably higher than they were when these articles had been imported. The mere fact that the Trans-Iranian could be financed by the revenue from the tea and sugar monopoly is sufficient proof. It can safely be assumed that the living standard of the working class sank below its previous level.

To predict the turn economic and social conditions will take in the future is impossible. Influences from without may work to strengthen the tendencies toward nationalization. If, however, Iran is left to herself, she will try to find her way back to forms of economic activity and a social structure more suitable to her mentality.

THE OUTLOOK

THE REIGN of Reza Shah was happily uneventful so far as foreign relations were concerned. Reza Shah's rise and success was conditioned and accompanied by the comparatively tranquil state of the world after the first World War. Russia was occupied with reconstruction and Germany had lost her position as a great power, and since the danger of Nazism was being wilfully ignored, the international situation before 1938, though far from being really peaceful, was at least distinguished by the absence of war. Iran was not immediately affected by the fluctuation of European politics. During all these years Iran, in her dealings with foreign countries, asserted effectively the rights springing from her regained independence. In denouncing the capitulations she threw off the last fetters chaining her to the past. In due course she extended her diplomatic relations and strengthened her situation by pacts of friendship and commercial agreements with various countries. In 1932 the Persian government annulled the concession of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company on the ground that the company had not lived up to its financial obligations. In the ensuing litigation, which was not without serious incidents, the Persian government won the case and the concession was renewed under conditions very favorable for Iran.

Having become a member of the League of Nations as early as 1919, she was elected a nonpermanent member of the Council of the League in 1937. In the same year a pact of nonaggression—called the Pact of Saadabad, named for the shah's palace near Teheran, where it was signed—between Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Afghanistan was concluded. The significance of this pact caused some speculation at the time. As a matter of fact, the pact did not change much the existing situation. The four countries were living in a state of perfect understanding and peace, and there was no reason

to fear an aggressive policy from any one of them. Even some unsettled border questions between Iran and Iraq and between Iran and Turkey—questions which would never have been permitted to lead to an armed conflict—had been settled before the conclusion of the pact. Under these circumstances it must be assumed that these countries wanted to assert solemnly the existing situation and to emphasize the solidarity of the partnership. Moreover, the contracting parties may have intended to demonstrate that they were united in the desire to live as nations in complete independence and particularly that each one would refuse to be used by foreign powers in any scheme which might harm the interests of the others.

The second World War found Iran in a precarious situation comparable to and yet different from its position in 1914. This time, as in 1914, Iran declared her strict neutrality at the beginning of hostilities, but she was in no position to have it respected by the great powers. During the preceding war Iran immediately became a battlefield. Russians, Turks, and Germans fought in the northwestern and western parts of the country—the Russians coming from the Caucasus and across the Caspian Sea, the others across the mountain ranges from Iraq, at that time a province of the Ottoman Empire. In southern Iran the German Consul, Wasmus, sometimes called the German Lawrence, created serious difficulties for the British by stirring up the tribes of the Persian Gulf regions. In 1918 the Germans were at Tiflis. In the same year British, Turks, and Bolsheviks ruled successively in Batum and Baku. Each of the hostile parties tried to draw Iran into the war on its side. On the soil of Iran there was no question of great armies fighting each other as in the Near East, Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. But a few thousand, even a few hundred, men could be decidedly important. At first there were the Persian Cossacks under the command of Russian officers in the north and in the south the Persian gendarmery, trained by Swedish officers, a force with strong pro-German tendencies. Later the British organized the South Persian Rifles. The official Persian army had little or no military value. The various tribes were always ready to join whatever forces promised more pay and looting. So the coun-

try, from the high officials down, was torn asunder and kept divided by pressure, bribery, and divergent sympathies.

At no time had there been a serious threat to India. True, two small groups of Germans, poorly equipped with arms and money, tried to make their way across Iran—one to persuade the Amir of Afghanistan to join the cause of Germany and Turkey, the other to foment trouble in India. Both efforts failed. The first group got as far as Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, but the Amir declared he could not break his treaty with the British before German troops were near enough to support him. Nearly all the members of this adventurous mission were captured on the way back, and so were the men of the other group, who did not even reach India. Not even after the collapse of Russia, when the gigantic front from the Baltic to Iran crumbled away, was there serious danger for India. For by 1917 Turkey was too weakened and her empire was too much of a battlefield to serve as a base for such a grandiose enterprise as the invasion of India.

Twenty-five years later, at the beginning of the second World War, the situation of Iran had undergone a radical change. Iran had developed into an independent country under Reza Shah. If Iran was theoretically free to make her own choice, her interests commanded her to align herself with the victorious side, steering a middle course by hiding her sympathies until the outcome could be judged with a fair amount of certainty. Iran's attitude was that of her ruler. Of a real public opinion there could hardly be any possibility. The masses of the people were not interested in problems of foreign policy, nor were they qualified to understand them. Among the educated, opinion was divided. France certainly enjoyed the sympathy of many, probably of more than merely the students who had been educated in France, while for the more politically minded Great Britain had undoubtedly recovered the traditional prestige she had forfeited some decades ago.

But the crucial problems concerned the Germans and the Russians. Germany's position in Iran had steadily grown stronger as Nazism became increasingly powerful. The Nazis combined economic penetration and political propaganda to gain a foothold in

the country, as they did elsewhere. Totalitarian economy permitted Nazi Germany to offer Iran trade facilities which the democracies could not afford to grant. In the industrialization of Iran, Germany moved into the first place, and more and more German engineers and experts were employed. In the foreign trade of Iran, Germany held by far the first place in 1319 (March 21, 1940–March 20, 1941) with a trade valued at rials 813,714,000—contrasted with Russia's rials 200,803,000 and the U.S.A.'s rials 196,641,000 (1 rial = 3.077 cents, U.S.A.). Every German sent to Iran could be trusted to be an active Nazi propagandist, and the economic expansion was accompanied by the usual propaganda apparatus. Visits such as that of Baldur von Schirach, the head of the Nazi Youth Movement, and of Dr. Schacht were not exceptional. The shah could not help being impressed by the financial and economic advantages offered by the Nazis and the courtesy and attention displayed by this great power, which to all appearances had no political interest in Iran. One of the shah's chief ideas was to turn for help and co-operation to countries which could not be suspected of political designs with regard to Iran, such as France and the smaller nations. Nazi Germany, a country combining power and apparent disinterestedness, was bound to seem a most welcome and useful partner—quite apart from the self-evident fact that to the shah the totalitarian idea of state and government appealed infinitely more than the democratic ideals. In his later years, as has been pointed out, German and Italian institutions and methods were taken as models—for example, the militarization of education and the establishment of an office for the direction of public opinion.

However, what must have attracted more than anything else the shah's sympathy for Nazi Germany was her fanatical hostility to Bolshevik Russia. If there was a central idea in Reza Shah's foreign policy, it was his dread of Bolshevism and of the spreading of Bolshevik propaganda in his country. In 1937 he had a group of people arrested, all of them belonging to the educated class (doctors, students, and so forth) under the indictment of having conspired to spread Communistic ideas. Whatever was the evidence, the court, being under pressure, had to find the defendants guilty,

and they were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment (from which they were released after the occupation by the Allies). There can be little doubt that the accusation lacked any serious basis and that their crime consisted merely in having read and discussed socialistic theories in regular meetings. The political police of the shah were constantly occupied with the tracing of Bolshevik propaganda and the search for suspect individuals. How justly the shah's fear was really founded is, of course, difficult to know. But one can well understand that Nazi Germany seemed to him a gift sent from heaven to alleviate his fear and that he was not interested in (probably because he was not sufficiently informed about) either the real nature of Nazism or its plans for world domination and enslavement. There is no doubt with whom his sympathies lay when Germany declared war on Russia.

For the Allies there was no choice. They had to occupy Iran for four major reasons. First, to insure a steady flow of supplies into Russia, since the route to the Persian Gulf, from there to the Caucasus, and then across the Caspian Sea was at that time the only one comparatively safe from German submarines. Secondly, the whole situation in the Near East and the Middle East called for rapid and radical action. Since the Germans were approaching the entrances to the Caucasus, the combined German and Italian forces threatened Egypt, and the possibility of the appearance of a Japanese fleet in the waters of the Persian Gulf was more than a product of fertile imagination, all defensive measures against this potential threefold onslaught had to be taken. These protective measures involved the oil, which was, indeed, the third reason why the occupation of Iran became inevitable. It is not too much to say that without the Persian oil the war could not have been won. The oilfields had to be defended against the possibility of attacks by enemy armies and navies, and at the same time against a foe inside Iran—the German agents, who were likely to try to damage the fields. If no such attempt was made, it was probably due to their protection by British and Persian troops. Yet there might have been another reason why the Germans refrained from any attempt against the oilfields—a reason which applies equally

to the much more vulnerable Trans-Iranian Railway. The Germans may have been so convinced of their early victory that they hesitated to destroy installations and constructions which would thereafter be of inestimable value to them. Finally, there was the activity of German agents on Persian soil. Even before 1939 their machinations, extending as far as Baluchistan, were well known to the British, but at that time it was difficult to counteract them without violating the sovereign rights of Iran.

Neither the policy of appeasement practiced by the democracies nor the collapse of France were likely to inspire the shah with confidence in the Allied cause, nor was the military situation of the Allies in the summer of 1941 such as to encourage him to throw in his lot with the Russians and the British, who requested him to expel the German agents from the country. So in August, 1941, the Allies marched onto Persian soil—the Russians occupied the northern provinces, the British the southern region. The shah abdicated. There was, indeed, no other way open to him. To yield submissively to the demands of the Allies and to bear the consequences of the occupation was incompatible with his nature and would have been a flat disavowal of his life work. Even if he had succeeded in prevailing upon himself to stay, conflicts between him and the occupying authorities were inevitable and would have led to the same end. Had he insisted on his right, the dynasty would have gone down with him, and this would have disturbed him more than his own fate. His fate was tragic and full of cruel irony. He relinquished the country to the same powers from which he had previously freed it—his mighty achievement he now saw annihilated. He could not foresee that this transitory occupation was a minor, in fact a trifling, evil compared with what would have been the fate of Iran in the hands of Germany and Japan.

Iran did not become a battlefield, as in the last war, nor was she expected to join in the military actions of the war. She was, however, obliged to co-operate with the Allies in every other way possible. In order to give full scope to this co-operation, in September, 1941, Iran declared war on Germany. As a consequence all Germans who had not succeeded in leaving the country were arrested

and taken either to Russia or to British India. To confirm and to define the new situation a Treaty of Alliance was concluded in Teheran on January 29, 1942, between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and Iran.* It is well to remember the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907. Then the two powers, although they divided Iran into two spheres of influence, mutually agreed "to the strict independence and integrity of Persia"—a unilateral act without a pledge to the nation concerned, which, in fact, became the mere object of arbitrary decisions. In contrast to this agreement, it is worth emphasizing that in the treaty of 1942 Iran appears on equal terms with the other contracting parties. For this reason—not to mention the change of general political conditions and the reference made in the Preamble to the Atlantic Charter—the pledge "to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Iran" carries real weight. Annex No. 1 added to the Treaty is of special interest, because it stresses this point and declares explicitly that this pledge applies equally to any peace conference or other general international conferences. The same form and spirit is to be found in the text of the Anglo-American-Russian statement on Iran, made in Teheran on December 1, 1944.† Here, too, the form of a unilateral document is abandoned; the statement begins as follows: "The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the USSR and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire . . ." "Maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran" is again emphasized. Iran is assured that her economic problems in the post-war period will receive full consideration "by conferences or international agencies." This declaration is of particular moment, for it states that even after the war no unilateral action with regard to Iran's economic interests will be taken.‡

Both diplomatic instruments, the treaty and the statement, stress

* For full text of the treaty see Appendix D.

† For full text of this statement see Appendix D.

‡ The Teheran statement was primarily the work of the Iranian minister of the court, now ambassador to the United States, Hussein Ala.

the special economic difficulties the war has caused for Iran and promise that every possible assistance will be given her to cope with them. Famine followed the occupation. Though the occupying troops were supposed to live on their own supplies, it could not be prevented that for a certain time they profited by what the country had to offer. This happened especially in the Russian zone, which contained the richest provinces of Iran and where there were more occupying troops than in the southern section occupied by the British. But the draining of the food supplies by the foreign armies was not the only, perhaps not even the main, reason for the shortage of food. There had been a bad harvest, and transportation was disrupted. In some regions there was sufficient wheat for distribution to less fortunate territories, but the trucks were seized for military needs. As always happens under such conditions, cornering of foodstuffs by irresponsible individuals made the disaster more serious. This dire food situation, together with the fact that imports had practically ceased as a result of the war, caused an enormous rise in prices. At the end of 1942 serious riots occurred in Teheran, which could only be quelled by military help. State bakeries were created, the Allies helped by supplying grain, and after the disorder accompanying the first period of the occupation subsided the situation steadily improved. Doctor Millspaugh who had been the American financial adviser to Iran from 1922 to 1927 and had handled successfully a very difficult situation, returned in the same function to Iran in 1943, this time with full power to make regulations having the force of law.*

Economic difficulties were not the only ones the government of the young shah had to face. There were other domestic problems, which were indirectly connected with the occupation. As a matter of fact, Great Britain and Russia refrained as far as possible from interfering with the administration and the life of the people. It has been acknowledged by the Apostolic Delegate to Iran that the Russians avoided any interference with the religious affairs of the country and that there was nowhere any atheistic propaganda. However, the appearance on Iranian soil of foreign troops caused a

* He left Iran in February, 1945.

deep repercussion on the inner situation of the country, inasmuch as it resulted in the resignation of Reza Shah. It is one of the fatal attributes inherent in dictatorship that it lacks the continuity which distinguishes hereditary monarchies and democracies. When it collapses, the pendulum has a natural tendency to swing back to the other extreme, to disorder and lawlessness. Symptoms of disorder became manifest throughout the country. The discipline of the army was relaxed, the tribes, in possession of arms which they had previously hidden or got from disbanded soldiers or by smuggling, began to show signs of unrest, and the safety of the roads suffered considerably; even Allied trucks were sometimes attacked. It may well be that the presence of foreign troops prevented more serious outbreaks. It needed the prestige and prudence of the late Mohammed Ali Foroughi who was wisely appointed prime minister by the young shah, and all the sound instincts of the majority of the Persian people to restore order.

Of deeper interest, because of a positive character, is the revival of intellectual activity which followed the end of the dictatorship. Under the rigorous censorship of Reza Shah's regime freedom of thought, of speech, and of the press had been suspended. Any discussion of political topics, let alone criticism of the government, was unthinkable—dangerous even in private circles. Now that the barriers had broken down the old Persian spirit emerged into the open. We mentioned above the issuing of a surprising number of new papers, most of them small, limited in circulation, and enjoying only ephemeral existence. Each expressed the opinion of one individual or a small group, and often enough the writer was both editor and publisher. It would be wrong to attribute this display of wit and intelligence merely to a psychological reaction of repressed energies. It was a characteristic sign of an awakening political interest. The topics are chiefly analysis and criticism of personalities in public life, past or present, and discussion of the social, economic, and political problems of the day. This is a sound and a promising symptom of the interest in and the will to an independent political life. Fundamental political, economic, and social problems have not yet been tackled; principles and methods have not

been elaborated; platforms which may serve as the basis for the formation of political parties are still to be established.

Some forty years ago, when the first Persian parliament was formed, such difficult problems did not arise. Though there were some extremists with vague revolutionary ideas, the traditional political and social frame was not questioned during the short life of the assembly. This was expressed by the composition of the assembly, which consisted of members of the upper strata. The character of the parliament as an upper- and middle-class chamber was safeguarded by the simple and well-justified regulation that illiteracy disqualified for membership. Under the regime of Reza Shah the majlis became a sham parliament, which neither represented the people nor exercised any real functions. Today the situation is entirely different. Reza Shah had destroyed the edifice of Persian society. The old respected, influential, and homogeneous classes belong to the past. The modern liberal professions are rapidly increasing in importance, literacy is steadily penetrating into the masses, and so society in Iran is on the way to becoming as unstratified as it is in our Western world. There have been no elections to the majlis since the abdication of Reza Shah, and probably there will be none as long as the abnormal conditions of the occupation prevail. But when the decisive moment arrives, government and people will face the task of organizing the nation so as clearly to express its will and adequately to represent its various interests. This is a formidable task in a country where the traditional structure of society has ceased to exist and for the first time the lower strata will have a word to say. In the whole history of Iran, as it was in Western history until the French Revolution, the people, in the narrower sense of the term, were but mute pawns of politics. Even if—as it must be expected—literacy is still required for voting, the steadily extending primary and adult education will bring a large number, if not the majority, of the common people to the ballot box.

The problems connected with this situation need no explanation. Comprehensive platforms must be worked out with clear programs embracing political, social, and economic issues. At pres-

ent only the Leftist, almost Communist group, called *Tudeh* (masses), deserves the name "party," but since it has sprung up within the war years, it is not represented in parliament. There are other groups of importance, though they lack the clear and comprehensive program and the efficient organization of the *Tudeh*, such as the *Mardom* (people), a middle party, headed by Mohammad Sadeq Tabatabai, the president of the parliament, consisting mainly of merchants and industrialists, and the *Melli* (nation), a conservative party of Zia ed Din Tabatabai, the latter outspokenly Anglophile and conservative. They are both represented in parliament. These two groups maintain branches in other towns, but their ramifications cannot be compared with those of the People's Party. All three groups possess newspapers. Another sociological trend which marked the end of the dictatorial period is the organization of professional groups—teachers, lawyers, engineers, and various industrial groups. There are even two women's organizations uniting women active in social work. These professional groups will certainly be called upon to play an important part in the political life of the future.

What will be the outcome of these beginnings it is impossible to predict. In fact, everything seems to be in a state of flux. It cannot be otherwise. Iran passed from a state of internal disorder and foreign intervention—which lasted about thirty years, from the death of Nasr ed Din until the rise of Reza Shah—into a twenty-year period of dictatorship. These last fifty years have not schooled the people for unbiased political thinking. Time will show whether Persian politicians are sufficiently prepared to face the new situation. In the meantime, it is a promising symptom that after the abdication of Reza Shah men of the younger generation appeared on the political scene who were willing to assume responsibilities and expected to be entrusted with influential positions. Their hopes were unfounded, and men of experience with well-known names assumed the leadership. As things were, this was, perhaps, the wiser decision. Wartime conditions require a particularly prudent handling of public affairs and do not permit experimentation. The aspirants to political power may benefit by this unwelcome leisure

to examine and to ripen their ideas in order to be prepared when the country returns to normal conditions.

The masses who will enter for the first time the orbit of political life present another great problem. There is nothing so far to organize them except the leftist *Tudeh* party. The other groups should rapidly get to work. It is difficult to form a clear idea of the psychological state of the masses in Iran, where the population is scattered over wide areas, having comparatively few great centers and inadequate means of communication. Although it is, perhaps, too soon to speak of the Persian masses as a psychologically homogeneous and coherent body, it would be imprudent to deny the possibilities of exploitation by adroit leaders. Such mass movements will always start in the larger towns where there are subversive elements enough to cause serious rioting. Because of the famine and the distress of recent years, discontent and despair must have driven thousands to listen to propagandists and to reinforce the troublemakers. All these elements have no doubt been absorbed by the *Tudeh* party in whose foundations and activities the staging skill of the Russians can be discerned. The organization of the industrial workers into labor unions seems to have made considerable progress. As to the attitude of the peasants, it is impossible to form an opinion. We must not ignore that under the Russian occupation the peasantry of the densely populated Caspian provinces is exposed to Russian influence, even if the Russians refrain from systematic propaganda. Not much is known about the situation, since the Russians seem to keep the Caspian provinces hermetically sealed against all foreigners.

A general observation may be added to these necessarily fragmentary comments. The break with traditions and the abrupt modernization under Reza Shah came as a shock to the masses. Unlike the cultured classes, who could understand the motives and aims back of the transformation and had the means of adjusting themselves to the new trend, the masses were simply overrun. It is easy enough to see that they will take shelter wherever it is offered, particularly if keen interest in their proper needs is shown. To ask what the Persian masses are and what they feel is probably futile.

They will be what circumstances make of them. Fate has not granted to Iran the benefit of steady evolution; modernization came to her like a sudden storm. In this respect the situation of the masses in Iran may be compared to that of the Russian masses at the moment of the Bolshevik Revolution. Though members of an old civilization and infinitely more individualistic than the Russian peasants, the Persian peasants as a class are emerging from a social and political vacuum. The role they may be called upon to play in the future depends upon the use which is made of formal education and other means of modern instruction such as the radio and motion pictures. It depends, above all, upon a wise social and economic policy and upon the organization of parties which will take in the masses not merely as tools but collaborators.

Persians are certainly individualists. All observers agree that this applies to the simple people no less than to the upper levels. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that with the collapse of traditional Iran a change in the national psychology may come to pass. The need of a reorientation makes itself felt everywhere. So far, the Persians have never been extremists. If left to themselves, they are likely to develop democracy within the frame of monarchy. So the future of Iran depends largely upon whether or not the country will be allowed to find its own way unhampered by foreign interference. Therefore, the domestic problem of Iran is tied up with her foreign relations and with the international situation in general.

After the collapse of Napoleon's fantastic plan of an Indian invasion, interest in Iran was monopolized by Great Britain and Russia. It was these two powers that created the Persian problem. Neither for Great Britain nor for Russia was Iran an aim in herself. She was merely a pawn in their struggle for supremacy in Asia. More than one hundred years of European and Asiatic history are to a large extent dominated by this conflict, which may well be called one of the great tragedies of human history. Not only to common sense but also to sound political judgment it would appear that the continent of Asia is large enough to permit the ambition and the lust for power of these two nations to coexist without

permanent friction and threat. However, Sadi seems to express the truth when he says: "Ten dervishes may sleep under one blanket, but on the surface of the earth is not room for two kings."

The parts assigned in this drama to Great Britain and Russia differed widely. To Great Britain, Asia was equivalent to India, and if she got interested in other Asiatic regions, it was because of India. To Russia, Asia meant at first Siberia, later it included the Middle East. When the Russians wrested from Iran the greater part of her Caucasian possessions, and when they began to conquer, in the second half of the last century, Central Asia, their occupation of Turkestan cost the Persians other territories. As a whole, Russia's potential sphere of interest and conquest in Asia was never clearly defined in her own mind, and it spread like oil on blotting paper, until neither geographical barriers nor political considerations could stop the advance. This insatiable hunger for more land is all the more astonishing since the czars did not succeed in developing even the economic resources of the European part of their empire. Rightly or wrongly, the British felt that the Russian expansion in Asia was a threat to India. True, there never was a serious move on the part of the Russians to justify such a fear. It may well be that the Russians themselves never intended an Indian invasion. In any case, they made good use of the British anxiety as a means of extorting concessions, as is demonstrated by the history of Anglo-Russian relations in Iran. It would, however, be erroneous to think of the Anglo-Russian relations as an uninterrupted chain of ill-feeling and hostility. Some of the czars, for example, Nicholas I and Alexander II, without doubt cherished pro-British sympathies and would have liked to come to terms with the British. Unfortunately, the basic interests of the two powers—or what they considered basic interests—thwarted all attempts to improve the situation. Nicholas I proposed the division of the Ottoman Empire as the basis for an agreement, a plan which the British could not accept. Sixty years later not even the fear of the rising power of Germany, which in 1907 inspired the Anglo-Russian agreement on Iran, was strong enough to prevent the Russians from acting against the letter and the intention of that agreement. True, Isvol-

sky, in his effort to strengthen the Entente with Great Britain, wanted to put the Russian policy in Iran on another footing, but the influence of the military clique, in co-operation with the Russian Embassy in Teheran, proved stronger than his. With the British Russophobia was certainly a reality—even a complex, but only when Disraeli's half romantic pro-Turkish policy was in effect and during the first ten or fifteen years of Bolshevism did Great Britain's attitude of political suspicion and fear become mixed with dislike and hatred.

The British felt that they pursued in Asia a conservative policy, wishing merely to preserve what they possessed, and that it was up to the Russians to make the concessions necessary for a settlement of the rivalry by limiting their boundless hunger for ever-expanding territory. This view, logically consistent it seemed, was not that of the Russians, who looked at the situation in a more realistic way. They certainly could not accuse the British of any act of aggression or of direct provocation, but to them the passive resistance the British opposed to their intended movements amounted practically to the same. As a matter of fact, the British barred the road to the Russians in three directions, in Afghanistan, in Turkey, and in Iran.

In order to understand the importance of these three areas for Great Britain and the pertinacity with which she guarded them, one must keep in mind that India, or to be more precise, the defense of India, began and begins at Gibraltar. The whole complex of land and sea between Gibraltar and India constitutes the immensely vulnerable glacis of India. Therefore, Great Britain cannot be disinterested in anything that occurs on the northern or southern shores of the Mediterranean, nor can she be indifferent to the colors which are flown on the Mediterranean itself. Hence, Great Britain's preoccupation in the Balkans—the Near East in the former and classic sense of the term when the Balkans constituted the European part of the Ottoman Empire. But the Suez Canal and the land routes to India had to be equally guarded, so the Near East in the more recent and current sense, comprising Egypt and the Asiatic lands of the former Ottoman Empire, had to be included in the defense of the India system. Finally, Iran and Afghanistan,

the immediate neighbors of India, completed the fortification belt.

Strange to say, Russian policy in Afghanistan and with regard to Afghanistan seems to have been less inflexible than in the other two areas, although Afghanistan dominates the access to the famous Khyber Pass, the traditional invasion road into India. Did the Russians never seriously plan an attack on India, or did they consider the British fortifications of the pass too mighty an obstacle? In any case, the treaty of 1907 implied the recognition of the predominance in Afghanistan of British interests and removed for the time being the danger of a Russian threat to India.

However, the area in which Russian and British interests centered and clashed before the first World War was Turkey. Here diametrically opposed interests and intentions met, and their incompatibility constitutes chiefly what is known as the Oriental Question during the nineteenth century. Czarist Russia suffered not only from a *Drang nach Osten*, a driving impulse toward the east, she was dominated by a still mightier impulse to the south, with Constantinople as the goal and symbol. It may even be said with but little exaggeration that she turned east only when and because the road to the south was barred to her by British policy. The well-known incentives for the Russian move southward are the mutual attraction between Russia and the southern Slavs of the Balkans, culminating in the ideals of Panslavism and Russian supremacy in the Balkans, the replacement by the orthodox cross of the crescent on the Hagia Sophia in Constantinople, symbolizing the renascence of the East Roman or Byzantine Empire, and the more practical desire to obtain the access to the warm waters of the Mediterranean. The condition for the realization of these aims was the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the division of the spoils among the great powers, the lion's share falling to Russia and Great Britain. In the various more or less noncommittal schemes discussed among the European capitals with regard to the distribution of the parts, Great Britain had, of course, to participate. But her interest and the real aim of her policy was to maintain Turkey as a bulwark barring to the Russians the road to the Mediterranean. The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire as a

consequence of its defeat in the first World War was contrary to the British interests and was compensated by the weakness of Bolshevik Russia, which prevented any imperialistic policy.

With regard to British and Russian interests the case of Iran presents a strict analogy to that of Turkey. Russia's plan of a drive into and through Iran, which they never lost sight of until the first World War, had two objectives: first, to cut the British lifeline to India on land, just as a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean would have threatened it on sea, and, secondly, to gain access to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. The British interest, on the contrary, as stated by Lord Curzon in 1911, was "a strong Persian Government. Even if you look at the matter from the narrow and selfish point of view, it is so." It was the old theory of Iran as a bulwark and buffer state. It was not only the weak and irresolute policy of Sir Edward Grey which rendered impracticable the realization of this ideal, circumstances stronger than human will and skill opposed it. Great Britain as a naval power was not in a position to build up a strong Iran under the very eyes of the Russians, nor could she hope in case of an armed conflict to build up her own power in Iran so as to offer serious opposition to the Russians who dominated the two large land bases and bridges to march into Iran across the Caucasus and from Turkestan. So the British policy in Iran, looked at as a whole, was before and even after the 1907 agreement, carefully to steer a middle course and to yield in critical situations enough so as to avoid the crucial test.

That a *modus vivendi* between the rival powers was found at all—unsatisfactory as it was—was due to the threat of German supremacy in Europe, which was already foreshadowing its implications in Asia. The construction by the Germans of the Baghdad railway, which was to link Berlin with the heart of the Near East and the Middle East, united Great Britain and Russia in protests and anxieties. The Potsdam agreement of 1910 was based on concessions made by the three powers concerned. Achieved after endless discussions and bargaining, it illustrated the almost unbearable tension which held the European nations spellbound in an atmosphere of suspicion and fear, ambition and envy, lust for power and

insidiousness. As for Great Britain and Russia, the tension between them did not sensibly diminish. It is open to doubt whether with all British indulgence a clash could have been avoided if the war had not compelled the two rivals to forget about their antagonism and to join their forces against the common enemy. In 1914, before the outbreak of the war, the Russians were planning to take over the customs in their zone in Iran, and this measure was believed to prepare for annexation. Had it come to that the British would have had to choose between two evils—either to resort to war or to accept the Russian action.

Anglo-Russian relations after the first World War resembled in many respects those prevailing before 1914. Again the British, at least some of her responsible statesmen, looked with utter suspicion upon Russia. The somewhat conciliatory intentions of Lloyd George were defeated by Lord Curzon. What Curzon particularly feared was the influence of Bolshevik propaganda in India. This was the same fear which had partially inspired the Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919. A situation of mutual distrust arose which did not change after Russia became a member of the League of Nations. The fear of a Communist world revolution continually fomented by Hitler's propaganda service and his peaceful protestations blinded England, and the Russian efforts to establish a system of collective security were frustrated. The British foreign policy was apparently based on the hope that the anticommunist mania of the Nazis would explode in a war against Russia and that, whatever its outcome, both antagonists would be so weakened as to cease to constitute a menace to the peace of the world. This delusive theory which fatally ignored the forces inherent in Nazism and the crooked ways of Hitler's policy, was at the bottom of the democracies' unwillingness to increase their armaments. It may even be said to have been invented in order to justify their own inertia.

As for Iran, her present situation with regard to Anglo-Russian relations must be appreciated with all its potentialities. The trend swings decidedly to the advantage of the Russians, perhaps even more so than before 1914. Russia is today stronger than ever. These

last war years have clearly demonstrated the importance of unbroken land continuity in warfare, having advantages which cannot be matched by airpower or possession of sea routes. The Persian railways recently constructed or under construction are within easy reach of Russia and connect the Caucasus region with Turkestan. Nothing has been done to further the realization of the old British project, construction of a railway connecting the Arab Near East with India. The strengthening of the Russian position in Iran by active propaganda or because the Bolshevik ideology may naturally attract the Persian masses has been discussed above. For the British there is not much to counterbalance the Russian superiority. There is certainly a favorable change in the British position in the Near East and the Middle East because the first step for the unification of the Arab states has been taken in Cairo, by the initiative of the British or at least with their consent and co-operation. This block is meant to compensate for the anticipated weakening of the British position in Egypt after the war and to constitute at the same time a barrier to any Russian advance in an area in which they have begun to show some interest. But the access to the Arab states will be exposed to the Russians, who have emerged from the war a Mediterranean power. Their dominating position in the Balkans will practically assure them free passage through the Dardanelles.

Russia, persistently demanding an unhampered outlet into the Mediterranean, viewed with dissatisfaction the decision of the International Conference in Montreux in 1936 which restored to Turkey the sovereignty over the straits and authorized the Turks to reconstruct the Dardanelles fortifications, conferring upon them the full control of the Dardanelles in any war in which they are belligerents. The importance to the Russians of a free outlet into the Mediterranean is obvious, for before this war half of Russian exports were shipped from the Black Sea ports through the Dardanelles. Their recent policy toward Turkey makes it clear that they will not accept the *status quo* and that they will not agree to anything less than the internationalization of the straits. The old Russian drive for an outlet to the warm oceans has reached

its goal. Russia can no longer complain that she is confined to the Arctic and barred from the great oceans. Before the war the Baltic Sea seemed to Russia not much better than an inland lake, since the straits between Denmark and Sweden, forming the outlet to the North Sea, were dominated by Germany. Access to the Pacific from Vladivostok lay within easy reach of the Japanese fleet. Once the German and Japanese land and sea power belong to the past, Russia will be guaranteed free passage into the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Will Russia, after such a momentous, even revolutionary, change in her maritime position continue to pursue the aims with regard to the Persian Gulf, considered by the British their inviolable sphere of interest? The desire to reach the Gulf could easily be understood when the Russians were nervously looking around for a road to warm waters and when in the period of Anglo-Russian rivalry they could hope to inflict a severe blow on the British if they succeeded—when even the impending possibility of such a move constituted, like the threat to India, an incomparable means of political pressure. Having attained an open door to three oceans and being allied with the British for war and peace, the Russians cannot be expected to object to the evacuation of the occupied provinces or to cling to their old objectives with regard to the gulf. The new railway system and the improved roads linking the gulf with Russia should suffice for Russian export and import trade, and port facilities in Khorramshahr would safeguard all their commercial interests.

In October and November, 1944, Russian demands for an oil concession in Iran and incidents connected with it caused some sensation and alarm. The Russians had been prospecting for oil before the war in northern Iran, particularly in Mazanderan. But it was the policy of Reza Shah to delay drilling as long as possible. After the occupation the Russians began to drill in the occupied zone, and they asked for other concessions in the Kavir region, south of the Elburz Mountains. They had good reason to do so. American and British oil concerns were harassing the Iranian government for concessions. At first the government was willing to grant the

demands, against considerable opposition, and the Russians, of course, pleaded for equal rights. Later the government revoked its decision. It may be that the argument prevailed that it was preferable not to grant any concessions under the abnormal conditions of the occupation, or perhaps the appearance on the scene of the Russians provoked a revision of the first decision—in any case, the Russians, who, it seems, were not immediately informed of the change in the cabinet's policy, held the anti-Russian members of Mohammed Said's cabinet responsible. Mass demonstrations in Tabriz, Teheran, and other towns followed, demanding the resignation of the cabinet. Quite naturally the staging of these expressions of public opinion was laid at the door of the Russians. This may have been correct. On the other hand, the Persian leaders of the *Tudeh* party may have acted without help and initiative from without. They could easily see that oil concessions would mean work for thousands, and they may have suspected that any anti-Soviet decision would be in the way of what they considered their interest. Meanwhile a bill was approved by parliament prohibiting the negotiating or signing of any agreement concerning oil concessions during the occupation and authorizing the government to deliberate exploitation of Persian oil. Thereupon Americans and British made representations in Moscow defending the Iranian government's right to refuse their demands. The Russians, in view of a clear situation, withdrew their complaints and abstained from further insistence.

This example should be a warning against rash judgment. Russian policy in Europe and in the Balkans and her interest in the countries of the Near East and the Middle East must be understood as legitimate for a great power which is definitely re-establishing its place on the globe and is anxious to secure its frontiers against aggression in the future. There may come a time when the building of a defense wall and the interest taken in the neighboring countries which is necessarily connected with it, will begin to assume another aspect and will merge into imperialistic expansion, causing interference with the domestic affairs of other nations. The future of Iran and of other nations depends upon the nature of the evolu-

tion of Russian policy and whether if imperialism does develop, the international peace organization will have the authority and the power to deal with the situation.

The atmosphere of Russia's relations with other nations is still charged with mutual misgivings. The policy of the czars and of the early Bolshevik regime did not inspire confidence. On the other hand, the great powers' almost unanimous attitude toward the new Russia, treating her as a pariah nation, their refusal to consider her urgent plea for a collective security system, America's isolationism, and Great Britain's attempt to play off Germany against Russia, and vice versa, and the double dealing of Germany herself with regard to Russia—all this could not but fill the Russians with deep suspicion. It would be false optimism to contend that the period of distrust belongs to past history. As it is, the Russians, as well as their Allies should remember that what is thought of any one nation by the other nations is bound to influence her attitude and actions in a positive and constructive or in a negative and destructive way. We should not think of the Russians as a given quantity, determined once for all, but as a living entity which may to some extent develop according to what we believe her to be. If the world continues to adhere to the old political dogma that the reward of confidence is treason and abuse and that distrust is the safest means of self-preservation, the new international organization will be as futile as the League of Nations was in the past.

There is no doubt that for a long time to come Russia's only concern will be to reconstruct and to develop her own country. This means that they may well abandon the expansionist policy of the czars and leave the Communist world revolution to chance. It is interesting to read the text of the treaty of a twenty-year defensive alliance between Russia and Great Britain, called the "Treaty of Alliance in the War against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe and of collaboration and mutual assistance thereafter concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland," signed in London, May 26, 1942. There it is stated in Part II, Article IV, 2: ". . . This article shall remain in force until the High contracting

Parties by mutual agreement shall recognize that it is superseded by the adoption of the proposals contemplated in Article III" (proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period). Article V declares: "They will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations."

If it is not too much to put our trust in such solemn assertions, the future of an independent Iran should be guaranteed. Iran will not receive the restoration of her territory and of her independence merely as a boon from the hands of the Allies. The history of Iran during the last forty years includes the story of her struggle for freedom and shows that her claim to unimpaired sovereignty is legitimate. Nobody will read without emotion and admiration the history of the revolution of 1905-6, which succeeded in wresting the constitution from the shah. If the fruits of this heroic effort did not ripen, it was not the fault of the people, but of foreign interference and the resulting domestic disintegration. Less than twenty years later Reza Shah reached the goal under more favorable conditions. Today Iran is definitely on the right path, and what she needs is independence, peace, and friendly co-operation with other nations. A free world guaranteed by the collaboration of peace-loving members would provide the atmosphere wherein a free Iran could prosper. Under such conditions her genius again will contribute lavishly to civilization, as it has done in the past.




TRIBESMEN FROM THE BAKHTIARI MOUNTAINS


Photographed by Ernest Beaumont Schoedsack




TURKOMAN TRIBESMEN



MASJID-I-SHAH AND MEIDAN, ISFAHAN




TOMB OF TOGHRUL, RAYY; SNOWCAPPED MOUNT
DEMAVEND IN THE BACKGROUND




RUINS OF RAGES, THE ANCIENT CAPITAL OF MEDIA, AND A
MODERN CEMENT FACTORY




A GARDEN IN THE OASIS OF TABBAS




MODERN PERSIAN CROWD



THE TRANS-IRANIAN RAILWAY CLIMBING THE
LAST STEEP ASCENT TO GADOOK



AN OLD VILLAGE ON THE CHALUS HIGHWAY, BETWEEN
TEHERAN AND KAZVIN, WITH A MIST OF POPLAR TREES
IN THE FOREGROUND



THE NATIONAL BANK OF IRAN, TEHERAN

Shabankareh.—The plain of Shabankareh (province of Fars) covers a surface of 80,000 ha. and includes more than forty large villages (more than 2,000 families). The peasants in this fertile plain are still using an old system of canalization, but large areas remain without irrigation. The water of the two rivers traversing the plain has now been dammed by a barrage yielding 8–10 cu.m. per second. The irrigation of about 15,000 ha. is thus provided for. The crops grown or to be grown are cereals of various kinds, cotton, cane sugar, palm trees, and oranges; cattle and horses are bred there. The man power in that region seems to be sufficient to exploit the new land.

Ravansar.—The fertile plain of Ravansar is situated northeast of Kermanshah. The plain is watered by the Kara-su River. A barrage has been constructed with a power of about 3 cu.m. per second. A system of canals which is partly finished will permit the irrigation of about 10,000 ha. No transfer of population is needed.

Semnan.—A dam has been constructed to collect the underground water for the needs of the town.

Behbahan.—A corporation has been formed by the Bank for Agriculture and the landowners to bring the water of the Marun River to Behbahan. A dam, a tunnel, and a few miles of canals are needed. More than half the work was accomplished in 1941. It is interesting that there existed an old dam and a tunnel which went deep into the rock; the dam was destroyed by an earthquake. New villages have been built in the region of Behbahan and Kuhgiluieh, and 130,000 trees have been planted. The settlers seem to have come mostly from the Luri tribes; they were brought in after the revolt of the Lurs had been crushed.

Khorasan.—The Agricultural Corporation of Khorasan, founded by the Bank for Agriculture, has begun to improve the lands belonging to the sanctuary of Imam Reza in Meshed. These lands, among them many of the most fertile of the province, had been under the ineffective administration of the officials of the sanctuary. The improvement concerns a great number of widespread villages and consists in the development of qanats.

SOME OF THE PROJECTS UNDER CONSIDERATION

Khorasan.—There are many projects being studied in the province, for example, the repair and improvement of the old dam near Torogh and Golestan.

Azerbaijan.—Construction of a dam across the Aras River has been proposed.

Teheran.—Construction of a tunnel from the Lar River to the Djar-djerud and from there to Teheran has been proposed, with the intention of using the difference of the level for hydro-electric power. The Lar valley is about 40 km. northeast of Teheran.

Luristan.—A project to bring the water of the Kalrud River to the town of Burudjerd has been under consideration.

Seistan.—Construction of two great reservoirs in Zabol.

Zaindeh and Karun rivers.—The plan conceived by Shah Tahmasp and Shah Abbas II, viz., to divert some of the water of the Karun at its source into the Zaindeh River seems to have been revived in another form. Whereas Shah Abbas tried to cut across the Kuhrang hills, the idea now is to achieve the communication by dams and tunneling. The purpose is to increase the water of the Zaindeh River that irrigates the plain of Isfahan and particularly to use the power for industrial aims.

It is obvious that the irrigation problem in Persia has just been tackled. Indeed, compared to what could be done, the achievements—important and promising as they are—cover little ground. A systematic irrigation scheme should make good use of all the possibilities. One should not think only—and, perhaps, not even chiefly—of constructions on a large scale. Quite apart from the expense involved, water conditions in Persia are not favorable to large-scale devices, and among those which are here reviewed few are above criticism with regard to practicability. Under the circumstances, traditional and less elaborate methods of irrigation demand due consideration.

B: THE FINANCIAL AND BUDGETARY SITUATION

The financial condition of Iran may best be illustrated by some remarks based on the reports of the National Bank of Iran. Though not a belligerent country, Iran is deeply affected by the impact of the war. Her foreign trade has been drastically reduced, and this reduction affects the volume of the domestic trade, half of which consists of imported products. The public revenues resulting from customs, transport taxes, and postal and telegraph taxes suffered similar reduction. For this reason the budgets of recent years had to avoid all disbursements except those which were absolutely indispensable. Even so, the budget for the year 1942/43 (to be more exact, from March 21, 1942, to March 20, 1943—corresponding to the Persian year 1321) could not be balanced, and the Government had to borrow from the National Bank. The following figures show the situation for the first ten months of the Persian years 1321 and 1322 (March 21, 1943, to March 20, 1944).

	1321	1322	<i>Difference</i>
	<i>(In thousands of rials)</i>		
Total receipts	3,959,245	5,398,668	1,439,433
Total payments	4,713,292	6,641,430	1,928,138

In both years the budget shows a deficit, which amounts to 19 percent of the total receipts in 1321 and to 23 percent in the following year.

The cost-of-living index (taking the index of 1935/36 as 100) rose to 339 at the beginning of 1942 and to 778 at the beginning of 1943, while the wholesale price index went up to 291 and 625 in the same periods. In the beginning of 1944 the cost-of-living index rose to 1085, representing an average rise of 39.5 percent for the past year, while the average rise was 129 percent in the previous year. The wholesale price index rose from 625 to 661 in 1943/44, or about 5.8 percent, while the rise in 1942/43 was not less than 115 percent. The main reasons for this improvement are the prospect of cessation of hostilities, abundant wheat and barley crops, consolidation of the monetary system of Iran, and the import and sale of gold.

The bank, in its report for the year 1322 (March 21, 1943, to March

20, 1944), has this to say on the monetary situation in connection with the rise of prices:

"During the last two and one-half years the note issue has increased considerably. The chief cause has been, of course, the increased expenditure of the Allies. However, it must be borne in mind that since according to the Act of November 19, 1942, the issue of notes must be backed by a reserve consisting of 60 percent in gold and 40 percent in sterling and/or dollars guaranteed against depression in terms of gold, the gold purchasing power of the rial is in fact stabilized. Moreover, the Central Bank cannot increase its issue for the purpose of making loans to the Government without having a 100 percent cover, as described above. Consequently, the application of the term 'inflation' to Iranian currency is not only incorrect but has also harmful psychological effects. 'Inflation' should be applied to a situation in which money loses its actual and potential purchasing power. The potential purchasing power of our currency remains undoubted, for the fact that the rial is not actually exchangeable against goods has nothing to do with its purchasing power, but is solely due to temporary obstacles and difficulties. After the war, when conditions return to normal, the surplus money will be available for the purchase of consumer goods and capital equipment and will thus appreciably help to expand the economy of the country."

The bank, though fully aware of the difficulties and shortcomings of the actual situation, sees definite signs of hope and prospects of improvement in facts such as the abundance of cereals and dried fruits, the improvement of the transportation system, and the reduction of speculation.

C: STATISTICS OF PRODUCTION

AGRICULTURAL AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS

Since the years after war began cannot be considered characteristic for the productive capacity of Iran, the year 1937 has been chosen as the test year. Included are the provinces, subprovinces, or regions which lead in the production of the various items, with their respective production figures.

TABLE I
THE MOST IMPORTANT SOIL- AND ANIMAL-PRODUCTS

CEREALS (IN TONS)			
<i>Product</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Region</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Wheat	1,942,254	Azerbaijan-East	343,540
Barley	732,900	Azerbaijan-East	169,500
Rice	382,052	Gilan	181,500
Leguminous plants	98,666	Isfahan	15,736
Citrus fruits	14,069	Fars	8,656
Dates	133,007	Khuzistan	61,655
Dried raisins	42,368	Khorasan	10,023
Almonds	11,545	Azerbaijan-East	5,670
Dried fruits	19,840	Teheran	7,700
Pistachios	668	Semnan	207
PLANTS USED FOR INDUSTRIAL PURPOSES			
Cotton am.	85,229	Khorasan	15,771
Cotton nat.	38,778	Isfahan	11,289
Cocoons	2,431	Gilan	2,090
Jute	3,836	Gilan	3,348
Sugar beets	174,547	Azerbaijan-East	50,200
OTHER PRODUCTS			
Tobacco	14,598	Gilan	4,250
Tea	928	Gilan	682
Castor oil	3,298	Khamzeh	1,300
Olives	5,698	Gilan	5,698
Gum tragacanth	2,583	Khorasan	1,037
ANIMAL PRODUCTS (IN TONS)			
Wool	17,554	Khorasan	5,567
Butter	16,075	Azerbaijan-East	3,579
Cheese	5,320	Mazanderan	1,242
Skins (pieces)	3,121,145	Khorasan	1,072,700
Guts (pieces)	3,066,846	Khorasan	893,900

STATISTICS OF PRODUCTION

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DOMESTIC ANIMALS (IN HEADS)

<i>Product</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Region</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Horses	305,328	Kermanshah	44,236
Asses	1,174,109	Khorasan	210,200
Mules	52,466	Isfahan	9,590
Oxen	1,508,126	Azerbaijan-East	370,016
Cows	1,406,024	Azerbaijan-East	419,889
Sheep	13,711,157	Khorasan	3,177,300
Goats	6,999,394	Khorasan	1,349,500

TABLE 2

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS IN 1942 (MARCH 21, 1942, TO MARCH 20, 1943
—THE IRANIAN YEAR BEGINS MARCH 21)

(In 1,000 rials; 1 dollar = 32.68 rials)

<i>Product</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>
Livestock	6	3,527
Beverages and food stuff	605,311	110,730
Raw materials	40,468	287,502
Manufactured goods	664,708	155,849
Precious metals	3,418	111
Total	1,313,911	557,719

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS BY CONTINENTS

<i>Continent</i>		
Asia	1,022,271	330,638
Europe	98,923	46,682
Africa	2,266	7,705
America	146,207	172,694
Oceania	44,244	.

IMPORTANT EXPORT ARTICLES IN METRIC TONS

<i>Product</i>	<i>1940</i>	<i>1941</i>
Carpets	2,764	2,657
Wool	11,658	7,217
Lamb and kid skins	3,703	2,271
Dried fruits	69,259	28,490
Silk cocoons	304	404

Comparison with the corresponding figures for the preceding year fiscal period (1941/42) shows the impact of the war on foreign trade: imports, 1,802,400 thousand rials; exports, 3,405,600 thousand rials.

"Iran's leading exports products are: oil (of which Iran is the world's fourth largest producer), hand-made rugs, cotton, hides and skins, wool, gums, opium and sausage casings. On the other hand, Iran depends upon imports for sugar, tea, cotton, and wool fabrics and cotton yarn, railroad equipment, machinery, iron and steel, automobiles, tyres and tubes, motorcycles and bicycles, paper and paper products, lubricating oils and greases, kerosene and cement.

"Trade between the United States and Iran has increased in recent years. Total trade between the two countries, according to United States data, amounted to Doll. 11,078,000 in 1929, and fell sharply during the depression years to a low of Doll. 3,846,000 in 1932. By 1938 total trade had risen to Doll. 12,364,000 but dropped again in 1939 to Doll. 8,800,000. It recovered in 1940, when it amounted to Doll. 15,113,000." "Trade Agreement between The United States and Iran," Signed April 8, 1943.

TABLE 3

IMPORTANT ARTICLES OF IMPORT AND EXPORT IN THE TRADE OF IRAN
WITH THE UNITED STATES IN 1942

(In rials; 1 dollar = 32.68 rials)

IMPORTS FROM THE U.S.A.

<i>Product</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Wheat, barley, other cereals and grains, and their flour	42,732,730
Juices	23,155,595
Mineral fuels, mineral oils, and bituminous substances; products of their distillation	15,584,888
Pharmaceutical and chemical products	7,569,092
Tires, inner tubes	17,825,399
Paper, cardboard, books	9,217,827
Pearls, precious metals, jewelry	2,433,420
Iron, cast iron, steel in rods, etc.	3,057,585
Products of iron, cast iron, and steel	6,503,225
Electric machines and equipment	3,415,546
Omnibuses, motor coaches, tire-pumps, and spare parts	2,899,709
Passenger cars	2,793,666
Chassis, trucks	1,831,764
Total	139,020,446

EXPORTS TO THE U.S.A.

Guts, bladders, etc. (dried) of sheep, cows and bulls, goats	24,394,389
Gum tragacanth, gums, resins, natural balsams and their juices and extracts	25,855,953

STATISTICS OF PRODUCTION

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EXPORTS TO THE U.S.A.

<i>Product</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Opium	44,431,815
Sheep and goat skins	5,113,317
Lamb skins	12,810,705
Skins for peltry (marten, fox, etc.)	4,245,791
Carpets and rugs	47,789,689
Total	<u>164,642,659</u>

OIL

The United States Bureau of Mines gives the following production figures for 1943 (in millions and tenths of millions of 42-gallon barrels): U.S., 1,503.2; Russia, 200.7; Venezuela, 177.6; Rumania, 36.5; Iran, 73.8.*

In 1938 the production of crude oil in Iran totaled 77,230,000 barrels, i.e., an average of more than 211,000 barrels daily, or about 4 percent of total world production. U.S. production in the same year was 1,213,254,000 barrels, or about 61 percent of total world production. In 1944 the average throughput of crude oil at Abadan † refinery was more than 284,000 barrels daily. In 1945 the average throughput at Abadan is expected to reach 350,000 barrels daily. Up to the end of 1944 the total throughput at Abadan was about 1,150,000,000 barrels.

* Quoted in 1945 *World Almanac*.

† The Abadan figures do not include the production from the Naft-i-Shah field, near Kermanshah. The production of this field is almost entirely consumed in Iran.

D: TWO DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENTS

TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE SOVIET UNION AND IRAN (WITH NOTES), TEHRAN, JANUARY 29, 1942

His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the one hand, and His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah of Iran, on the other;

Having in view the principles of the Atlantic Charter jointly agreed upon and announced to the world by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on the 14th August, 1941, and endorsed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 24th September, 1941, with which His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah declares his complete agreement and from which he wishes to benefit on an equal basis with other nations of the world; and

Being anxious to strengthen the bonds of friendship and mutual understanding between them; and

Considering that these objects will best be achieved by the conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance;

Having agreed to conclude a treaty for this purpose and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries;

His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
His Excellency Sir Reader William Bullard, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Iran.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency M. Andre Andreewich Smirnov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Iran.

His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah of Iran, His Excellency M. Ali Soheily, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1. His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter referred to as the Allied Powers) jointly and severally undertake to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Iran.

ARTICLE 2. An alliance is established between the Allied Powers on the one hand and His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah of Iran on the other.

ARTICLE 3. (i) The Allied Powers jointly and severally undertake to defend Iran by all means at their command from all aggression on the part of Germany or any other Power.

(ii) His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah undertakes—(a) to co-operate with the Allied Powers with all the means at his command and in every way possible, in order that they may be able to fulfil the above undertaking. The assistance of the Iranian forces shall, however, be limited to the maintenance of internal security on Iranian territory; (b) to secure to the Allied Powers, for the passage of troops or supplies from one Allied Power to the other or for other similar purposes, the unrestricted right to use, maintain, guard and, in case of military necessity, control in any way that they may require all means of communication throughout Iran, including railways, roads, rivers, aerodromes, ports, pipelines and telephone, telegraph and wireless installations; (c) to furnish all possible assistance and facilities in obtaining material and recruiting labour for the purpose of the maintenance and improvement of the means of communication referred to in paragraph (b); (d) to establish and maintain, in collaboration with the Allied Powers, such measures of censorship control as they may require for all the means of communication referred to in paragraph (b).

(iii) It is clearly understood that in the application of paragraph (ii) (b) (c) and (d) of the present article the Allied Powers will give full consideration to the essential needs of Iran.

ARTICLE 4. (i) The Allied Powers may maintain in Iranian territory land, sea and air forces in such number as they consider necessary. The location of such forces shall be decided in agreement with the Iranian Government so long as the strategic situation allows. All questions concerning the relations between the forces of the Allied Powers and the Iranian authorities shall be settled so far as possible in co-operation with the Iranian authorities in such a way as to safeguard the security of the said forces. It is understood that the presence of these forces on Iranian

territory does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations.

(ii) A separate agreement or agreements shall be concluded as soon as possible after the entry into force of the present Treaty regarding any financial obligations to be borne by the Allied Powers under the provisions of the present article and of paragraphs (ii) (*b*), (*c*) and (*d*) of Article 3 above in such matters as local purchases, the hiring of buildings and plant, the employment of labour, transport charges, &c. A special agreement shall be concluded between the Allied Governments and the Iranian Government defining the conditions for any transfers to the Iranian Government after the war of buildings and other improvements effected by the Allied Powers on Iranian territory. These agreements shall also settle the immunities to be enjoyed by the forces of the Allied Powers in Iran.

ARTICLE 5. The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier. The expression "associates" of Germany means all other Powers which have engaged or may in the future engage in hostilities against either of the Allied Powers.

ARTICLE 6. (i) The Allied Powers undertake in their relations with foreign countries not to adopt an attitude which is prejudicial to the territorial integrity, sovereignty or political independence of Iran, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty. They undertake to consult the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah in all matters affecting the direct interests of Iran.

(ii) His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah undertakes not to adopt in his relations with foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 7. The Allied Powers jointly undertake to use their best endeavours to safeguard the economic existence of the Iranian people against the privations and difficulties arising as a result of the present war. On the entry into force of the present Treaty, discussions shall be opened between the Government of Iran and the Governments of the

Allied Powers as to the best possible methods of carrying out the above undertaking.

ARTICLE 8. The provisions of the present Treaty are equally binding as bilateral obligations between His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah and each of the two other High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 9. The present Treaty shall come into force on signature and shall remain in force until the date fixed for the withdrawal of the forces of the Allied Powers from Iranian territory in accordance with Article 5.

In witness whereof, the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Teheran in triplicate in English, Russian and Persian, all being equally authentic, on the 29th day of January, 1942.

(L.S.) R. W. BULLARD.

(L.S.) A. A. SMIRNOV.

(L.S.) ALI SOHEILY.

ANNEX 1. *Identic Notes addressed to the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs by His Majesty's Minister and the Soviet Ambassador.* With reference to Article 6, paragraph (i), of the Treaty of Alliance signed to-day, I have the honour, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom/the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to assure Your Excellency that my Government interpret the provisions of this clause as being applicable to any peace conference or conferences held at the conclusion of the present war, or other general international conferences. Consequently they consider themselves bound not to approve anything at any such conference which is prejudicial to the territorial integrity, sovereignty or political independence of Iran, and not to discuss at any such conference anything affecting the direct interests of Iran without consultation with the Government of Iran.

His Majesty's Government/the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will further do their best to secure that Iran will be represented on a footing of equality in any peace negotiations directly affecting her interests.

ANNEX 2. *Identic Notes addressed to His Majesty's Minister and the Soviet Ambassador by the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs.* With reference to Article 6, paragraph (ii), of the Treaty of Alliance signed this day, I have the honour, on behalf of the Iranian Government, to assure Your Excellency that the Iranian Government would consider it contrary to their obligations under this clause to maintain diplomatic

relations with any State which is in diplomatic relations with neither of the Allied Powers.

ANNEX 3. *Identic Notes addressed to the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs by His Majesty's Minister and the Soviet Ambassador.* I have the honour, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom/the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to convey to Your Excellency the following assurances:—(1) With reference to Article 3 (ii) (a) of the Treaty of Alliance which has been signed to-day, the Allied Powers will not require of Iran the participation of her armed forces in any war or military operations against any Foreign Power or Powers. (2) With reference to Article 4 (ii), it is understood that there is no provision in the Treaty which requires that the Iranian Government shall bear the cost of any works which the Allied Powers carry out for their own military ends and which are not necessary for the needs of Iran. (3) It is understood that Annex 1 will remain in force even if the Treaty ceases to be valid, in accordance with the provisions of Article 9, before peace has been concluded.

AN ANGLO-AMERICAN-RUSSIAN STATEMENT CONCERNING IRAN
TEHERAN, IRAN, DEC. 1, 1943

The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the U.S.S.R., and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States of America, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union. The three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran and they agreed that they will continue to make available to the Iran Government such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States of America, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom are in accord

with the Government of Iran that any economic problem confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration along with those of other members of the United Nations by conferences or international agencies, held or created, to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States of America, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have continued to subscribe.

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